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NVD / CVE Program· CNA Linux

CVE-2025-37988: fix a couple of races in MNT_TREE_BENEATH handling by do_move_mount()

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 18/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.14% (FIRST EPSS).
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: Linux Linux 0d039eac6e5950f9d1ecc9e410c2fd1feaeab3b6, 4f435c1f4c48ff84968e2d9159f6fa41f46cf998, a61afd54826ac24c2c93845c4f441dbc344875b1; azl3 kernel 6.6.85.1-4 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.92.2-1; azl3 kernel 6.6.92.2-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.92.2-1.
  • Severity is disputed: the assigning authority (CNA) scores it 7.8, NVD 4.7.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to Linux Linux 0d039eac6e5950f9d1ecc9e410c2fd1feaeab3b6, 4f435c1f4c48ff84968e2d9159f6fa41f46cf998, a61afd54826ac24c2c93845c4f441dbc344875b1; azl3 kernel 6.6.85.1-4 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.92.2-1; azl3 kernel 6.6.92.2-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 6.6.92.2-1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fix a couple of races in MNT_TREE_BENEATH handling by do_move_mount() Normally do_lock_mount(path, _) is locking a mountpoint pinned by *path and at the time when matching unlock_mount() unlocks that location it is still pinned by the same thing. Unfortunately, for 'beneath' case it's no longer that simple - the object being locked is not the one *path points to. It's the mountpoint of path->mnt. The thing is, without sufficient locking ->mnt_parent may change under us and none of the locks are held at that point. The rules are * mount_lock stabilizes m->mnt_parent for any mount m. * namespace_sem stabilizes m->mnt_parent, provided that m is mounted. * if either of the above holds and refcount of m is positive, we are guaranteed the same for refcount of m->mnt_parent. namespace_sem nests inside inode_lock(), so do_lock_mount() has to take inode_lock() before grabbing namespace_sem. It does recheck that path->mnt is still mounted in the same place after getting namespace_sem, and it does take care to pin the dentry. It is needed, since otherwise we might end up with racing mount --move (or umount) happening while we were getting locks; in that case dentry would no longer be a mountpoint and could've been evicted on memory pressure along with its inode - not something you want when grabbing lock on that inode. However, pinning a dentry is not enough - the matching mount is also pinned only by the fact that path->mnt is mounted on top it and at that point we are not holding any locks whatsoever, so the same kind of races could end up with all references to that mount gone just as we are about to enter inode_lock(). If that happens, we are left with filesystem being shut down while we are holding a dentry reference on it; results are not pretty. What we need to do is grab both dentry and mount at the same time; that makes inode_lock() safe *and* avoids the problem with fs getting shut down under us. After taking namespace_sem we verify that path->mnt is still mounted (which stabilizes its ->mnt_parent) and check that it's still mounted at the same place. From that point on to the matching namespace_unlock() we are guaranteed that mount/dentry pair we'd grabbed are also pinned by being the mountpoint of path->mnt, so we can quietly drop both the dentry reference (as the current code does) and mnt one - it's OK to do under namespace_sem, since we are not dropping the final refs. That solves the problem on do_lock_mount() side; unlock_mount() also has one, since dentry is guaranteed to stay pinned only until the namespace_unlock(). That's easy to fix - just have inode_unlock() done earlier, while it's still pinned by mp->m_dentry.

MediumCVSS 4.7 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
May 20, 2025
Updated
Aug 5, 2026
EPSS
0.1% · 4th percentile

Report tools

JSON

Action score

18

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
18 / 40 · 4.7 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.1%

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
4.7
CNA · Linux
7.8
3.1 point gap

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

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  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • No public exploit code on record
  • A fix has been released

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Follow CVE-2025-37988

When you'll hear from us

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  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
linuxlinux kernel

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • linux linux kernel6.5 and later · before 6.6.89
  • linux linux kernel6.7 and later · before 6.12.26
  • linux linux kernel6.13 and later · before 6.14.5
  • linux linux kernel6.15

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Linux). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Linux Linux

    • 6.5affected
    • 6ac392815628f317fcfdca1a39df00b9cc4ebc8b and later · before 4f435c1f4c48ff84968e2d9159f6fa41f46cf998affected · git
    • 6ac392815628f317fcfdca1a39df00b9cc4ebc8b and later · before a61afd54826ac24c2c93845c4f441dbc344875b1affected · git
    • 6ac392815628f317fcfdca1a39df00b9cc4ebc8b and later · before d4b21e8cd3d7efa2deb9cff534f0133e84f35086affected · git
    • 6ac392815628f317fcfdca1a39df00b9cc4ebc8b and later · before 0d039eac6e5950f9d1ecc9e410c2fd1feaeab3b6affected · git
    • before 6.5not affected · semver
    • 6.6.89 and later · up to and including 6.6.*not affected · semver
    • 6.12.26 and later · up to and including 6.12.*not affected · semver
    • 6.14.5 and later · up to and including 6.14.*not affected · semver
    • 6.15 and laternot affected · original_commit_for_fix

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Debian:13linuxbefore 6.12.27-16.12.27-1

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

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  • CVE-2021-22555Heap Out-Of-Bounds Write in Netfilter IP6T_SO_SET_REPLACEKEV
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Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierCVE-2025-37983May 20, 2025 · qibfs: fix _another_ leak
    22Monitor
  • ← EarlierCVE-2025-37987May 20, 2025 · pds_core: Prevent possible adminq overflow/stuck condition
    22Monitor
  • Later →CVE-2025-37991May 20, 2025 · parisc: Fix double SIGFPE crash
    31Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Linux Linux0d039eac6e5950f9d1ecc9e410c2fd1feaeab3b6Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linux4f435c1f4c48ff84968e2d9159f6fa41f46cf998Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linuxa61afd54826ac24c2c93845c4f441dbc344875b1Vendor (CNA)
Linux Linuxd4b21e8cd3d7efa2deb9cff534f0133e84f35086Vendor (CNA)
azl3 kernel 6.6.85.1-4 on Azure Linux 3.06.6.92.2-1 · CBL-Mariner ReleasesMicrosoft (MSRC)
azl3 kernel 6.6.92.2-1 on Azure Linux 3.06.6.92.2-1 · CBL-Mariner ReleasesMicrosoft (MSRC)
debian:linux6.12.27-1 · Debian:13Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd-primary

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

All records