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CVE-2026-65633· NVD / CVE Program· CNA EEF

Purpose-limited JWT accepted as full bearer authentication in AshAuthentication

Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows purpose-limited JWTs to be replayed as full bearer API credentials when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification. The bearer-token authentication helper AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 verifies an Authorization: Bearer JWT's signature and rejects tokens containing an act claim, but performs no check that the token's purpose claim equals user at the bearer boundary. When the resource is configured with require_token_presence_for_authentication?: false (the DSL default), the follow-on validate_token/3 helper returns {:ok, nil} without consulting the token resource, so no downstream check on purpose takes place either. As a result, any valid, non-expired JWT the library itself issued for a narrow, single-purpose flow (most notably the purpose: sign_in token that WebAuthn always emits during sign-in, and that the Password strategy emits when sign-in tokens are enabled) is accepted directly as a general-purpose bearer credential and resolves to a full current_user assignment. This bypasses the library's intended token-exchange contract, in which the sign_in token is meant to be presented exactly once to a preparation that validates the purpose claim and immediately revokes the token. The first use of a still-valid sign-in token presented directly in the Authorization header succeeds because the stateless bearer path never scopes it to purpose == "user". An attacker who obtains a not-yet-exchanged sign-in token for a target subject (for example via log or referrer leakage, an intercepted magic-link delivery channel, or a partially compromised intermediary) can present it as a bearer token and be authenticated as that subject, fully bypassing the intended one-time-use and revocation semantics. Exploitation additionally requires that the host application wire up retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a reachable route and uses either WebAuthn (sign-in tokens are always issued) or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. Resources configured with require_token_presence_for_authentication?: true (including applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0) and the session-based path (authenticate_resource_from_session/4) enforce purpose == "user" against the stored token record and are not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.

HighCVSS 7.6 · v4.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Aug 25, 2026
Updated
Sep 1, 2026
EPSS
0.6% · 46th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.6 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.6%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · EEF
7.6
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • team-alembic ash_authentication

    • 3.10.5 and later · before 4.14.2affected · semver
    • 5.0.0-rc.0 and later · before 5.0.0-rc.13affected · semver
    • eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269 and lateraffected · gitfixed in 8cf8b2d4426172be0900a3505e9491800b951750, 124eddd1bbeb40289c3fe8831ac10677a19fcf09

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Hexash_authenticationfrom 3.10.5 · before 4.14.24.14.2
Hexash_authenticationfrom 5.0.0-rc.0 · before 5.0.0-rc.135.0.0-rc.13

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-76949Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-91039dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-88952OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-86533Revoked session accepted because the session jti is never checked in AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-85500`require_confirmed_with` is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-82761Magic link single-use tokens replayable via TOCTOU race in AshAuthentication
    36Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
team-alembic ash_authentication124eddd1bbeb40289c3fe8831ac10677a19fcf09Vendor (CNA)
team-alembic ash_authentication4.14.2Vendor (CNA)
team-alembic ash_authentication5.0.0-rc.13Vendor (CNA)
team-alembic ash_authentication8cf8b2d4426172be0900a3505e9491800b951750Vendor (CNA)
Hex:ash_authentication4.14.2Package registry (OSV)
Hex:ash_authentication5.0.0-rc.13Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-8895223 days apartOAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication
    36Monitor
  • CVE-2026-8021823 days apartSign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication
    30Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
P
Scope
X

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

ts
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

All records