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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897x: Poweradmin: API user-update endpoint leads to a non-admin reset any user's password and take over the superuser account

HighCVSS 8.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: poweradmin/poweradmin (Packagist) 4.2.5, 4.3.4.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to poweradmin/poweradmin (Packagist) 4.2.5, 4.3.4 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary The REST API user-update endpoint (`PUT/PATCH /api/v2/users/{id}` and the V1 equivalent) does not enforce two authorization rules that the web interface enforces. A user who holds the `user_edit_others` permission but is not a superuser can: 1. edit user accounts that belong to a superuser, and 2. set the password of any account, even without the `user_passwd_edit_others` permission. Because of this, a non-admin "user manager" role can send a single API request that changes the administrator's password, then log in as the administrator. This is a full privilege escalation and account takeover. The same actions are explicitly blocked in the web UI, so the API is inconsistent with the application's own permission model. ### Details Poweradmin's permission model treats these as three distinct permissions: - `user_edit_others` (id 57): "User is allowed to edit other users." - `user_passwd_edit_others` (id 58): "User is allowed to edit the password of other users." - `user_is_ueberuser` (id 53): full admin. The existence of a separate `user_passwd_edit_others` permission means that "edit other users" is not supposed to include changing their passwords. The web UI enforces this, and it additionally forbids any non-superuser from editing a superuser account at all. The API skips both rules. **Where the API is missing the superuser check.** `lib/Domain/Service/ApiPermissionService.php`, `canEditUser()`: ```php public function canEditUser(int $userId, int $targetUserId): bool { if ($this->userHasPermission($userId, 'user_is_ueberuser')) { return true; } if ($userId === $targetUserId && $this->userHasPermission($userId, 'user_edit_own')) { return true; } // User with user_edit_others can edit ALL users, including superusers if ($this->userHasPermission($userId, 'user_edit_others')) { return true; } return false; } ``` There is no check on whether the target is a superuser. Compare this with the web controller `lib/Application/Controller/EditUserController.php` (lines 237 to 243), which explicitly refuses: ```php // Prevent non-superusers from editing superuser accounts (privilege escalation protection) $targetIsSuperuser = UserManager::isUserSuperuser($this->db, $editId); $currentIsSuperuser = UserManager::verifyPermission($this->db, 'user_is_ueberuser'); if ($targetIsSuperuser && !$currentIsSuperuser) { $this->showError(_('You do not have permission to edit a superuser account.')); } ``` The comment in the maintainers' own code calls this "privilege escalation protection." The API has no equivalent. **Where the API is missing the password permission check.** `lib/Domain/Service/UserManagementService.php`, `updateUser()` (lines 393 to 413) writes the password whenever one is supplied, with no permission check at all (it only refuses when the target is an external-auth user): ```php if (!empty($userData['password'])) { $user = $this->userRepository->getUserById($userId); $authMethod = $user['auth_method'] ?? 'sql'; $externalAuthMethods = ['oidc', 'saml', 'ldap']; if (in_array($authMethod, $externalAuthMethods, true)) { return [ 'success' => false, 'message' => '...', 'status' => 400 ]; } // Hash password if allowed <-- no permission check happens here $userData['password'] = password_hash($userData['password'], PASSWORD_DEFAULT); } $success = $this->userRepository->updateUser($userId, $userData); ``` Compare the web path `lib/Domain/Model/UserManager.php`, `editUser()`, which only writes the password column when the caller has the right permission: ```php $edit_own_perm = self::verifyPermission($this->db, 'user_edit_own'); $passwd_edit_others_perm = self::verifyPermission($this->db, 'user_passwd_edit_others'); if ($user_password != "" && ($edit_own_perm || $passwd_edit_others_perm)) { ... $query .= ", password = :password"; } ``` **The call path.** `lib/Application/Controller/Api/V2/UsersController.php`, `updateUser()` (lines 701 to 727): ```php if (!$this->apiPermissionService->canEditUser($currentUserId, $targetUserId)) { // line 708 ... 