CVE-2026-89666: nfsd: reject out-of-range nseconds in NFSv3 SETATTR and create ops
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.16% (FIRST EPSS).
- Fixed version: Linux Linux 54e02f5e32c52fb395f2ee02986a6c6d5608d22b, 55341d8a5a0f5853e70d46f5a55cf06007808f1d, 98fc1d21a7b80324ba64b949ac6bcc00364dd068.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 54e02f5e32c52fb395f2ee02986a6c6d5608d22b, 55341d8a5a0f5853e70d46f5a55cf06007808f1d, 98fc1d21a7b80324ba64b949ac6bcc00364dd068 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: reject out-of-range nseconds in NFSv3 SETATTR and create ops A client can send an NFSv3 SETATTR, CREATE, MKDIR, SYMLINK or MKNOD carrying an atime or mtime whose nseconds field is out of range. The value is well-formed on the wire and decodes cleanly into a valid uint32, but it is not a valid timespec64: tv_nsec must be less than NSEC_PER_SEC. Nothing in the setattr path clamps it. notify_change() runs the time through timestamp_truncate(), which does not reduce tv_nsec below NSEC_PER_SEC when the filesystem supports nanosecond granularity (s_time_gran == 1), and the inode atime/mtime setters store it verbatim (only ctime is normalized, via inode_set_ctime_to_ts()). The un-normalized value then corrupts on-disk metadata: ext4's ext4_encode_extra_time() shifts tv_nsec left by EXT4_EPOCH_BITS, which overflows the 32-bit extra field and clobbers the seconds-epoch bits, so the stored seconds (and thus the year) are wrong on read-back. XFS with bigtime mis-stores the timestamp for the same reason. Validate the client-supplied atime/mtime in the proc handlers and return NFS3ERR_INVAL before anything is changed. RFC 1813 lists NFS3ERR_INVAL for SETATTR and describes it as the error for a value the server 'can not store ... in its own representation'; the client maps it to EINVAL. Checking in the proc handlers, rather than in nfsd_setattr(), keeps the rejection in front of object creation. The create operations create the object before nfsd_create_setattr() runs, so a late failure would leave the new object behind and turn a non-idempotent request into a namespace change that reports failure. The check is therefore done up front, for the create operations before the object is created. tv_nsec is a long, so the comparison casts it to unsigned long (the same width) rather than to u32, matching timespec64_valid(). A u32 cast would truncate on 64-bit; the unsigned long cast also rejects a value that became negative when an out-of-range u32 wire nseconds was assigned to a 32-bit long. Only client-supplied times are checked: SET_TO_SERVER_TIME requests carry no client value. The sattrguard3 ctime is deliberately left alone: an out-of-range guard simply never matches the object's ctime and yields NFS3ERR_NOT_SYNC via the existing guardtime comparison, which is the protocol-correct outcome rather than rejecting the request.
- Published
- Sep 11, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 21, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 6th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 2.6.12affected
- 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and later · before 98fc1d21a7b80324ba64b949ac6bcc00364dd068affected · git
- 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and later · before 55341d8a5a0f5853e70d46f5a55cf06007808f1daffected · git
- 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and later · before 54e02f5e32c52fb395f2ee02986a6c6d5608d22baffected · git
- 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and later · before e2543852152bcf9aeb57da17d9f9219f7df8aafbaffected · git
- 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and later · before eb0eca7720662ba5847df1510e73801f7f473094affected · git
- before 2.6.12not affected · semver
- 6.6.160 and later · up to and including 6.6.*not affected · semver
- 6.12.109 and later · up to and including 6.12.*not affected · semver
- 6.18.50 and later · up to and including 6.18.*not affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux | from 0 | — |
| Debian:12 | linux-6.12 | before 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.111-1 | 6.12.111-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.6-1 | 7.2.6-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-89664Sep 11, 2026 · nfsd: release OPEN-decoded posix ACLs via op_release30Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-89665Sep 11, 2026 · nfsd: reject out-of-range useconds in NFSv2 SETATTR/CREATE32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-89667Sep 11, 2026 · nfsd: close shrinker/GC/fsnotify vs per-net shutdown race in filecache32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | 54e02f5e32c52fb395f2ee02986a6c6d5608d22b | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 55341d8a5a0f5853e70d46f5a55cf06007808f1d | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | 98fc1d21a7b80324ba64b949ac6bcc00364dd068 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | e2543852152bcf9aeb57da17d9f9219f7df8aafb | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | eb0eca7720662ba5847df1510e73801f7f473094 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:linux | 6.12.111-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux-6.12 | 6.12.111-1~deb12u1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-1085 · Sep 14, 2026(Linux Kernel Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.