Skip to content
Noroxi

Subdomain finder and takeover checker

Collects your subdomains from several passive sources (Certificate Transparency, passive DNS, home page), probes common names via DNS and lists them in one table: what each resolves to, which source found it, dangling records and takeover signals. Up to 150 names in the light scan (with or without an account); 300 in the deep scan (paid plans).

No account needed3 scans a day without an account10 an hour with a free accountSample results:

Scan depth · Light

Scan depth

  • Certificate logs, passive DNS, home page
  • Short wordlist, DNS only
  • No HTTP requests to found names

The domain you enter is really scanned: only public information is read (HTTP headers, the page and the scripts it loads, TLS handshake, DNS, certificate logs). The result is saved (the same domain isn’t rescanned within 10 minutes); 3 scans per day without an account, 10 per hour with a free account.

What it looks at

10 checks in 3 groups

Sources are passive: Certificate Transparency (crt.sh, Cert Spotter), passive DNS (RapidDNS), the home page HTML and the names on its certificate, the DNSSEC NSEC chain. Common names and permutations are probed via DNS only (no request reaches your server). Each name is resolved for its CNAME chain, A/AAAA, NS, MX and wildcard record; if a dangling target’s base domain is unregistered (RDAP), takeover is treated as confirmed. The domains of the external scripts, stylesheets and iframes the home page loads are extracted from the same body and checked against RDAP (no extra request). No port scanning. The registration check of provider-hosted names (one request) and the liveness probe run only in deep discovery (paid plans, with your authorization).

Discovery

  1. Subdomains foundNames visible from outside
  2. Names that resolve in DNSNames that resolve today
  3. Provider-hosted namesNames on providers like GitHub Pages or Heroku
  4. Zone listability (DNSSEC NSEC)Can the zone be walked through NSEC

Takeover

  1. Dangling CNAME recordsCNAME pointing to a target that does not resolve
  2. Takeover signalCan the target be registered again
  3. Subdomains delegated to a separate zone (NS)Delegation to abandoned name servers
  4. Domains of the resources the page loadsUnregistered domains the page loads from

Certificates

  1. Resolving names with an expired certificateNames that resolve with an expired certificate
  2. Wildcard certificate useCopies of a *.domain certificate

What does this test do?

A subdomain finder collects the subdomains of your domain from certificate transparency logs, passive DNS, the home page and dictionary lookups in DNS, and shows what each one resolves to and whether it is dangling. A record that still points at a deleted service (GitHub Pages, Heroku, cloud storage…) can let someone else publish content under your name: a subdomain takeover.

Sources and method

Sources are passive: Certificate Transparency (crt.sh, Cert Spotter), passive DNS (RapidDNS), the home page HTML and the names on its certificate, the DNSSEC NSEC chain. Common names and permutations are probed via DNS only (no request reaches your server). Each name is resolved for its CNAME chain, A/AAAA, NS, MX and wildcard record; if a dangling target’s base domain is unregistered (RDAP), takeover is treated as confirmed. The domains of the external scripts, stylesheets and iframes the home page loads are extracted from the same body and checked against RDAP (no extra request). No port scanning. The registration check of provider-hosted names (one request) and the liveness probe run only in deep discovery (paid plans, with your authorization).

What it checks and how to fix it

Every item the test looks at, why it matters and what to do if it is missing. The result screen lists only the gaps found on your site.

Discovery4 checks

Subdomains found

Every name visible from the outside is an entry point. The list should match your asset inventory; a name you don’t recognise may be a forgotten system or a certificate someone else issued.

How to fix it

Informational only. Investigate names you don’t recognise; remove DNS records of the ones no longer used.

Names that resolve in DNS

A name that resolves is a system reachable today; one that doesn’t only shows it once had a certificate.

How to fix it

Informational only. Every resolving name should have a known owner.

Provider-hosted names

Providers such as GitHub Pages, Heroku, S3 and Shopify resolve every name; when the name is not registered there, DNS does not show it — only the provider’s “no such site” page does. That is why a resolving CNAME counts as a candidate too.

How to fix it

Informational only. The registration check (one request to the provider) runs in deep discovery (paid plans, with your authorization); the result appears on the Domains page.

Zone listability (DNSSEC NSEC)

Plain NSEC in DNSSEC names the neighbouring record in every negative answer; walking the chain end to end lists every name in the zone (our discovery does exactly that). NSEC3 hashes the names and compact NSEC returns a synthetic neighbour: neither chain can be walked. The check does not apply to an unsigned zone.

