GHSA-hg58-rf2h-6rr7: CometBFT is unstability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 0.37.7, 0.38.8.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 0.37.7, 0.38.8 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
**Name**: ASA-2024-008: Instability during blocksync when syncing from malicious peer **Component**: CometBFT **Criticality**: Medium ([ACMv1](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md): I:Moderate; L: Possible) **Affected versions**: < v0.38.7 # Summary An issue was identified for nodes syncing on an existing network during blocksync in which a malicious peer could cause the syncing peer to panic, enter into a catastrophic invalid syncing state or get stuck in blocksync mode, never switching to consensus. It is recommended for all clients to adopt this patch so that blocksync functions as expected and is tolerant of malicious peers presenting invalid data in this situation. Nodes that are vulnerable to this state may experience a Denial of Service condition in which syncing will not work as expected when joining a network as a client. # Recognition This issue was reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on 5/01/24 by unknown_feature. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos. If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io). For more information about CometBFT, please see https://docs.cometbft.com/. For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.
- Published
- Jun 28, 2024
- Updated
- Jul 5, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-610
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | pkg:golang/github.com/cometbft/cometbft |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | from 0.37.0 · before 0.37.7 | 0.37.7 |
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | from 0.38.0 · before 0.38.8 | 0.38.8 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-4361Inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- GHSA-c32p-wcqj-j677CometBFT has inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived0Monitor
- GO-2025-4025CometBFT's invalid BitArray handling can lead to network halt in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGO-2024-2471Jan 23, 2024 · Chain halt panic in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-555p-m4v6-cqxvFeb 28, 2024 · ASA-2024-004: Default configuration param for Evidence may limit window of validity0Monitor
- Later →GO-2024-2951Jul 2, 2024 · Denial of service when syncing with a malicious peer in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft | 0.37.7 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft | 0.38.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-610 · Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another SphereAttack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.