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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-rm67-g9ch-vxff: Poweradmin: Broken access control (IDOR): any zone owner can modify DNS records in zones they do not own

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: poweradmin/poweradmin (Packagist) 3.9.11, 4.2.5, 4.3.4.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to poweradmin/poweradmin (Packagist) 3.9.11, 4.2.5, 4.3.4 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## Affected software - Product: Poweradmin (web front-end for PowerDNS) - Version tested: master, commit 7f28c3a97 (also reachable in the 4.x release line — the record-edit code is the same) - Component: record editing (web UI) - Vulnerability type: Broken Access Control / Insecure Direct Object Reference ## Severity Any authenticated user who owns at least one zone can tamper with records in every other zone on the server. In a shared/multi-tenant Poweradmin install this is effectively a cross-tenant DNS takeover. ## Summary When you save a record edit, Poweradmin checks whether you're allowed to touch the record by looking at a zone id you send in the POST body, but it then applies the change to a record id you also send in the POST body. Nothing checks that the record id actually belongs to that zone id. So you point the permission check at a zone you legitimately own, point the record id at somebody else's record, and the update goes through. A low-privilege "Editor" who only owns `attacker.example` was able to overwrite a record living in `victim.example` (owned by the admin), even though the same account gets a flat "you do not have permission to access this zone" if it tries to open that zone directly. ## Where the bug is The core mistake is in `RecordManager::editRecord()` in `lib/Domain/Service/Dns/RecordManager.php`: ```php // line 298 – ownership is checked against the zone id from the request $user_is_zone_owner = UserManager::verifyUserIsOwnerZoneId($this->db, $record['zid']); ... // line 346 – but the update targets the record id from the request $this->backendProvider->editRecord( $record['rid'], $name, $record['type'], $content, $validatedTtl, $validatedPrio, $record['disabled'] ); ``` `$record['zid']` and `$record['rid']` are both taken straight from the submitted form. The permission gate uses one, the write uses the other, and they're never tied together. The backend write has no zone scoping at all — `lib/Infrastructure/Service/SqlDnsBackendProvider.php` line 235: ```php $stmt = $this->db->prepare( "UPDATE $recordsTable SET name = ?, type = ?, content = ?, ttl = ?, prio = ?, disabled = ? WHERE id = ?" ); $stmt->execute([$name, $type, $content, $ttl, $prio, $disabled, $recordId]); ``` It's `WHERE id = ?` on the record id and nothing else, so any record in the database is fair game. The validation layer doesn't save it either. `DnsRecordValidationService::validateRecord()` (`lib/Domain/Service/DnsRecordValidationService.php`, around line 97) uses the zone id only to look up the zone name for hostname validation. It never verifies the record id lives in that zone. There are two request paths that reach this same sink: 1. Multi-record save — `EditController::saveRecords()` (`lib/Application/Controller/EditController.php`, ~line 571) loops over `$_POST['record']` and hands each entry's `rid`/`zid` to `editRecord()` verbatim. The controller's `run()` only permission-checks the zone id in the URL (~line 204), not the zone id inside each record row. 2. Single-record save — `EditRecordController::saveRecord()` reads `$_POST['rid']` and forwards the whole `$_POST` (including the attacker-chosen `zid`) into `editRecord()`. For comparison, the delete path does it correctly. `DeleteRecordController` (~line 101) derives the zone id from the record id on the server side with `getZoneIdFromRecordId()` and checks permission against that. `EditCommentController` also uses the URL zone id for both the check and the write. So this really is an oversight in the edit path, not a deliberate design choice — the safe pattern already exists elsewhere in the same codebase. ## Proof of concept Setup (two accounts, two zones): - `attacker` — a normal user on the "Editor" permission template (`zone_content_edit_own_as_client`, i.e. can only edit records in zones it owns). Owns `attacker.example`, which is zone/domain id 3. - `admin` — owns `victim.example`, which is zone/domain id 2. That zone contains the record `www.victim.example A 1.1.1.1` with record id 5. Steps: 1. Log in as `attacker`. Confirm the access control is actually there: browse to `/zones/2/edit` (victim.example). You get "You do not have permission to access this zone." Good — you genuinely can't edit that zone the normal way. 2. Open your own zone's edit page, `/zones/3/edit`, and start a save (change any field and submit) with your intercepting proxy on. Catch the `POST /zones/3/edit` request. It already carries a valid CSRF `_token` and a valid `serial` for your zone, so don't touch those. 