How to fix it

Enable NSEC3 (without opt-out) or compact/minimal NSEC answers at your zone provider. Do not rely on the name list staying secret: certificate logs and passive DNS still see names; keep anything that must stay private out of public DNS.

Takeover4 checks

Dangling CNAME records

A CNAME pointing at a target that no longer resolves is the trace of a service that was shut down; if the provider lets the name be re-registered, someone else can publish content under your subdomain.

How to fix itExample: record to delete

Delete the CNAME if it is unused; recreate the target service if it is.

record to deletedns
eski-kampanya.alanadiniz.com.  CNAME  uygulama.sunucu-saglayici.example.

Takeover signal

If the dangling record’s target is a known hosting provider that lets names be re-registered (GitHub Pages, Heroku, S3, Azure, Elastic Beanstalk…) or the delegated DNS zone was deleted at the provider (Route 53, DigitalOcean, Google Cloud DNS), the subdomain can be taken over. This tool only shows the signal; it never attempts a takeover.

How to fix it

Delete the DNS record right away, or re-claim the name at the provider. To confirm it, run the deep scan (paid plans, with your authorization): the provider’s page is checked with a single request and the evidence (HTTP status + the provider’s error text) is shown on the row. Every flagged row carries a read-only verification command with the equivalent nuclei-templates template; the provider list matches nuclei and can-i-take-over-xyz.

Subdomains delegated to a separate zone (NS)

A subdomain delegated to other name servers via NS records depends entirely on those servers. If a name server no longer resolves, or the provider (Route 53 etc.) does not know the zone, whoever recreates the zone at the provider controls every record of the subdomain (web, mail, verification). Far wider impact than a single CNAME.

How to fix itExample: delegation to delete

Delete unused delegations (the NS records) from the parent zone; if still in use, recreate the zone at the provider and update the NS records.

delegation to deletedns
eski-uygulama.alanadiniz.com.  NS  ns-123.awsdns-45.example.eski-uygulama.alanadiniz.com.  NS  ns-678.awsdns-90.example.

Domains of the resources the page loads

Your home page loads scripts, stylesheets and iframes from other domains. If one of those domains has lapsed, whoever registers it runs their own code on your site: a more direct supply-chain problem than a takeover. Extracted from the home page body that is read anyway; the registration status comes from RDAP, with no extra request to your site.

How to fix itExample: tag to remove

Remove the tag loaded from the unregistered domain or move the asset to your own server / a CDN you trust; add SRI to external scripts. Keep an eye on domains whose registration expires soon.

tag to removehtml
<script src="https://cdn.eski-widget.example/w.js"></script>

Certificates2 checks

Resolving names with an expired certificate

A name that still resolves but whose only certificate has expired is usually a forgotten system that no longer gets updates.

How to fix it

Renew the certificate if still in use; otherwise remove the system and its DNS record.

Wildcard certificate use

If a *.yourdomain.com certificate is copied to many servers, a key leak on the weakest server affects every subdomain.

How to fix it

Where possible, issue a separate certificate for each service; automatic renewal makes this effortless.

Frequently asked questions

Other tests

Check the same domain from another angle. All free, no account needed.

Site tests

  • SSL/TLS checkShows whether your certificate is valid, when it expires and whether the connection uses current encryption.
  • Email securityReads your SPF, DKIM and DMARC records to tell you whether someone can send fake email in your name.
  • Security headers testGrades the security settings your site sends to browsers (HSTS, CSP, cookie flags) and lists what is missing.
  • DNS and domain securityChecks when your domain expires, whether the transfer lock is on and whether your DNS records are protected (DNSSEC, CAA).
  • Cookie and consent checkShows whether trackers such as Google Analytics or Meta Pixel load before the visitor consents.
  • JavaScript library vulnerabilitiesFinds jQuery, Bootstrap and other libraries on your site, flags versions with known vulnerabilities and names the safe one.
  • Attack surface scanCollects what an attacker can learn about you from public sources: subdomains, the software you run, DNS.

Other free scanners

  • WP Lens: WordPress scanMatches the versions of WordPress core, plugins and themes against known vulnerabilities.
  • Port scanFinds the ports your server exposes and their service versions, and matches them against known vulnerabilities. Runs only with your confirmation.
  • Dependency scan (SBOM)Matches the dependencies in your package-lock, yarn.lock or SBOM file against known vulnerabilities.
  • Banner to CVEPaste a service version line and see the known vulnerabilities of that version. No scanning.

All free tools