GHSA-qr8r-m495-7hc4: Validation of `VoteExtensionsEnableHeight` can cause chain halt in Go package github.com/cometbft/cometbft
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 0.38.3.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 0.38.3 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary A vulnerability in CometBFT’s validation logic for `VoteExtensionsEnableHeight` can result in a chain halt when triggered through a governance parameter change proposal on an ABCI2 Application Chain. If a parameter change proposal including a `VoteExtensionsEnableHeight` modification is passed, nodes running the affected versions may panic, halting the network. The CometBFT team addressed this issue by improving validation logic for the `VoteExtensionsEnableHeight` to correctly handle governance proposals addressing this parameter. ## Next Steps for Impacted Parties If you are a chain developer with an active network running on CometBFT v. 0.38.x, we recommend updating your chain application to v0.38.3 or later of CometBFT to patch this issue. This issue can be resolved with a “soft patch” to an active network, i.e. nodes can be patched and restarted at different times without the need for a coordinated upgrade that halts a chain. If this patching methodology is used, the risk of a network halt triggered by this issue is mitigated once more than 66.7% of voting power on the network has applied the update, which provides protection from exploitation while on-chain governance processes for software upgrades take place. Once all validator nodes operating a network have been updated, the risk of a network halt due to this issue will be fully resolved. For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/. This issue was found by Dongsam ([@b_harvest](https://twitter.com/b__harvest?lang=en)) who reported it to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on January 15, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos.
- Published
- Jan 19, 2024
- Updated
- Jan 23, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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What does it mean in your environment?
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We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | pkg:golang/github.com/cometbft/cometbft |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | from 0.38.0 · before 0.38.3 | 0.38.3 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-4361Inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- GHSA-c32p-wcqj-j677CometBFT has inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived0Monitor
- GO-2025-4025CometBFT's invalid BitArray handling can lead to network halt in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-hq58-p9mv-338cSep 29, 2023 · CometBFT's default for `BlockParams.MaxBytes` consensus parameter may increase block times and affect consensus participation0Monitor
- Later →GO-2024-2471Jan 23, 2024 · Chain halt panic in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxvFeb 28, 2024 · ASA-2024-004: Default configuration param for Evidence may limit window of validity0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft | 0.38.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.