CVE-2026-86688: Session id is not renewed on authentication in ash_authentication, allowing session fixation
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 29/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.74% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 54.9% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: team-alembic ash_authentication 3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa, 4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to team-alembic ash_authentication 3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa, 4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Session Fixation vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a session identifier in a victim's browser to hold an authenticated session once that victim signs in. AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.store_in_session/2 writes the authenticated subject into the existing session with Plug.Conn.put_session/3 and never calls Plug.Conn.configure_session(renew: true), so the identifier the visitor arrived with carries into their authenticated session. Every authentication event reaches this one function: the default success/4 injected by AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Controller.__using__/1, the AuthController emitted by mix ash_authentication_phoenix.install, and remember-me auto-login. AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Plug.store_in_session/2 is a defdelegate to it. Logout does not close the window either, because clear_session/2 ends with Plug.Conn.clear_session/1, which clears session contents but leaves the identifier intact, so a planted identifier survives a logout-then-login cycle. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
- Published
- Sep 17, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 18, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.7% · 54th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-384
Report tools
Action score
29
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 29 / 40 · 7.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.7%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 7.4
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
team-alembic ash_authentication
- 0.2.0 and later · before 4.15.0affected · semver
- 5.0.0-rc.0 and later · before 5.0.0-rc.14affected · semver
- a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231 and lateraffected · gitfixed in 872db454405ecad4fcdabd9ff3d8755d1d6a69ae, 3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 0.2.0 · before 4.15.0 | 4.15.0 |
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 5.0.0-rc.0 · before 5.0.0-rc.14 | 5.0.0-rc.14 |
Same product
team-alembic: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-76949Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement36Monitor
- CVE-2026-91039dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover36Monitor
- CVE-2026-88952OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication36Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-86522Sep 17, 2026 · Log injection via an unescaped password reset identity in AshAuthentication25Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-86533Sep 17, 2026 · Revoked session accepted because the session jti is never checked in AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix36Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-118505Nov 3, 2026 · AshAuthentication brute_force_strategy does not limit sign-in and request actions defined on the resource25Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 4.15.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.14 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 872db454405ecad4fcdabd9ff3d8755d1d6a69ae | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 4.15.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Peter Ullrichreporter
- James Hartonremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFcoordinator
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- A
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-384 · Session FixationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Session Credential Falsification through ForgingCAPEC-196likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP CookiesCAPEC-31likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data TokensCAPEC-39likelihood: High · Medium
- Session Credential Falsification through PredictionCAPEC-59likelihood: High · High
- Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)CAPEC-60likelihood: High · High
- Session FixationCAPEC-61likelihood: Medium · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Access Token ManipulationT1134
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with TokenT1134.002
- Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate TokenT1134.003
- Steal Application Access TokenT1528
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Forge Web CredentialsT1606
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3e1d452cbf1564e87f5f97be882b66fe25af7cfa
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/872db454405ecad4fcdabd9ff3d8755d1d6a69ae
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/a939dde9b917c072cdf10c4b0913a9886a4b0231
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-v577-944g-7h3x
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-86688
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.