CVE-2026-66882: Reflected XSS in AshAuthentication confirmation and magic link interaction forms
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 8/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.75% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 55.1% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: team-alembic ash_authentication 0bd5199db066be22b2ca1ec8bc6109e5d62e6070, 4.14.2, 5.0.0-rc.13.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to team-alembic ash_authentication 0bd5199db066be22b2ca1ec8bc6109e5d62e6070, 4.14.2, 5.0.0-rc.13 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows reflected cross-site scripting via the confirmation and magic link interaction forms. When a strategy is configured with require_interaction? set to true, AshAuthentication serves an intermediate HTML page asking the user to confirm the action by submitting a form. Both such pages embed a request parameter directly into a hidden input's value attribute without HTML escaping: lib/ash_authentication/add_ons/confirmation/confirmation_form.html.eex interpolates the confirm parameter, and lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_form.html.eex interpolates the magic link token parameter. These templates are compiled with EEx.function_from_file/3 using plain <%= %> expressions, which perform no escaping, so the parameter is reflected verbatim. Neither accept handler validates the value before rendering it. AshAuthentication.AddOn.Confirmation.Plug.accept/2 only checks that a confirm key is present, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.Plug.accept/2 reads the parameter directly, so no token signature is verified at this stage and arbitrary attacker-supplied text reaches the template. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore craft a URL whose parameter terminates the attribute and injects markup, for example a quote followed by a <script> element. Because the accept phase is served over GET, loading the crafted link is sufficient; no form submission or prior authentication is required. The injected script executes in the origin of the application embedding AshAuthentication, giving it access to that origin's cookies, session, and same-origin responses. Since these pages are part of the authentication flow, a victim following what appears to be a legitimate confirmation or sign-in link is a plausible target. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.8.0 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.
- Published
- Aug 25, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 1, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.7% · 55th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-79
Report tools
Action score
8
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 8 / 40 · 2.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.7%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 2.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Limit the impact of XSS
This is a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. A well-configured Content-Security-Policy doesn't fix it, but greatly reduces its impact. Check your site's CSP and other security headers for free.
Check security headersVersions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
team-alembic ash_authentication
- 4.8.0 and later · before 4.14.2affected · semver
- 5.0.0-rc.0 and later · before 5.0.0-rc.13affected · semver
- fe0b4558dbe852fee5d81a460a8355577618a8c8 and lateraffected · gitfixed in 62719710790a150a9eacab9c0a066e0d122d15be, 0bd5199db066be22b2ca1ec8bc6109e5d62e6070
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 4.8.0 · before 4.14.2 | 4.14.2 |
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 5.0.0-rc.0 · before 5.0.0-rc.13 | 5.0.0-rc.13 |
Same product
team-alembic: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-76949Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement36Monitor
- CVE-2026-91039dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover36Monitor
- CVE-2026-88952OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication36Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-49757Jun 15, 2026 · OAuth2/OIDC account takeover in AshAuthentication via email-based user matching36Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-65633Aug 25, 2026 · Purpose-limited JWT accepted as full bearer authentication in AshAuthentication30Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-78223Sep 17, 2026 · Token revocation record built from unverified JWT claims in AshAuthentication27Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 0bd5199db066be22b2ca1ec8bc6109e5d62e6070 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 4.14.2 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.13 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 62719710790a150a9eacab9c0a066e0d122d15be | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 4.14.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.13 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Arpit Jainfinder
- James Hartonremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFcoordinator
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- A
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-79 · Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
User content is inserted into the page as HTML. The browser interprets the content as code rather than data.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-79 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
commentEl.innerHTML = comment.body;Fixed
commentEl.textContent = comment.body;Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/0bd5199db066be22b2ca1ec8bc6109e5d62e6070
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/62719710790a150a9eacab9c0a066e0d122d15be
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-54fc-x3hv-ffhw
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66882
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.