CVE-2026-79984: Apache Camel: camel-mina-sftp resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the di
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 29/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.65% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 51.4% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.1.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Mina SFTP component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.18.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel remote-file consumers poll a directory on a remote server and build the absolute remote path of each file by concatenating the configured directory with the file name reported in the server's directory listing. That concatenation (FtpUtils.absoluteFilePath and GenericFileConsumer) applied no lexical normalization and no check that the result stayed inside the directory being polled, and the resulting path became the operand for every subsequent remote operation on the file: retrieval (FtpOperations.retrieveFile / SftpOperations, reached from GenericFileConsumer where the retrieve name is taken verbatim from GenericFile.getAbsoluteFilePath), deletion when delete=true (GenericFileDeleteProcessStrategy), and renaming when move, preMove, moveFailed or readLock=rename is configured (GenericFileProcessStrategySupport and GenericFileRenameExclusiveReadLockStrategy). Neither isValidFile nor isMatched performed any containment check. A listing entry that is not a single path segment therefore resolved to a path outside the configured polling directory, causing Camel to read, delete or rename files outside it using the endpoint's own credentials. A listing name is not route-controlled data. It is supplied by the remote server, and the FTP control channel carries no integrity protection at all, so an on-path attacker can rewrite a LIST response without holding any credentials; a compromised, malicious or multi-tenant server, or a server backed by a virtual filesystem, can emit such a name directly. Retrieval is reachable in a default consumer configuration, since the remote consumers download every listed file; deletion and renaming additionally require one of the disposition options above, all of which are common. Escape from the directory Camel was configured to poll is unconditional, while escape from the server's own account boundary additionally depends on whether that server confines the account. The jailStartingDirectory option, which is documented as restricting Camel to the starting directory and is enabled by default, governed producer writes and, since the localWorkDirectory containment work, consumer downloads to the local work directory - but it did not constrain this remote operand, so its name and description claimed a boundary that was not enforced here. The same entry point had already been recognised on the local side: the localWorkDirectory download path was constrained so that a remote file name containing parent-directory segments could not resolve outside the local work directory. The remote operand was the remaining half of that surface. This artifact provides the mina-sftp scheme, an alternative SFTP implementation whose consumer derives from the same RemoteFileConsumer base class and therefore inherited the same unconstrained resolution. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x stream reached end of life and does not receive this fix; users on it should move to a supported releases stream.
- Published
- Oct 19, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 20, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 51th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-22
Report tools
Action score
29
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 29 / 40 · 7.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · apache
- 7.4
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel
- 4.18.5, 4.22.1, 4.23.0not affected
- 4.18.0 and later · before 4.18.5affected · maven
- 4.19.0 and later · before 4.22.1affected · maven
Same product
apache software foundation: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-78162Apache Camel: Camel-Hazelcast Managed Instances Missing Java Deserialization Filter (Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-43865)40Plan
- CVE-2026-88900Apache Camel: Camel-JGroups: Unsafe Java Deserialization of Cluster Messages in the JGroups Consumer Can Lead to Remote Code Execution35Monitor
- CVE-2026-83531Apache Camel: Camel-Dynamic-Router Control Endpoint Compiles Predicate Expressions Supplied by Control Messages35Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-78165Oct 19, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Spring-Redis Unfiltered Java Deserialization of Redis Payloads35Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-79983Oct 19, 2026 · Apache Camel: camel-ftp resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the director29Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-79985Oct 19, 2026 · Apache Camel: camel-smb resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the director29Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.18.5 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.22.1 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-10-16 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- First PoC-3 d
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayOct 29, 2026+10 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Dilrevx, NSSL, SJTUreporter
- Andrea Cosentinoremediation developer
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-799830 days apartApache Camel: camel-ftp resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the director29Monitor
- CVE-2026-799850 days apartApache Camel: camel-smb resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the director29Monitor
- CVE-2026-799860 days apartApache Camel: camel-azure-files resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the 29Monitor
- CVE-2026-781630 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Docling Unvalidated Message Body Input Source Enables Server-Side Request Forgery and Local File Disclosure23Monitor
- CVE-2026-956287 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Docling Custom CLI Argument Path Validation Does Not Reject Absolute Paths (Incomplete Fix of CVE-2026-40047)21Monitor
- CVE-2026-956297 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Docling Unvalidated Output Path Header Enables Writing Conversion Output to an Arbitrary Directory21Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-1361 · Oct 20, 2026(Apache Çoklu Proje Güvnelik Zafiyeti)
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
nvd-secondary
Root cause
A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-22 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);
res.sendFile(file);Fixed
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);
if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {
return res.sendStatus(400);
}
res.sendFile(file);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Path TraversalCAPEC-126likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
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Change log
- SSVC exploitationnone → poc
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Exploit maturity— → poc
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (6 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.