403 ... } $result = $this->userManagementService->updateUser($targetUserId, $input); // line 727 ``` So `canEditUser` returns true for any `user_edit_others` holder against any target, and `updateUser` then writes the password with no further check. The V1 controller (`lib/Application/Controller/Api/V1/UsersController.php`) has the same shape. Note: `perm_templ` is separately protected (a `PermissionTemplateAssignmentGuard` rejects it unless the caller has `user_edit_templ_perm`), so an attacker cannot elevate their own template through the API. They do not need to. Resetting the administrator's password and logging in as the administrator achieves full control directly. <img width="1324" height="986" alt="temp-perm" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f4411543-2f07-457c-9681-46bdada09d15" /> ### PoC Tested on Poweradmin master (commit 7f28c3a97) and the code path is present in the 4.0.x, 4.1.x, 4.2.x and 4.3.x release branches. **Configuration required (both are common in real deployments, neither is the default):** - The REST API must be enabled (`api.enabled = true` in `config/settings.php`). The API is intended for automation such as the Terraform provider, so it is frequently turned on. - A delegated "user manager" role must exist: a permission template that grants `user_edit_others` (and typically `user_view_others`) but not `user_is_ueberuser` and not `user_passwd_edit_others`. This is a normal way to let a helpdesk or team lead manage user accounts. **Setup (performed once by the administrator to create the delegated role and the attacker):** 1. As admin, create a permission template named "UserMgr" of type "user" with the permissions "User is allowed to edit other users" and "User is allowed to see other users and their details" only. 2. Create a normal user, for example `umgr`, and assign it the UserMgr template. 3. As `umgr`, create an API key from the user's API keys page. Call it, for example, `pwa_umgr_key`. `umgr` is now the attacker: a non-admin user with a self-scoped API key. **Exploit request (Burp Suite Repeater).** Send this single request. `id` 1 is the administrator account. ``` PUT /api/v2/users/1 HTTP/1.1 Host: TARGET_HOST X-API-Key: pwa_umgr_key Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 30 {"password":"NewAdminPass1!"} ``` Expected response (HTTP 200): ``` {"success":true,"data":{"user_id":1},"message":"User updated successfully"} ``` <img width="1574" height="817" alt="burp-api-request" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/465a365b-511b-4cf5-900d-3779622bb10e" /> now we can login to admin user with a new password! The page refuses with "You do not have permission to edit a superuser account." So the same user with the same permission is denied on the web but allowed on the API. <img width="1228" height="699" alt="umgr-perm-denied" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5bdb9c82-e00b-4f00-9d25-3887826e5ee3" /> Record ids are the normal sequential user ids, and the administrator is usually id 1, so no guessing is required. The attacker can also change `username`, `email`, `active` and `use_ldap` on any account through the same request. ### Impact This is a broken access control and privilege escalation issue (CWE-285 Improper Authorization, CWE-266 Incorrect Privilege Assignment). Who is impacted: any Poweradmin installation that has the REST API enabled and that has created at least one non-admin role holding `user_edit_others` (a delegated user-manager or helpdesk role). On such an installation, any holder of that role, using nothing more than their own API key, can reset the superuser's password and take over the administrator account. From there they control every zone, record, user and setting in Poweradmin, and, through the PowerDNS backend, the DNS data itself. The severity is high because the outcome is full administrative takeover from a low-privilege authenticated position, over the network, with a single request and no user interaction. The reason it is not rated critical outright is the precondition that a delegated `user_edit_others` role exists and the API is enabled. The underlying defect is real regardless of configuration: the API does not enforce the superuser-edit protection or the `user_passwd_edit_others` permission that the web interface enforces, so the API grants more authority than the permission model intends. Suggested fix: mirror the web guards in the API. In `ApiPermissionService::canEditUser`, reject a non-superuser editing a superuser target. In `UserManagementService::updateUser`, only write the password when the caller is editing their own account or holds `user_passwd_edit_others`. Apply the same to both V1 and V2 controllers. ## Disclosure Credit: Found by Saif Salah (https://saifsalah.github.io/) Found during a security review of Poweradmin. Happy to coordinate a fix timeline and CVE before any public write-up.

Published
Jul 24, 2026
Updated
Jul 24, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

35

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradminfrom 4.0.0 · before 4.2.54.2.5
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradminfrom 4.3.0 · before 4.3.44.3.4

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222Poweradmin: OIDC `sub` collation bypass in Poweradmin leading to account takeover
    32Monitor
  • GHSA-rm67-g9ch-vxffPoweradmin: Broken access control (IDOR): any zone owner can modify DNS records in zones they do not own
    32Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Packagist:poweradmin/poweradmin4.2.5Package registry (OSV)
Packagist:poweradmin/poweradmin4.3.4Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

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