CVE-2026-85500: `require_confirmed_with` is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 36/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.76% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 56.1% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: team-alembic ash_authentication 1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16, 17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711, 4.15.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to team-alembic ash_authentication 1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16, 17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711, 4.15.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement. AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2 decides whether the attribute named by require_confirmed_with is set using a bare is_nil(Map.get(user, value)). When that attribute is not selected on the loaded record Map.get/2 returns %Ash.NotLoaded{}, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns %Ash.ForbiddenField{}. Neither is nil, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-i require_confirmed_with is enforced in two places, and neither holds in every configuration. sign_in_with_token and register are checked only inside AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions, not on the action itself, so any caller that invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as AshGraphql or AshJsonApi invokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration. Where a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against nil. That attribute holds %Ash.NotLoaded{} or %Ash.ForbiddenField{} when it sets select_by_default?: false, when an API layer narrows the read's select, or when a field policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is nil, so those configurations read every user as confirmed. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
- Published
- Sep 17, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 18, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.7% · 56th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-305
Report tools
Action score
36
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 36 / 40 · 9.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.7%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 9.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
team-alembic ash_authentication
- 4.3.8 and later · before 4.15.0affected · semver
- 5.0.0-rc.0 and later · before 5.0.0-rc.14affected · semver
- 7d37bc6e4df6697b5813d2f373f0fdb08f813f98 and lateraffected · gitfixed in 17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711, 1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 4.3.8 · before 4.15.0 | 4.15.0 |
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 5.0.0-rc.0 · before 5.0.0-rc.14 | 5.0.0-rc.14 |
Same product
team-alembic: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-76949Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement36Monitor
- CVE-2026-91039dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover36Monitor
- CVE-2026-88952OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication36Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-82760Sep 17, 2026 · Superlinear base62 decoding exhausts CPU and memory in AshAuthentication API key sign-in32Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-82761Sep 17, 2026 · Magic link single-use tokens replayable via TOCTOU race in AshAuthentication36Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-86522Sep 17, 2026 · Log injection via an unescaped password reset identity in AshAuthentication25Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 4.15.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.14 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 4.15.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Peter Ullrichreporter
- James Hartonremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFanalyst
Not on record for this CVE: variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-305 · Authentication Bypass by Primary WeaknessCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/7d37bc6e4df6697b5813d2f373f0fdb08f813f98
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-85500
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.