GHSA-chm2-m3w2-wcxm: OpenClaw Google Chat spoofing access with allowlist authorized mutable email principal despite sender-ID mismatch
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: openclaw (npm) 2026.2.14.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to openclaw (npm) 2026.2.14 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary Google Chat allowlisting supports matching by sender email in addition to immutable sender resource name (`users/<id>`). This weakens identity binding if a deployment assumes allowlists are strictly keyed by immutable principals. ### Affected Packages / Versions (As of 2026-02-14; based on latest published npm versions) - `openclaw` (npm): `<= 2026.2.13` - `clawdbot` (npm): `<= 2026.1.24-3` ### Details Affected component: - `extensions/googlechat/src/monitor.ts` The `allowFrom` checks accept: - Immutable sender id (`users/<id>`) - Raw email (`alice@example.com`) for usability Historically, `users/<email>` was also treated as an email allowlist entry. This is now deprecated because it looks like an immutable ID but is actually a mutable principal. ### Security Triage (2026-02-14) Severity: **Low** Rationale: - Requests are authenticated as coming from Google Chat (token verification), so this is not a generic unauthenticated spoofing vector. - A realistic exploit generally requires **Google Workspace / IdP administrative control** over identity lifecycle (e.g. reassigning an email address to a different underlying account) to obtain the same email with a different `users/<id>`. - With that level of access, the attacker typically has broader compromise paths. We still treat it as a valid defense-in-depth report because accepting mutable principals in authorization decisions can increase risk in chained-failure scenarios. ### Remediation / Behavior Changes Goal: preserve usability while reducing footguns. - Raw email allowlists remain supported. - `users/<email>` is deprecated and treated as a **user id**, not as an email allowlist. - Documentation recommends `users/<id>` when strict immutable binding is required. ### Fix Commit(s) - `c8424bf29a921e25663b29f308640b3d91a49432` (PR #16243) Thanks @vincentkoc for reporting.
- Published
- Feb 17, 2026
- Updated
- Feb 17, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-290
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | clawdbot | up to and including 2026.1.24-3 | — |
| npm | openclaw | before 2026.2.14 | 2026.2.14 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvhOpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval35Monitor
- GHSA-474h-prjg-mmw3OpenClaw: Sandboxed sessions_spawn(runtime="acp") bypassed sandbox inheritance and allowed host ACP initialization32Monitor
- GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743OpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch30Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65fFeb 17, 2026 · OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing28Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-g27f-9qjv-22pmFeb 17, 2026 · OpenClaw log poisoning (indirect prompt injection) via WebSocket headers12Monitor
- Later →GHSA-w5c7-9qqw-6645Feb 18, 2026 · OpenClaw inter-session prompts could be treated as direct user instructions0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:openclaw | 2026.2.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
- GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh13 days apartOpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval35Monitor
- GHSA-56f2-hvwg-57430 days apartOpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch30Monitor
- GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp14 days apartOpenClaw: Node camera URL payload host-binding bypass allowed gateway fetch pivots22Monitor
- GHSA-659f-22xc-98f214 days apartOpenClaw hook transform path containment missed symlink-resolved escapes0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-290 · Authentication Bypass by SpoofingCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Creating a Rogue Certification Authority CertificateCAPEC-459likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension WeaknessCAPEC-461High
- Signature SpoofCAPEC-473
- Signature Spoofing by MisrepresentationCAPEC-476likelihood: Low · High
- Session Credential Falsification through PredictionCAPEC-59likelihood: High · High
- Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)CAPEC-60likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureT1036.001
- Access Token ManipulationT1134
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Steal Application Access TokenT1528
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningT1553.002
- Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.