CVE-2026-46590: Apache Camel: Camel-PQC: The HashiCorp Vault and AWS Secrets Manager key-lifecycle managers deserialize persisted key metadata with java.io.ObjectInputStream an
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.83% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 58% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.3, 4.21.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.3, 4.21.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel PQC component. The camel-pqc component persists post-quantum key metadata (KeyMetadata) through pluggable KeyLifecycleManager implementations. HashicorpVaultKeyLifecycleManager and AwsSecretsManagerKeyLifecycleManager read that metadata back from the configured secret backend by deserializing a Base64-wrapped value with a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream.readObject() and no ObjectInputFilter or class allow-list; the cast to KeyMetadata happens only after readObject() returns, so any readObject() side effects in a crafted object run before the type check. The same unfiltered legacy-migration read also remained in FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager (for the stored KeyPair and KeyMetadata). A principal who can write to the operator-controlled backend that holds these values - the HashiCorp Vault KV path, or the AWS Secrets Manager secret (requiring a Vault token or secretsmanager:PutSecretValue) - could store a crafted serialized object that is deserialized during normal key-lifecycle operations, potentially leading to code execution in the context of the application that manages the keys. This is an incomplete-remediation follow-on to CVE-2026-40048 (CAMEL-23200), which changed FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager to store metadata as JSON / PKCS#8 / X.509 but did not add an ObjectInputFilter, did not cover the Vault and AWS sibling managers, and left FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager's own legacy-migration deserialization unfiltered. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.18.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, restrict write access to the key backend so that only the application's own identity can write the camel-pqc secrets (least-privilege HashiCorp Vault policies and secretsmanager:PutSecretValue IAM), and keep the PQC key material in a backend separate from any data that less-trusted principals can write.
- Published
- Jul 6, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 25, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.8% · 58th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-502
Report tools
Action score
35
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.8%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apache | camel | cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache camel4.18.0 and later · before 4.18.3
- apache camel4.19.0 and later · before 4.21.0
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel
- 4.18.0 and later · before 4.18.3affected · semver
- 4.19.0 and later · before 4.21.0affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-pqc | from 4.18.0 · before 4.18.3 | 4.18.3 |
| Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-pqc | from 4.19.0 · before 4.21.0 | 4.21.0 |
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2025-27636Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering51Plan
- CVE-2026-47323Apache Camel: Camel-CXF Message Header Injection via Missing Inbound Filtering45Plan
- CVE-2026-33453Apache Camel: CoAP URI Query Parameter to Exchange Header Injection in camel-coap Allows Single-Packet Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution43Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-46584Jul 6, 2026 · Apache Camel Mail: The mail producer applied attacker-supplied message headers as JavaMail session properties, allowing an attacker to influence SMTP parameters14Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-46585Jul 6, 2026 · Apache Camel Lucene: The query control headers used non-Camel-prefixed names (QUERY, RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS) that bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP cl30Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-46591Jul 6, 2026 · Apache Camel: Camel-Neo4j: JSON property names from the CamelNeo4jMatchProperties header are interpolated into the Cypher WHERE clause without validation, allow32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.18.3 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.21.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-pqc | 4.18.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-pqc | 4.21.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-07-15 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+9 d
- TodayNov 10, 2026+127 d
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Yu BaoPaypalfinder
- Andrea CosentinoApache Software Foundationremediation developer
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-4086070 days apartApache Camel: Unsafe Deserialization of JMS ObjectMessage in camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-sjms2 and camel-amqp40Plan
- CVE-2026-78162105 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Hazelcast Managed Instances Missing Java Deserialization Filter (Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-43865)40Plan
- CVE-2026-438670 days apartApache Camel: Camel-PQC: The AWS Secrets Manager key-lifecycle manager deserializes persisted key metadata with java.io.ObjectInputStream and no ObjectInputFilt39Monitor
- CVE-2026-3345470 days apartApache Camel: Inbound Header Filter Missing in MailHeaderFilterStrategy Allows Remote Code Execution via MIME Header Injection (CVE-2025-30177 Variant)37Monitor
- CVE-2026-4047370 days apartApache Camel Mina: Unsafe Deserialization in MinaConverter.toObjectInput() via TCP/UDP35Monitor
- CVE-2026-2717270 days apartApache Camel: Unsafe Java deserialization in camel-consul ConsulRegistry allows arbitrary code execution via malicious values read from the Consul KV store35Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
- CVE-2026-539130 days apartApache Camel Keycloak: KeycloakSecurityPolicy verifies the bearer access token only inside its role and permission checks, so in the default configuration the t39Monitor
- CVE-2026-464540 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Cometd: Inbound Bayeux message headers are mapped into the Exchange without a HeaderFilterStrategy, allowing unauthenticated clients to inje39Monitor
- CVE-2026-6690849 days apartApache Camel: Camel-platform-http-main: when JWT authentication was configured with a keystore but no issuer or audience, the iss and aud claims were never vali30Monitor
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-502 · Deserialization of Untrusted DataCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Root cause
Data received over the network is deserialized into the language’s native object format without verifying its source. Code paths inside the object can be triggered during deserialization.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-502 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
payload = sock.recv(65536)
job = pickle.loads(payload)Fixed
payload = sock.recv(65536)
if not hmac.compare_digest(sign(payload), header_sig):
raise PermissionError("invalid signature")
job = JobSchema.validate(json.loads(payload))Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
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Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.