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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxv: ASA-2024-004: Default configuration param for Evidence may limit window of validity

Low—No exploit No fix recorded

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.

Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

## ASA-2024-004: Default configuration param for Evidence may limit window of validity **Component**: CometBFT **Criticality**: Low **Affected versions**: All **Affected users**: Validators, Chain Builders + Maintainers ## Summary A default configuration in CometBFT has been found to be small for common use cases, and may prevent the slashing mechanism from working in specific cases. The default values for `EvidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks` and `EvidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration` consensus parameters may not be sufficient for common use cases to provide coverage for the entire unbonding period for a chain (`Staking.UnbondingTime`). If the conditions of both of these parameters are exceeded, evidence may be prematurely expired and considered no longer valid, potentially allowing for unpunished Byzantine behavior if evidence is discovered outside of that window. ## Next Steps for Chains and Validators It is recommended that chain ecosystems and their maintainers set the consensus parameters `EvidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks` and `EvidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration` to values appropriate for their use case: - `EvidenceParams.MaxAgeDuration` (set in nanoseconds) should exceed the duration of the chain’s unbonding period - `EvidenceParams.MaxAgeNumBlocks` should exceed the number of estimated blocks that will be produced by your chain throughout the unbonding period For more information about evidence in CometBFT, please see: https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.37/spec/consensus/evidence. For more information about the cosmos-sdk `x/staking` and `x/slashing` modules, and `UnbondingTime` parameter, please see: https://docs.cosmos.network/v0.50/build/modules/staking and https://docs.cosmos.network/v0.50/build/modules/slashing. CometBFT is designed to be configurable by chains, and implements many different configuration variables and parameters to allow chain developers, validators, node operators, and chain participants to customize it best to their use case. As more chains adopt the Interchain Stack for new and cutting-edge use cases, the CometBFT team recommends that all chains regularly evaluate their consensus parameters and configurations to ensure they meet the needs of their ecosystem as their networks mature. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the [CometBFT repository](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxv). For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/. This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on February 15, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.

Published
Feb 28, 2024
Updated
Feb 28, 2024
EPSS
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0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbft

Package-level exposure

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EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/cometbft/cometbftup to and including 0.38.5—

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-4361Inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived in github.com/cometbft/cometbft
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-c32p-wcqj-j677CometBFT has inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived
    0Monitor
  • GO-2025-4025CometBFT's invalid BitArray handling can lead to network halt in github.com/cometbft/cometbft
    0Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierGHSA-qr8r-m495-7hc4Jan 19, 2024 · Validation of `VoteExtensionsEnableHeight` can cause chain halt in Go package github.com/cometbft/cometbft
    0Monitor
  • ← EarlierGO-2024-2471Jan 23, 2024 · Chain halt panic in github.com/cometbft/cometbft
    0Monitor
  • Later →GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7Jun 28, 2024 · CometBFT is unstability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer
    0Monitor

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