Purpose-limited JWT accepted as full bearer authentication in AshAuthentication
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows purpose-limited JWTs to be replayed as full bearer API credentials when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification. The bearer-token authentication helper AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 verifies an Authorization: Bearer JWT's signature and rejects tokens containing an act claim, but performs no check that the token's purpose claim equals user at the bearer boundary. When the resource is configured with require_token_presence_for_authentication?: false (the DSL default), the follow-on validate_token/3 helper returns {:ok, nil} without consulting the token resource, so no downstream check on purpose takes place either. As a result, any valid, non-expired JWT the library itself issued for a narrow, single-purpose flow (most notably the purpose: sign_in token that WebAuthn always emits during sign-in, and that the Password strategy emits when sign-in tokens are enabled) is accepted directly as a general-purpose bearer credential and resolves to a full current_user assignment. This bypasses the library's intended token-exchange contract, in which the sign_in token is meant to be presented exactly once to a preparation that validates the purpose claim and immediately revokes the token. The first use of a still-valid sign-in token presented directly in the Authorization header succeeds because the stateless bearer path never scopes it to purpose == "user". An attacker who obtains a not-yet-exchanged sign-in token for a target subject (for example via log or referrer leakage, an intercepted magic-link delivery channel, or a partially compromised intermediary) can present it as a bearer token and be authenticated as that subject, fully bypassing the intended one-time-use and revocation semantics. Exploitation additionally requires that the host application wire up retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a reachable route and uses either WebAuthn (sign-in tokens are always issued) or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. Resources configured with require_token_presence_for_authentication?: true (including applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0) and the session-based path (authenticate_resource_from_session/4) enforce purpose == "user" against the stored token record and are not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.
- Published
- Aug 25, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 1, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 46th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-287
Sign in to follow · You’ll be notified if a followed record enters KEV, gets an exploit or is updated.
Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.6 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 7.6
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
team-alembic ash_authentication
- 3.10.5 and later · before 4.14.2affected · semver
- 5.0.0-rc.0 and later · before 5.0.0-rc.13affected · semver
- eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269 and lateraffected · gitfixed in 8cf8b2d4426172be0900a3505e9491800b951750, 124eddd1bbeb40289c3fe8831ac10677a19fcf09
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 3.10.5 · before 4.14.2 | 4.14.2 |
| Hex | ash_authentication | from 5.0.0-rc.0 · before 5.0.0-rc.13 | 5.0.0-rc.13 |
Same product
team-alembic: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-76949Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement36Monitor
- CVE-2026-91039dynamic_oidc identities are not namespaced by connection in ash_authentication, allowing cross-connection account takeover36Monitor
- CVE-2026-88952OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication36Monitor
- CVE-2026-86533Revoked session accepted because the session jti is never checked in AshAuthentication and AshAuthentication Phoenix36Monitor
- CVE-2026-85500`require_confirmed_with` is not enforced on the action and fails open on an unreadable attribute in AshAuthentication36Monitor
- CVE-2026-82761Magic link single-use tokens replayable via TOCTOU race in AshAuthentication36Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 124eddd1bbeb40289c3fe8831ac10677a19fcf09 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 4.14.2 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.13 | Vendor (CNA) |
| team-alembic ash_authentication | 8cf8b2d4426172be0900a3505e9491800b951750 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 4.14.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Hex:ash_authentication | 5.0.0-rc.13 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- EQSTLabfinder
- James Hartonremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFcoordinator
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-8895223 days apartOAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication36Monitor
- CVE-2026-8021823 days apartSign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication30Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- P
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-287 · Improper AuthenticationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-287 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);Fixed
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Authentication AbuseCAPEC-114Medium
- Authentication BypassCAPEC-115Medium
- Identity SpoofingCAPEC-151likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Fake the Source of DataCAPEC-194Medium
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive DataCAPEC-57likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Session HijackingCAPEC-593likelihood: High · Very High
- Token ImpersonationCAPEC-633Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65633.html
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/124eddd1bbeb40289c3fe8831ac10677a19fcf09
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/8cf8b2d4426172be0900a3505e9491800b951750
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-6vcj-3h59-rrc3
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65633
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.