GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh: OpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: openclaw (npm) 2026.2.14.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to openclaw (npm) 2026.2.14 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary OpenClaw Gateway exposes an authenticated HTTP endpoint (`POST /tools/invoke`) intended for invoking a constrained set of tools. Two issues could combine to significantly increase blast radius in misconfigured or exposed deployments: - The HTTP gateway layer did not deny high-risk session orchestration tools by default, allowing a caller with Gateway auth to invoke tools like `sessions_spawn` / `sessions_send` and pivot into creating or controlling agent sessions. - ACP clients could auto-approve permission requests for risky tools with insufficient user interaction/guardrails, reducing the friction that should normally prevent silent execution or mutation. ## Impact If the Gateway is reachable by an attacker and they obtain a valid Gateway token, they may be able to: - Escalate from single-tool invocation to spawning/controlling sessions and reach command execution capabilities depending on tool policy and runtime environment. - Perform cross-session message injection via `sessions_send`. - In ACP-integrated scenarios, obtain unintended approvals for non-read/search tool permissions. ## CVSS - `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` (8.8) ## Affected versions - `openclaw < 2026.2.14` ## Fixed in - `openclaw >= 2026.2.14` ## Remediation The default behavior is now hardened: - PR #15390: deny high-risk tools over HTTP `/tools/invoke` by default (with `gateway.tools.{allow,deny}` overrides) and harden ACP permission handling. - Commit `bb1c3dfe1`: ACP clients now prompt for any non-read/search permission request (fail closed for mutating/execution/fetch operations). - Commit `539689a2f`: security audit warns when `gateway.tools.allow` re-enables default-denied HTTP tools, since this can increase RCE blast radius if the Gateway is reachable. - Commit `153a7644e`: ACP safe-kind inference is stricter to avoid accidental auto-approval due to substring matches (still auto-approves only confident `read/search`). ## Mitigations / deployment guidance - Keep the Gateway loopback-only unless you have a strong reason not to: `gateway.bind="loopback"` / `openclaw gateway run --bind loopback`. - Avoid exposing the Gateway directly to the public internet. Use an SSH tunnel or Tailscale to access a loopback-bound Gateway. - Treat opting in to default-denied HTTP tools (via `gateway.tools.allow`) as high-risk and audit such configurations carefully. ## Credits OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting this issue and contributing remediation work.
- Published
- Mar 2, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 4, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-78
Report tools
Action score
35
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | pkg:npm/openclaw |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | before 2026.2.14 | 2026.2.14 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-474h-prjg-mmw3OpenClaw: Sandboxed sessions_spawn(runtime="acp") bypassed sandbox inheritance and allowed host ACP initialization32Monitor
- GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743OpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch30Monitor
- GHSA-qcc4-p59m-p54mOpenClaw: Sandbox dangling-symlink alias handling could bypass workspace-only write boundary28Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-7xmq-g46g-f8pvMar 2, 2026 · OpenClaw: Sandbox media TOCTOU could read files outside sandbox root0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-6x2m-hqfw-hvpjMar 2, 2026 · OpenClaw: Node exec approvals could be replayed across nodes0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-5847-rm3g-23mwMar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw has hook auth rate limiter bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 client key variants0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:openclaw | 2026.2.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-ff98-w8hj-qrxf1 days apartOpenClaw plugin runtime command execution is part of trusted plugin boundary0Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
- GHSA-chm2-m3w2-wcxm13 days apartOpenClaw Google Chat spoofing access with allowlist authorized mutable email principal despite sender-ID mismatch0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-78 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Root cause
User input is inserted as text into a shell command. The shell may interpret special characters in the input as part of the command.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-78 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const host = req.body.host;
exec("ping -c 1 " + host, onResult);Fixed
const host = req.body.host;
if (!/^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}$/i.test(host)) return res.sendStatus(400);
execFile("ping", ["-c", "1", host], onResult);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation LayersCAPEC-43likelihood: Medium · High
- Argument InjectionCAPEC-6likelihood: High · High
- OS Command InjectionCAPEC-88likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (6 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.