3. Edit the record block in that request so it targets the victim's record while keeping your own zone id: ``` POST /zones/3/edit HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8080 Cookie: PHPSESSID=<your attacker session> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded _token=<the valid token from step 2>&serial=<the valid serial from step 2>&commit=1 &record[5][rid]=5&record[5][zid]=3 &record[5][name]=pwned&record[5][type]=A&record[5][content]=6.6.6.6 &record[5][ttl]=3600&record[5][prio]=0 ``` The important part: `record[5][rid]=5` is the victim's record (in zone 2), and `record[5][zid]=3` is your own zone (so the ownership check passes). 4. Send it. You get HTTP 200. 5. Check the result. Record 5, which lives in the admin's zone, is now overwritten: ``` sqlite> SELECT id, domain_id, name, type, content FROM records WHERE id = 5; 5|2|pwned.attacker.example|A|6.6.6.6 ``` <img width="3363" height="1311" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-06 162351" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a2013e3b-0993-42ac-9402-7933e6d9331f" /> It's still `domain_id = 2` (the victim's zone) but its content is now attacker-controlled. You changed a record in a zone you were explicitly denied access to in step 1. Two practical notes if you're reproducing this: - The `serial` field is Poweradmin's optimistic-lock. It's checked against **your own** zone's current SOA serial and it bumps by one after every successful save, so grab a fresh one each time (the intercept-and-modify approach in step 2 handles this for you automatically). - Record ids are sequential integers, so in a real attack you'd just walk `rid = 1, 2, 3, …` to hit every record in every zone on the box. ## Impact With one owned zone, an attacker can rewrite `content`, `type`, `ttl` and the `disabled` flag of any record anywhere in the installation. Concretely that means: - Repointing or corrupting other customers' / other departments' DNS records (integrity). - Silently disabling records by setting `disabled = 1` (availability). - A clean, resolvable hijack (victim's name kept intact) when the attacker owns a parent/ancestor zone of the target name — `HostnameValidator::normalizeRecordName` leaves the name alone if it already ends in the attacker's zone suffix, which is exactly the case in delegated-subzone setups (attacker owns `example.com`, victim owns delegated `sub.example.com`). In the plain sibling-zone case the edited record's name gets forced under the attacker's zone suffix, which still destroys the original record — so at minimum it's cross-zone record deletion, and at most it's full record hijack. The attacker's own CSRF token and own zone serial satisfy every form-level check, so nothing about the request looks abnormal to the app. ## Suggested fix Stop trusting the `zid` in the request. In `RecordManager::editRecord()` (and the `EditRecordController` path), look the zone up from the record id on the server side and use that for both the ownership check and the hostname normalization — the same thing `deleteRecord()` already does: ```php $details = $recordRepository->getRecordDetailsFromRecordId($record['rid']); if ($details === null) { // record doesn't exist – reject return false; } $realZid = $details['zid']; // use $realZid for verifyUserIsOwnerZoneId() and for zone-name normalization ``` Reject the edit if the record doesn't exist, and never let the client decide which zone a record "belongs" to. ## Disclosure Credit: Found by Saif Salah (https://saifsalah.github.io/) Found during a security review of Poweradmin.

Published
Jul 24, 2026
Updated
Jul 24, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradminfrom 3.0.0 · before 3.9.113.9.11
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradminfrom 4.0.0 · before 4.2.54.2.5
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradminfrom 4.3.0 · before 4.3.44.3.4

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-h4hf-v6w5-897xPoweradmin: API user-update endpoint leads to a non-admin reset any user's password and take over the superuser account
    35Monitor
  • GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222Poweradmin: OIDC `sub` collation bypass in Poweradmin leading to account takeover
    32Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Packagist:poweradmin/poweradmin3.9.11Package registry (OSV)
Packagist:poweradmin/poweradmin4.2.5Package registry (OSV)
Packagist:poweradmin/poweradmin4.3.4Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

osv

References

All records