CVE-2026-98641: bpf, arm64: set up the frame pointer for the exception callback
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.16% (FIRST EPSS).
- Fixed version: Linux Linux b67b4c763f211e7a6391c356fef552e2ea63f08a, d7cd5ebe13989f265015910faa25e5d50faa4c22, ecdd770a9fc3eaf6c3127c5991312b84774a7b0f.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux b67b4c763f211e7a6391c356fef552e2ea63f08a, d7cd5ebe13989f265015910faa25e5d50faa4c22, ecdd770a9fc3eaf6c3127c5991312b84774a7b0f or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, arm64: set up the frame pointer for the exception callback A program acting as exception boundary saves all callee-saved registers, so build_prologue() takes the exception_cb path and never calls push_callee_regs(). That is the only place find_used_callee_regs() runs, and with it the only place ctx->fp_used is set, so the callback prologue does not emit the mov x25, sp that points BPF_REG_FP at the frame the callback runs on. x25 keeps whatever it held when bpf_throw() was called. If the throw came from a subprogram that uses its own BPF stack, that is the subprogram's frame pointer, and since the subprogram never returns it never restores x25 either. Stack accesses through BPF_REG_FP are rewritten to be stack pointer relative, so those still land in the callback's own frame. Materializing the register does not: a callback that passes the address of a local variable to a helper hands over an address in the dead subprogram's frame. That address is below the callback's stack pointer by then, and the helper's own call chain covers it, so the helper can write over its own return address. 0x1234 below is the value the helper was asked to store: pc : 0x1234 lr : 0x1234 Call trace: 0x1234 (P) bpf_test_run+0x188/0x3e0 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x47c/0x998 __sys_bpf+0xbdc/0xdd8 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt Set ctx->fp_used on the exception callback path so that the existing code further down sets x25 from the stack pointer. The epilogue restores it from the main program's save area along with the other callee-saved registers, as it already does. x86 sets the frame pointer for the callback from the argument it is passed, and powerpc computes it from the stack pointer.
- Published
- Oct 18, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 19, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 6th percentile
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
0
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Linux Linux
- 6.12affected
- 5d4fa9ec5643a5c75d3c1e6abf50fb9284caf1ff and later · before ecdd770a9fc3eaf6c3127c5991312b84774a7b0faffected · git
- 5d4fa9ec5643a5c75d3c1e6abf50fb9284caf1ff and later · before b67b4c763f211e7a6391c356fef552e2ea63f08aaffected · git
- 5d4fa9ec5643a5c75d3c1e6abf50fb9284caf1ff and later · before d7cd5ebe13989f265015910faa25e5d50faa4c22affected · git
- 5d4fa9ec5643a5c75d3c1e6abf50fb9284caf1ff and later · before ef1fb82f12186dd26153b14d9fbcf4ec98db81b3affected · git
- before 6.12not affected · semver
- 6.12.112 and later · up to and including 6.12.*not affected · semver
- 6.18.55 and later · up to and including 6.18.*not affected · semver
- 7.2.9 and later · up to and including 7.2.*not affected · semver
- 7.3 and laternot affected · original_commit_for_fix
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | linux-6.12 | before 6.12.113-1~deb12u1 | 6.12.113-1~deb12u1 |
| Debian:13 | linux | before 6.12.113-1 | 6.12.113-1 |
| Debian:14 | linux | before 7.2.9-1 | 7.2.9-1 |
Same product
linux: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-74705udp: fix potential use-after-free in tunnel segmentation40Plan
- CVE-2026-74612veth: fix skb length accounting after XDP frag adjustment40Plan
- CVE-2026-74475vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit()40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-98639Oct 18, 2026 · KVM: riscv: Fix NACL hfence entry update order0Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-98640Oct 18, 2026 · HID: amd_sfh: Validate PCI BAR size before mapping0Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-98642Oct 18, 2026 · bpf: Fix UAF due to concurrent consumption of ttrace lists in alloc_bulk0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux | b67b4c763f211e7a6391c356fef552e2ea63f08a | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | d7cd5ebe13989f265015910faa25e5d50faa4c22 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | ecdd770a9fc3eaf6c3127c5991312b84774a7b0f | Vendor (CNA) |
| Linux Linux | ef1fb82f12186dd26153b14d9fbcf4ec98db81b3 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:linux | 6.12.113-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:linux-6.12 | 6.12.113-1~deb12u1 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 7, 2026+20 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-1351 · Oct 19, 2026(Linux Kernel Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
—
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.