NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

CVE-2026-66908: Apache Camel: Camel-platform-http-main: when JWT authentication was configured with a keystore but no issuer or audience, the iss and aud claims were never vali

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.61% (FIRST EPSS).
Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.22.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.22.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

Improper Authentication vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP Main component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.8.0 before 4.22.0. The camel-main embedded HTTP server can protect its endpoints with JWT authentication, configured through authenticationEnabled together with the JWT keystore properties. JWTAuthenticationConfigurer.buildJwtOptions returned null when neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience was configured, and the caller then skipped the JWTAuthOptions.setJWTOptions call entirely, so the Vert.x JWTAuth instance was built from the keystore alone. The result was that inbound tokens were checked only for signature and expiry: the iss and aud claims were not validated at all. Nothing signalled this - the server started normally and reported no warning - so a deployment configured the documented way silently enforced less than the operator believed it had enabled, and the component documentation itself presented signature and expiry checking as the default with issuer and audience as an optional extra. Both the application server and the management server were affected, because the omission was in each of the two configureAuthentication paths. Any unexpired token signed by any key the configured keystore trusts was therefore accepted, regardless of which issuer minted it or which audience it was intended for. How far that reaches depends on the trust set of the keystore: where the signing key belongs to a shared or multi-tenant identity provider, a token legitimately issued for an entirely different audience is accepted, while a keystore holding a dedicated signer narrows it to reuse of tokens minted for other services within the same trust domain. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options did not exist before 4.21.0, so on earlier releases there was no supported way to have these claims enforced at all. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. From 4.22.0 the server refuses to start when a JWT keystore is configured but neither jwtIssuer nor jwtAudience is set, naming the properties involved, and a deployment that genuinely wants signature and expiry validation only must say so explicitly with the new jwtAllowMissingIssuerAndAudience option, which defaults to false. This behaviour is fixed only on 4.22.0. The 4.14.9 and 4.18.4 releases do not change the default: they add the jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options so that operators on those maintenance lines can enforce the claims by configuration, and an installation that upgrades to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 without also setting at least one of those two properties is still accepting any unexpired token signed by a trusted key. Users on 4.14.x or 4.18.x should therefore upgrade to 4.14.9 or 4.18.4 and then set jwtIssuer, jwtAudience, or both. Releases from 4.8.0 up to and including 4.21.x offer no way to enforce these claims and should be moved to a version that does. Independently of version, restrict the JWT keystore to the smallest possible trust set - ideally a signer dedicated to this service rather than a shared identity-provider key - and where a gateway already validates issuer and audience in front of the server, ensure it cannot be bypassed. Notes: The JIRA ticket: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24281 refers to the various commits that resolved the issue, and has more details. The fail-closed guard could not be backported. The jwtIssuer and jwtAudience options were themselves only introduced in 4.21.0 by CAMEL-23525, so on camel-4.18.x and camel-4.14.x there was nothing an operator could set to satisfy the requirement and the guard would have broken every JWT deployment on those branches with no remedy available.

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—Proof of concept Fix available

Published: Aug 24, 2026
Updated: Oct 24, 2026
EPSS: 0.6% · 49th percentile
CWE: CWE-287

Report tools

JSON

Action score

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS: 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV: 0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS: 0 / 30 · 0.6%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical impact: partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Get told when this record changes

Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
A fix has been released

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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Vendor	Product	CPE
apache	camel	cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

apache camel4.8.0 and later · before 4.22.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel
- 4.8.0 and later · before 4.22.0affected · semver

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

Ecosystem	Package	Affected range	Fix
Maven	org.apache.camel:camel-platform-http-main	from 4.8.0 · before 4.22.0	4.22.0

Same product

apache: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

CVE-2025-27636Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering
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CVE-2026-47323Apache Camel: Camel-CXF Message Header Injection via Missing Inbound Filtering
45Plan
CVE-2026-33453Apache Camel: CoAP URI Query Parameter to Exchange Header Injection in camel-coap Allows Single-Packet Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution
43Plan

Published before and after this one in the same product

← EarlierCVE-2026-66906Aug 24, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Azure-Storage-Blob: the downloadBlobToFile operation built the local download target from the remote blob name without constraining it to th
36Monitor
← EarlierCVE-2026-66907Aug 24, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Google-Storage: the consumer appended the remote object name to the configured downloadFileName directory without constraining the result
30Monitor
Later →CVE-2026-71300Aug 24, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Atmosphere-Websocket: WebSocket dispatch header injection
39Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / package	Fixed version	Source
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel	4.22.0	Vendor (CNA)
Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-platform-http-main	4.22.0	Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
Source	Kind	Date
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub	stars:0	2026-08-24

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

First PoCAug 24, 2026-1 d
PublishedAug 24, 2026
TodayNov 2, 2026+69 d

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

n0mi1kfinder
Andrea CosentinoApache Software Foundationremediation developer

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

CVE-2026-5391349 days apartApache Camel Keycloak: KeycloakSecurityPolicy verifies the bearer access token only inside its role and permission checks, so in the default configuration the t
39Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

CVE-2026-4659049 days apartApache Camel: Camel-PQC: The HashiCorp Vault and AWS Secrets Manager key-lifecycle managers deserialize persisted key metadata with java.io.ObjectInputStream an
35Monitor
CVE-2026-40048119 days apartApache Camel PQC: Unsafe Deserialization from FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager
31Monitor
CVE-2026-600930 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Azure-Storage-DataLake: the downloadToFile operation built the local download target from the remote path name without constraining it to th
22Monitor
CVE-2026-9566463 days apartApache Camel: Camel-AWS2-S3 Producer Evaluates Untrusted S3 Object Keys From the CamelAwsS3Key Header as Simple Expressions
21Monitor

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
No account or password is required.
No user action is required.
No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality: none
Integrity: high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability: none

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: None
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality impact: None
Integrity impact: High
Availability impact: None

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-287 · Improper Authentication

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

nvd-secondary

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-287 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

1app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
2

3// Route added later skips the middleware
4app.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

1const admin = express.Router();
2admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
3

4admin.post("/config", updateConfig);
5app.use("/admin", admin);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

ATT&CK techniques

Change log

Fix✗ → ✓Sep 28, 2026, 10:09 PM UTC

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References

camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-66908.html

Show all references (1 more)

www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/24/12

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records