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CVE.org (no NVD analysis yet)· CNA apache

CVE-2026-95629: Apache Camel: Camel-Docling Unvalidated Output Path Header Enables Writing Conversion Output to an Arbitrary Directory

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)

  • Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 1% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 63% of all records.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.2. DoclingProducer runs the external docling tool in CLI mode, the default, and tells it where to write the converted document through the --output flag. When the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header was set, addOutputDirectoryArguments handed its value to that flag verbatim: the value was not normalized, an absolute path or a path containing .. segments was accepted as given, and no endpoint option could confine it to a directory. The custom-argument validation added by the fix for CVE-2026-40047 refuses the --output and -o flags in the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header and tells callers to choose the output directory with this header instead, so the one value that decides where docling writes reached the command line without any of the checks applied to custom arguments. Docling writes the conversion result, as Markdown, HTML, JSON or text, into that directory, naming the file after the input file, and the producer afterwards removes only its own temporary directory, so the file is left in place. A party able to set the header could therefore have conversion output created in any directory the Camel process can write to. The content of such a file is the conversion of the document carried by the message, so it is shaped by whoever supplies that document without being written byte for byte, and when the document content arrives in the message body the producer stores it under a random temporary name, which the output file then carries. The header belongs to the Camel header namespace, which consumers applying Camel's default header filtering, such as the JMS and Kafka consumers, remove from incoming messages, so the issue is reached where a route forwards externally influenced values into the header or where a consumer maps incoming headers without that filtering. The docling-serve mode does not use the header. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The fix adds an outputBaseDirectory endpoint option that is unset by default, so after upgrading, set it on every docling endpoint whose CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory.

MediumCVSS 5.4 · v3.1—Proof of concept Fix available
Published
Oct 26, 2026
Updated
Nov 6, 2026
EPSS
1.0% · 63th percentile

Report tools

JSON

Action score

21

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
21 / 40 · 5.4 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.0%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · apache
5.4
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow CVE-2026-95629

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
apachecamel

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache camel4.15.0 and later · before 4.18.5
  • apache camel4.19.0 and later · before 4.22.2

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel

    • 4.15.0 and later · before 4.18.5affected · maven
    • 4.19.0 and later · before 4.22.2affected · maven

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2025-27636Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering
    51Plan
  • CVE-2026-47323Apache Camel: Camel-CXF Message Header Injection via Missing Inbound Filtering
    45Plan
  • CVE-2026-33453Apache Camel: CoAP URI Query Parameter to Exchange Header Injection in camel-coap Allows Single-Packet Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution
    43Plan

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-101259Oct 26, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-CoAP Information Disclosure via Unmuted Consumer Exceptions
    21Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2026-95628Oct 26, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Docling Custom CLI Argument Path Validation Does Not Reject Absolute Paths (Incomplete Fix of CVE-2026-40047)
    21Monitor
  • Later →CVE-2026-95663Oct 26, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Keycloak Security Policy Accepts Expired Access Tokens Because Cached Token Introspection Results Are Not Bounded by the Token Expiry
    26Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel4.18.5Vendor (CNA)
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel4.22.2Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02026-10-29

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. Fix recordedsame day
  3. First PoC+3 d
  4. TodayNov 8, 2026+13 d
EPSS, last 120 days+1% in 7 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-799837 days apartApache Camel: camel-ftp resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the director
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-799867 days apartApache Camel: camel-azure-files resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-956280 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Docling Custom CLI Argument Path Validation Does Not Reject Absolute Paths (Incomplete Fix of CVE-2026-40047)
    21Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

  • CVE-2026-6690863 days apartApache Camel: Camel-platform-http-main: when JWT authentication was configured with a keystore but no issuer or audience, the iss and aud claims were never vali
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-841817 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Shiro Authentication Bypass via Skipped Credential Verification on Subject Reuse
    23Monitor

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Change log

  1. SSVC exploitation— → none
  2. Exploit maturitynone → poc
  3. Exploit maturity— → none
  4. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

All records