GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448: Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: fickling (PyPI) 0.1.9.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to fickling (PyPI) 0.1.9 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
# Assessment The missing pickle entrypoints `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7. # Original report ## Summary `fickling.always_check_safety()` does not hook all pickle entry points. `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled. ## Affected versions `<= 0.1.8` (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03) ## Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs No published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in `run_hook()`. Existing advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity. ## Root cause `run_hook()` patches only: - `pickle.load` - `pickle.Unpickler` - `_pickle.Unpickler` It does not patch: - `pickle.loads` - `_pickle.load` - `_pickle.loads` ## Reproduction (clean upstream) ```python import io, pickle, _pickle from unittest.mock import patch import fickling from fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError class Payload: def __reduce__(self): import subprocess return (subprocess.Popen, (['echo','BYPASS'],)) data = pickle.dumps(Payload()) fickling.always_check_safety() # Bypass path with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock: pickle.loads(data) print('bypass sink called?', popen_mock.called) # True # Control path is blocked with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock: try: pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data)) except UnsafeFileError: pass print('blocked sink called?', popen_mock.called) # False ``` Observed on vulnerable code: - `pickle.loads` executes payload - `pickle.load` is blocked ## Minimal patch diff ```diff --- a/fickling/hook.py +++ b/fickling/hook.py @@ def run_hook(): - pickle.load = loader.load + pickle.load = loader.load + _pickle.load = loader.load + pickle.loads = loader.loads + _pickle.loads = loader.loads ``` ## Validation after patch - `pickle.loads`, `_pickle.loads`, and `_pickle.load` all raise `UnsafeFileError` - sink not called in any path Regression tests added locally: - `test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loads` - `test_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loads` in `test/test_security_regressions_20260303.py` ## Impact High-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust `always_check_safety()` as global guard.
- Published
- Mar 4, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 4, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-693
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fickling | pkg:pypi/fickling |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fickling | before 0.1.9 | 0.1.9 |
Same product
PyPI: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8hfickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`0Monitor
- GHSA-r48f-3986-4f9cfickling modules linecache, difflib and gc are missing from the unsafe modules blocklist0Monitor
- GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xmFickling missing RCE-capable modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmrFeb 20, 2026 · Fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-mxhj-88fx-4pcvFeb 24, 2026 · Fickling: OBJ opcode call invisibility bypasses all safety checks0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-mhc9-48gj-9gp3Feb 25, 2026 · Fickling has safety check bypass via REDUCE+BUILD opcode sequence0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:fickling | 0.1.9 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-693 · Protection Mechanism FailureCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLsCAPEC-1likelihood: High · High
- Cross Site TracingCAPEC-107likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Directory IndexingCAPEC-127likelihood: High · Medium
- Using Malicious FilesCAPEC-17likelihood: High · Very High
- Encryption Brute ForcingCAPEC-20likelihood: Low · Low
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Escaping a Sandbox by Calling Code in Another LanguageCAPEC-237likelihood: Low · Very High
- Using Unpublished Interfaces or FunctionalityCAPEC-36likelihood: Medium · High
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.