GHSA-7ff8-xjh3-mgh6: OpenClaw's non-default autoAllowSkills setting could bypass on-miss exec prompt
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: openclaw (npm) 2026.2.23.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to openclaw (npm) 2026.2.23 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary In `openclaw` versions up to and including `2026.2.22-2`, a non-default exec-approval configuration could allow a skill-name collision to bypass an `ask=on-miss` prompt. When `autoAllowSkills=true`, a path-scoped executable such as `./skill-bin` could resolve to basename `skill-bin`, satisfy the `skills` allowlist segment, and run without prompting for approval. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `npm openclaw` - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.22-2` - Patched versions: `>= 2026.2.23` (released) ### Configuration Scope (Not Default) This behavior requires non-default settings and does not affect default installs. Required conditions: - `autoAllowSkills=true` (default is `false`) - `system.run` with `security=allowlist` - `ask=on-miss` ### Technical Details The allowlist evaluator accepted `skills` satisfaction by bin-name match, so `./skill-bin` could match `skillBins.has("skill-bin")` after resolution. The fix hardens skill auto-allow matching by requiring: - a pathless invocation token (no `/` or `\\`), and - a trusted resolved executable path for that skill bin on the machine where skills run. This preserves normal `skill-bin ...` behavior while preventing `./<skill-bin>` and absolute-path basename collisions from auto-satisfying `skills`. ### Impact In affected non-default configurations, approval prompts could be skipped for commands that should have required operator confirmation. ### Fix Commit(s) - `ffd63b7a2c4c6d5aeb4710ef951d5794ad7ad77b` (`fix(security): trust resolved skill-bin paths in allowlist auto-allow`) OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
- Published
- Mar 3, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 4, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-266
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | pkg:npm/openclaw |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | before 2026.2.23 | 2026.2.23 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvhOpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval35Monitor
- GHSA-474h-prjg-mmw3OpenClaw: Sandboxed sessions_spawn(runtime="acp") bypassed sandbox inheritance and allowed host ACP initialization32Monitor
- GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743OpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch30Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-r294-2894-92j3Mar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw has stored XSS in exported session HTML viewer via markdown/raw-HTML rendering0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-w9cg-v44m-4qv8Mar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw affected by BASH_ENV / ENV startup-file injection into spawned shell commands0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-7qf6-h84j-8fq4Mar 3, 2026 · OpenClaw: Microsoft Teams media fetch paths bypass shared SSRF guard model0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:openclaw | 2026.2.23 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-266 · Incorrect Privilege AssignmentCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.