GHSA-796m-2973-wc5q: OpenClaw has exec allowlist/safeBins policy-runtime mismatch via env -S wrapper interpretation
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: openclaw (npm) 2026.2.23.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to openclaw (npm) 2026.2.23 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary `tools.exec` allowlist/safe-bins evaluation could diverge from runtime execution for wrapper commands using GNU `env -S/--split-string` semantics. This allowed policy checks to treat a command as a benign safe-bin invocation while runtime executed a different payload. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Vulnerable versions: `<= 2026.2.22-2` (latest currently published npm version) - Patched version (released): `2026.2.23` ### Impact An attacker able to influence tool command text (for example via untrusted prompt/content injection reaching an exec-capable flow) could bypass allowlist/safe-bins intent and execute unexpected commands. ### Technical Details Root cause was policy/runtime interpretation mismatch for dispatch wrappers: - analysis resolved an effective executable from wrapper-unwrapped argv, - execution could still run original wrapper argv semantics, - safe-bin short-flag handling also allowed unknown short options in clusters. ### Remediation The fix hardens exec approvals to fail closed and enforce analysis/runtime parity: - introduce wrapper execution planning with semantic-wrapper blocking, - carry planned `effectiveArgv` + `policyBlocked` metadata through resolution, - evaluate allowlist/safe-bins against planned argv, - enforce canonical rebuilt shell command from planned argv for allowlist auto-paths, - use planned argv for node-host/mac exec-host invocation paths, - reject unknown short safe-bin flags, - add regression tests for semantic `env` wrappers and parity fixtures. ### Fix Commit(s) - `a1c4bf07c6baad3ef87a0e710fe9aef127b1f606` ### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the released version (`2026.2.23`). Patched in `2026.2.23` and published. OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.
- Published
- Mar 3, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 4, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-436
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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What does it mean in your environment?
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We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | pkg:npm/openclaw |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | before 2026.2.23 | 2026.2.23 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvhOpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval35Monitor
- GHSA-474h-prjg-mmw3OpenClaw: Sandboxed sessions_spawn(runtime="acp") bypassed sandbox inheritance and allowed host ACP initialization32Monitor
- GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743OpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch30Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-7ff8-xjh3-mgh6Mar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw's non-default autoAllowSkills setting could bypass on-miss exec prompt0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4Mar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw: Microsoft Teams media fetch paths bypass shared SSRF guard model0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-w7j5-j98m-w679Mar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw has multiple E2E/test Dockerfiles that run all processes as root0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:openclaw | 2026.2.23 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-9q2p-vc84-2rwm6 days apartOpenClaw: system.run allow-always persistence included shell-commented payload tails20Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-436 · Interpretation ConflictCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.