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NVD / CVE Program· CNA Linux

CVE-2025-39989: x86/mce: use is_copy_from_user() to determine copy-from-user context

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 22/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.24% (FIRST EPSS).
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: Linux Linux 0b8388e97ba6a8c033f9a8b5565af41af07f9345, 1a15bb8303b6b104e78028b6c68f76a0d4562134, 3e3d8169c0950a0b3cd5105f6403a78350dcac80; azl3 kernel 6.6.85.1-4 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.92.2-1; azl3 kernel 6.6.92.2-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.92.2-1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 0b8388e97ba6a8c033f9a8b5565af41af07f9345, 1a15bb8303b6b104e78028b6c68f76a0d4562134, 3e3d8169c0950a0b3cd5105f6403a78350dcac80; azl3 kernel 6.6.85.1-4 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.92.2-1; azl3 kernel 6.6.92.2-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.92.2-1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mce: use is_copy_from_user() to determine copy-from-user context Patch series "mm/hwpoison: Fix regressions in memory failure handling", v4. ## 1. What am I trying to do: This patchset resolves two critical regressions related to memory failure handling that have appeared in the upstream kernel since version 5.17, as compared to 5.10 LTS. - copyin case: poison found in user page while kernel copying from user space - instr case: poison found while instruction fetching in user space ## 2. What is the expected outcome and why - For copyin case: Kernel can recover from poison found where kernel is doing get_user() or copy_from_user() if those places get an error return and the kernel return -EFAULT to the process instead of crashing. More specifily, MCE handler checks the fixup handler type to decide whether an in kernel #MC can be recovered. When EX_TYPE_UACCESS is found, the PC jumps to recovery code specified in _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT() and return a -EFAULT to user space. - For instr case: If a poison found while instruction fetching in user space, full recovery is possible. User process takes #PF, Linux allocates a new page and fills by reading from storage. ## 3. What actually happens and why - For copyin case: kernel panic since v5.17 Commit 4c132d1d844a ("x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage") introduced a new extable fixup type, EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG, and later patches updated the extable fixup type for copy-from-user operations, changing it from EX_TYPE_UACCESS to EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG. It breaks previous EX_TYPE_UACCESS handling when posion found in get_user() or copy_from_user(). - For instr case: user process is killed by a SIGBUS signal due to #CMCI and #MCE race When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a UCNA signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check when the data is about to be consumed. ### Background: why *UN*corrected errors tied to *C*MCI in Intel platform [1] Prior to Icelake memory controllers reported patrol scrub events that detected a previously unseen uncorrected error in memory by signaling a broadcast machine check with an SRAO (Software Recoverable Action Optional) signature in the machine check bank. This was overkill because it's not an urgent problem that no core is on the verge of consuming that bad data. It's also found that multi SRAO UCE may cause nested MCE interrupts and finally become an IERR. Hence, Intel downgrades the machine check bank signature of patrol scrub from SRAO to UCNA (Uncorrected, No Action required), and signal changed to #CMCI. Just to add to the confusion, Linux does take an action (in uc_decode_notifier()) to try to offline the page despite the UC*NA* signature name. ### Background: why #CMCI and #MCE race when poison is consuming in Intel platform [1] Having decided that CMCI/UCNA is the best action for patrol scrub errors, the memory controller uses it for reads too. But the memory controller is executing asynchronously from the core, and can't tell the difference between a "real" read and a speculative read. So it will do CMCI/UCNA if an error is found in any read. Thus: 1) Core is clever and thinks address A is needed soon, issues a speculative read. 2) Core finds it is going to use address A soon after sending the read request 3) The CMCI from the memory controller is in a race with MCE from the core that will soon try to retire the load from address A. Quite often (because speculation has got better) the CMCI from the memory controller is delivered before the core is committed to the instruction reading address A, so the interrupt is taken, and Linux offlines the page (marking it as poison). ## Why user process is killed for instr case Commit 046545a661af ("mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported "not ---truncated---

MediumCVSS 5.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Apr 18, 2025
Updated
Nov 5, 2026
EPSS
0.2% · 15th percentile

Report tools

JSON

Action score

22

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
22 / 40 · 5.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.2%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

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When you'll hear from us

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  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
linuxlinux kernel

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • linux linux kernel5.15.58 and later · before 5.16
  • linux linux kernel5.17 and later · before 6.6.89
  • linux linux kernel6.7 and later · before 6.12.23
  • linux linux kernel6.13 and later · before 6.13.11
  • linux linux kernel6.14 and later · before 6.14.2

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Linux Linux

    • 88eded8104d2ca0429703755dd250f8cbecc1447, 5.17affected
    • 4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783 and later · before 7a1168257e81954fa1b5b1ce86f47d2567e734abaffected · git
    • 4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783 and later · before 5724654a084f701dc64b08d34a0e800f22f0e6e4affected · git
    • 4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783 and later · before 3e3d8169c0950a0b3cd5105f6403a78350dcac80affected · git
    • 4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783 and later · before 449413da90a337f343cc5a73070cbd68e92e8a54affected · git
    • 4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783 and later · before 0b8388e97ba6a8c033f9a8b5565af41af07f9345affected · git
    • 4c132d1d844a53fc4e4b5c34e36ef10d6124b783 and later · before 1a15bb8303b6b104e78028b6c68f76a0d4562134affected · git
    • 5.15.58 and later · before 5.16affected · semver
    • before 5.17not affected · semver
    • 6.1.191 and later · up to and including 6.1.*not affected · semver

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:12linuxfrom 0—
Debian:13linuxbefore 6.12.25-16.12.25-1

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-31431crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-placeKEV
    90Now
  • CVE-2022-0847A flaw was found in the way the "flags" member of the new pipe buffer structure was lacking proper initialization in copy_page_to_iter_pipe…KEV
    89Now
  • CVE-2021-22555Heap Out-Of-Bounds Write in Netfilter IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACEKEV
    85Now

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierCVE-2025-37860Apr 18, 2025 · sfc: fix NULL dereferences in ef100_process_design_param()
    22Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2025-39688Apr 18, 2025 · nfsd: allow SC_STATUS_FREEABLE when searching via nfs4_lookup_stateid()
    22Monitor
  • Later →CVE-2025-40325Apr 18, 2025 · md/raid10: wait barrier before returning discard request with REQ_NOWAIT
    22Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Linux Linux0b8388e97ba6a8c033f9a8b5565af41af07f9345Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linux1a15bb8303b6b104e78028b6c68f76a0d4562134Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linux3e3d8169c0950a0b3cd5105f6403a78350dcac80Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linux449413da90a337f343cc5a73070cbd68e92e8a54Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linux5.16Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linux5724654a084f701dc64b08d34a0e800f22f0e6e4Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linux7a1168257e81954fa1b5b1ce86f47d2567e734abVendor (CNA)
azl3 kernel 6.6.85.1-4 on Azure Linux 3.06.6.92.2-1 · CBL-Mariner ReleasesMicrosoft (MSRC)
azl3 kernel 6.6.92.2-1 on Azure Linux 3.06.6.92.2-1 · CBL-Mariner ReleasesMicrosoft (MSRC)
cbl2 kernel 5.15.202.1-1 on CBL-Mariner 2.0—Microsoft (MSRC)
debian:linux6.12.25-1 · Debian:13Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd-primary

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

Change log

  1. SSVC exploitation— → none
  2. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

All records