CVE-2026-91039: dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 36/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.66% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 51.6% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: team-alembic ash_authentication 5.0.0-rc.14, 73ad16e452670bbf843550a13361bd41e72ad964.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to team-alembic ash_authentication 5.0.0-rc.14, 73ad16e452670bbf843550a13361bd41e72ad964 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who operates one identity-provider connection of a dynamic_oidc strategy to be signed in as a local user established through a different connection. The strategy is meant to keep each connection in its own identity namespace by writing every UserIdentity row's strategy field as "<name>/<connection_id>", but that namespacing never takes effect. __connection_id__ is populated only on the ephemeral runtime struct built per request in dynamic_oidc/plug.ex, and DynamicOidc.IdentityChange.change/3 re-fetches the strategy from the compile-time DSL through Info.strategy_for_action, yielding the persisted struct whose __connection_id__ is its defstruct default of nil. OAuth2.identity_strategy_name/1 therefore falls back to the bare strategy name for both the identity write and the reads in oauth2/user_resolver.ex and oauth2/sign_in_preparation.ex. Since the identity resource's unique key is (uid, strategy), one row exists per sub across every connection, and the identity-match branch runs before any email check. Neither strategy handles iss, so nothing else distinguishes the issuers: OpenID Connect Core section 5.7 makes sub unique only within an issuer, so two connections numbering subjects independently share one subject space. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
- Published
- Sep 17, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 18, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 51th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-290
Report tools
Action score
36
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 36 / 40 · 9.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 9.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
team-alembic ash_authentication
- 5.0.0-rc.10 and later · before 5.0.0-rc.14affected · semver
- 64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7 and later · before 73ad16e452670bbf843550a13361bd41e72ad964affected · git
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 5.0.0-rc.10 · before 5.0.0-rc.14 | 5.0.0-rc.14 |
Same product
team-alembic: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-76949Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement36Monitor
- CVE-2026-88952OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication36Monitor
- CVE-2026-86533Revoked session accepted because the session jti is never checked in AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix36Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-85500Sep 17, 2026 · `require_confirmed_with` is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication36Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-86522Sep 17, 2026 · Log injection via an unescaped password reset identity in AshAuthentication25Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-86688Sep 17, 2026 · Session id is not renewed on authentication in ash_authentication, allowing session fixation29Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.14 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 73ad16e452670bbf843550a13361bd41e72ad964 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Jacereporter
- James Hartonremediation developer
- manus-pireporter
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFcoordinator
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-769490 days apartRemember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement36Monitor
- CVE-2026-4975794 days apartOAuth2/OIDC account takeover in AshAuthentication via email-based user matching36Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-290 · Authentication Bypass by SpoofingCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Creating a Rogue Certification Authority CertificateCAPEC-459likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension WeaknessCAPEC-461High
- Signature SpoofCAPEC-473
- Signature Spoofing by MisrepresentationCAPEC-476likelihood: Low · High
- Session Credential Falsification through PredictionCAPEC-59likelihood: High · High
- Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)CAPEC-60likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureT1036.001
- Access Token ManipulationT1134
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Steal Application Access TokenT1528
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningT1553.002
- Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/73ad16e452670bbf843550a13361bd41e72ad964
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-73j9-m294-fvv9
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-91039
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.