GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf: OpenClaw: MS Teams fileConsent/invoke missing conversation binding allowed cross-conversation pending-upload consumption
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: openclaw (npm) 2026.2.25.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to openclaw (npm) 2026.2.25 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary In `openclaw` MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by `uploadId` alone. `fileConsent/invoke` did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload. ### Impact An attacker who obtained a valid `uploadId` within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path). ### Technical Details - Pending uploads stored `conversationId`, but invoke handling consumed by `uploadId` only. - The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before `uploadToConsentUrl(...)` and pending-upload removal. - Fix binds accept/decline handling to normalized conversation id match before consuming pending upload state. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published npm version (as of February 26, 2026): `2026.2.24` - Vulnerable range: `<= 2026.2.24` - Patched in release: `2026.2.25` ### Remediation Upgrade to `openclaw` `2026.2.25` (or later) once published. ### Fix Commit(s) - `347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1` ### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`. OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Published
- Mar 3, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 4, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-639
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | pkg:npm/openclaw |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | before 2026.2.25 | 2026.2.25 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvhOpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval35Monitor
- GHSA-474h-prjg-mmw3OpenClaw: Sandboxed sessions_spawn(runtime="acp") bypassed sandbox inheritance and allowed host ACP initialization32Monitor
- GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743OpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch30Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-2mc2-g238-722jMar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw affected by iMessage remote attachment SCP hardening (strict host-key checks and remoteHost validation)0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-2hm8-rqrm-xfjqMar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw's owner-only gateway tool access checks were incomplete in specific authenticated DM flows0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-ff98-w8hj-qrxfMar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw plugin runtime command execution is part of trusted plugin boundary0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:openclaw | 2026.2.25 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg6 days apartOpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping21Monitor
- GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-77590 days apartOpenClaw's commands.allowFrom sender authorization accepted conversation identifiers via ctx.From0Monitor
- GHSA-f6h3-846h-2r8w1 days apartOpenClaw's elevated allowFrom accepted broader identity signals than specified within sender-scoped authorization0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled KeyCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Root cause
The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-639 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
res.json(invoice);Fixed
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
id: req.params.id,
ownerId: req.user.id,
});
if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
res.json(invoice);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.