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OSV ecosystem advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0195: Unbounded namespace-declaration allocation in `NsReader` enables memory-exhaustion denial of service

HighCVSS 7.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: quick-xml (crates.io) 0.41.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to quick-xml (crates.io) 0.41.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

`NsReader` resolves namespaces by calling `NamespaceResolver::push` for every `Start`/`Empty` event *before* the event is returned to the caller. `push` iterated all `xmlns` / `xmlns:*` attributes on the start tag and, for each one, appended the prefix bytes to an internal buffer and pushed a `NamespaceBinding` (32 bytes on 64-bit) to an internal `Vec`, with no upper bound on the number of declarations. ## Impact A start tag with `N` namespace declarations drove roughly `3×` the tag's byte size in `NamespaceResolver` heap, allocated *inside* `quick-xml` before the `NsReader` consumer ever received the event and could inspect or reject it. A consumer that bounds its *input* size therefore still cannot bound this allocation: an `M`-byte start tag yields on the order of `3 × M` bytes of resolver heap the caller never sees. On untrusted XML this lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker force large heap allocations with a single start tag. With several `NsReader`s running concurrently on independent inputs (a common server pattern), the allocations stack and can exhaust process memory, causing the operating system to kill the process (OOM). This was confirmed against a real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet Labs Routinator), where concurrent RRDP validation workers parsing a crafted `snapshot.xml` exceeded the memory limit and the process was OOM-killed. ## Affected code paths Consumers using `NsReader` (which always calls `NamespaceResolver::push` before yielding `Start`/`Empty`), or calling `NamespaceResolver::push` directly. A plain `Reader` that does not perform namespace resolution is not affected. ## Remediation Upgrade to `quick-xml >= 0.41.0`. `NamespaceResolver::push` now rejects a start tag that declares more than `DEFAULT_MAX_DECLARATIONS_PER_ELEMENT` (256) namespace bindings, returning the new `NamespaceError::TooManyDeclarations` instead of allocating without limit. The limit is configurable via `NamespaceResolver::set_max_declarations_per_element` (use `usize::MAX` to restore the previous unbounded behavior), and `NsReader::resolver_mut()` is provided to reach it. There is no clean workaround for `NsReader` consumers before 0.41.0, as the allocation happens inside the reader with no configuration knob to cap it.

Published
Jun 29, 2026
Updated
Jul 2, 2026
EPSS
—
CWE
—

Report tools

JSON

Action score

30

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
crates.ioquick-xml

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.ioquick-xmlfrom 0.0.0-0 · before 0.41.00.41.0

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • RUSTSEC-2026-0194Quadratic run time when checking a start tag for duplicate attribute names
    30Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:quick-xml0.41.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
none
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
None
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

—

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

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