CVE-2026-78162: Apache Camel: Camel-Hazelcast Managed Instances Missing Java Deserialization Filter (Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-43865)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Plan (action score 40/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 1% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 65.1% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.1.
Add it to your regular patch cycle. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The camel-hazelcast component applies a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig to the instances it creates from its own configuration, a protection introduced by CVE-2026-43865. That change did not reach two of the configuration paths Camel builds itself, so those paths continued to create Hazelcast instances whose Java deserialization is unrestricted. ReplicatedHazelcastAggregationRepository extends HazelcastAggregationRepository but overrides doStart() without calling super.doStart(), keeping its own copy of the bootstrap block, and therefore never received the filter: a route using it without supplying a hazelcastInstance starts a Hazelcast member that deserializes values read from the backing ReplicatedMap with no class restriction. HazelcastDefaultComponent#getOrCreateHzClientInstance() builds its own ClientConfig when hazelcastMode=client is selected and neither a referenced ClientConfig nor hazelcastConfigUri is supplied, and likewise applied no filter, so client-mode endpoints behaved differently from node-mode endpoints for an otherwise identical configuration. In both cases an attacker able to publish into the Hazelcast cluster that the affected instance is attached to can cause a serialized Java object of their choosing to be deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer, before Camel processes the exchange, resulting in remote code execution. Hazelcast clusters have neither authentication nor TLS enabled by default. Selecting client mode is a topology choice rather than a security option, so neither path required the deployment to opt in to unsafe behaviour. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, supply an explicit Hazelcast configuration carrying a JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or inject a pre-built HazelcastInstance, since a user-supplied configuration is never overwritten by Camel. Alternatively set the JVM-wide filter -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.;java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!* and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.
- Published
- Oct 19, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 3, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.0% · 65th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-502
Report tools
Action score
40
Plan
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 40 / 40 · 10.0 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.0%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · apache
- 10.0
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apache | camel | cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache camel4.0.0 and later · before 4.18.5
- apache camel4.19.0 and later · before 4.22.1
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel
- 4.18.5, 4.22.1, 4.23.0not affected
- 4.0.0 and later · before 4.18.5affected · maven
- 4.19.0 and later · before 4.22.1affected · maven
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2025-27636Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering51Plan
- CVE-2026-47323Apache Camel: Camel-CXF Message Header Injection via Missing Inbound Filtering45Plan
- CVE-2026-33453Apache Camel: CoAP URI Query Parameter to Exchange Header Injection in camel-coap Allows Single-Packet Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution43Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-80352Sep 10, 2026 · Apache Camel K: Camel K Master trait serviceAccountName YAML injection lets CR author apply arbitrary objects39Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-80354Sep 10, 2026 · Apache Camel K: Camel K Builder trait mavenProfiles ValueSources resolve tenant-named secrets in operator namespace32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-79983Oct 19, 2026 · Apache Camel: camel-ftp resolved the remote path of a polled file from the name reported in the server directory listing without constraining it to the director36Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.18.5 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.22.1 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-10-16 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- First PoC-3 d
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 5, 2026+17 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- cattierTCBSfinder
- Leon Zlobeckifinder
- Andrea Cosentinoremediation developer
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-40860175 days apartApache Camel: Unsafe Deserialization of JMS ObjectMessage in camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-sjms2 and camel-amqp40Plan
- CVE-2026-43867105 days apartApache Camel: Camel-PQC: The AWS Secrets Manager key-lifecycle manager deserializes persisted key metadata with java.io.ObjectInputStream and no ObjectInputFilt39Monitor
- CVE-2026-33454175 days apartApache Camel: Inbound Header Filter Missing in MailHeaderFilterStrategy Allows Remote Code Execution via MIME Header Injection (CVE-2025-30177 Variant)37Monitor
- CVE-2026-889000 days apartApache Camel: Camel-JGroups: Unsafe Java Deserialization of Cluster Messages in the JGroups Consumer Can Lead to Remote Code Execution35Monitor
- CVE-2026-46590105 days apartApache Camel: Camel-PQC: The HashiCorp Vault and AWS Secrets Manager key-lifecycle managers deserialize persisted key metadata with java.io.ObjectInputStream an35Monitor
- CVE-2026-27172175 days apartApache Camel: Unsafe Java deserialization in camel-consul ConsulRegistry allows arbitrary code execution via malicious values read from the Consul KV store35Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-502 · Deserialization of Untrusted DataCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
Data received over the network is deserialized into the language’s native object format without verifying its source. Code paths inside the object can be triggered during deserialization.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-502 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
payload = sock.recv(65536)
job = pickle.loads(payload)Fixed
payload = sock.recv(65536)
if not hmac.compare_digest(sign(payload), header_sig):
raise PermissionError("invalid signature")
job = JobSchema.validate(json.loads(payload))Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → poc
- Exploit maturity— → poc
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (7 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.