CVE-2026-10663: Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the experimental USB host stack
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 24/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.23% (FIRST EPSS).
- Physical access to the device is required. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: zephyrproject zephyr 4.4.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to zephyrproject zephyr 4.4.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx->root. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx->root, checking only that it is non-NULL. Because UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object. Impact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.
- Published
- Jul 12, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 4, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 14th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-416
Report tools
Action score
24
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 24 / 40 · 6.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · zephyr
- 6.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr | cpe:2.3:o:zephyrproject:zephyr |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- zephyrproject zephyr4.4.0 and later · before 4.5.0
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (zephyr). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
zephyrproject zephyr
- 4.4.0 and later · before 4.4.2affected · semver
Same product
zephyrproject: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2023-4260Potential off-by-one buffer overflow vulnerability in the Zephyr FS subsystem40Plan
- CVE-2021-3625Buffer overflow in Zephyr USB DFU DNLOAD40Plan
- CVE-2020-10071Insufficient publish message length validation in MQTT40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-10659Jul 7, 2026 · NULL pointer dereference in Zephyr Dhara FTL disk driver on flash read error during journal resume18Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-10660Jul 11, 2026 · Shared reassembly buffer in Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant enables cross-connection memory corruption25Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-10664Jul 12, 2026 · Out-of-bounds write in nRF70 Wi-Fi driver power-save event handler (unbounded TWT flow count)20Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject zephyr | 4.4.2 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-1236633 days apartUse-after-free freeing an armed dynamically-allocated k_timer in Zephyr userspace object disposal35Monitor
- CVE-2026-85035114 days apartUse-after-free via dynamically allocated message queue retained by the CAN RX filter35Monitor
- CVE-2026-106670 days apartSMP use-after-free in Zephyr `CONFIG_USERSPACE` dynamic kernel-object tracking, reachable from unprivileged user threads31Monitor
- CVE-2026-79979103 days apartStale TLB entries after demand-paging page-out let arm64 user threads access reused physical frames31Monitor
- CVE-2026-1068519 days apartUse-after-free of GATT subscribe params in Bluetooth host CCC-write response handler30Monitor
- CVE-2026-1063826 days apartUse-after-free in Zephyr ICMPv6 RX path when updating statistics after sending an echo reply or error30Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Physical access to the device is required.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Physical
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-416 · Use After FreeCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Root cause
After a memory region is freed, another reference pointing to it is still used. By then, the same region may have been allocated for different data.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-416 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
free(dev->buf);
/* ... another thread is still running ... */
process(dev->buf);Fixed
lock(&dev->lock);
free(dev->buf);
dev->buf = NULL;
unlock(&dev->lock);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.