GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg: OpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: openclaw (npm) 2026.3.7.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to openclaw (npm) 2026.3.7 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary `/allowlist ... --store` resolved the selected channel `accountId` for reads, but store writes still dropped that `accountId` and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store. Because default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the `default` account. This is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to **medium** because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run `/allowlist` edits. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version checked: `2026.3.2` - Affected versions: `<= 2026.3.2` - Fixed on `main`: March 7, 2026 in `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73` - Patched release: `2026.3.7` ### Details The affected path was: - `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-393` resolved `accountId` and read store state with it - `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:697-702` and `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:730-733` wrote store state without passing `accountId` - `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:231-234` and `src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:534-554` still merged legacy unscoped allowlist entries into the `default` account The fix scopes `/allowlist ... --store` writes to the resolved account and clears legacy default-account store entries on removal so legacy reads no longer create cross-account authorization bleed-through. ### Impact - Vulnerability class: improper authorization scoping / incorrect authorization - Exploitation requires: an already-authorized sender who can run `/allowlist` edits - Security effect: unintended authorization expansion from one channel account into `default` ### Fix Commit(s) - `70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73` — scope `/allowlist ... --store` writes by account and clean up legacy default-account removals ### Release Process Note npm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Published
- Mar 9, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 9, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-639
Report tools
Action score
21
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | pkg:npm/openclaw |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | before 2026.3.7 | 2026.3.7 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvhOpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval35Monitor
- GHSA-474h-prjg-mmw3OpenClaw: Sandboxed sessions_spawn(runtime="acp") bypassed sandbox inheritance and allowed host ACP initialization32Monitor
- GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743OpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch30Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-j425-whc4-4jgcMar 9, 2026 · OpenClaw's `system.run` env override filtering allowed dangerous helper-command pivots25Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-3h2q-j2v4-6w5rMar 9, 2026 · OpenClaw's system.run allowlist approval parsing missed PowerShell encoded-command wrappers20Monitor
- Later →GHSA-hfpr-jhpq-x4rmMar 9, 2026 · OpenClaw: `operator.write` chat.send could reach admin-only config writes17Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:openclaw | 2026.3.7 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-f6h3-846h-2r8w5 days apartOpenClaw's elevated allowFrom accepted broader identity signals than specified within sender-scoped authorization0Monitor
- GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-77596 days apartOpenClaw's commands.allowFrom sender authorization accepted conversation identifiers via ctx.From0Monitor
- GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf6 days apartOpenClaw: MS Teams fileConsent/invoke missing conversation binding allowed cross-conversation pending-upload consumption0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled KeyCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv
Root cause
The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-639 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
res.json(invoice);Fixed
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
id: req.params.id,
ownerId: req.user.id,
});
if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
res.json(invoice);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.