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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759: OpenClaw's commands.allowFrom sender authorization accepted conversation identifiers via ctx.From

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: openclaw (npm) 2026.2.23.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to openclaw (npm) 2026.2.23 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary `commands.allowFrom` is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include `ctx.From` (conversation identity) as a sender candidate. When `commands.allowFrom` contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord `channel:<id>` or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.22-2` - Patched version: `2026.2.23` (released) ### Details Root cause: `resolveSenderCandidates()` in `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts` always included `ctx.From` in candidate evaluation used by `commands.allowFrom` authorization checks. `ctx.From` is sender-like in some direct-message contexts, but conversation-like in channel/group/thread contexts. This mixed principal handling allowed conversation identifiers to satisfy sender-only authorization. ### Impact In affected versions, command/directive authorization could become broader than intended when operators configured `commands.allowFrom` with conversation identifiers, allowing unintended users in that conversation to run command-only/directive-only flows. ### Fix Main branch now treats `commands.allowFrom` as sender-only: - `ctx.From` is no longer included as a general sender candidate. - `ctx.From` is only used as fallback when sender fields are absent and the value is not conversation-shaped. - Regression tests were added for conversation-id denial and direct-message fallback preservation. ### Fix Commit(s) - `08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e` ### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the released version (`2026.2.23`). This advisory now reflects released fix version `2026.2.23`. OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.

Published
Mar 3, 2026
Updated
Mar 4, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
npmopenclaw

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmopenclawbefore 2026.2.232026.2.23

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvhOpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval
    35Monitor
  • GHSA-474h-prjg-mmw3OpenClaw: Sandboxed sessions_spawn(runtime="acp") bypassed sandbox inheritance and allowed host ACP initialization
    32Monitor
  • GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743OpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch
    30Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierGHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rxMar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw has Canvas route hardening for mixed-trust deployments
    0Monitor
  • ← EarlierGHSA-534w-2vm4-89xrMar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw's Zalo group sender allowlist bypass permits unauthorized GROUP dispatch
    0Monitor
  • Later →GHSA-8cp7-rp8r-mg77Mar 4, 2026 · OpenClaw has SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition over ISATAP
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:openclaw2026.2.23Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg6 days apartOpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping
    21Monitor
  • GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf0 days apartOpenClaw: MS Teams fileConsent/invoke missing conversation binding allowed cross-conversation pending-upload consumption
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-f6h3-846h-2r8w1 days apartOpenClaw's elevated allowFrom accepted broader identity signals than specified within sender-scoped authorization
    0Monitor

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Root cause

The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);res.json(invoice);

Fixed

ts
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({  id: req.params.id,  ownerId: req.user.id,});if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);res.json(invoice);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records