RUSTSEC-2026-0194: Quadratic run time when checking a start tag for duplicate attribute names
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: quick-xml (crates.io) 0.41.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to quick-xml (crates.io) 0.41.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
`BytesStart::attributes()` returns an `Attributes` iterator which, by default (`with_checks(true)`), rejects a start tag that repeats an attribute name. For each attribute yielded, the iterator compared the new name against every name seen so far in the same tag using a linear scan, so a start tag with `N` distinct attribute names cost `O(N²)` byte comparisons. There was no bound on `N` other than the size of the buffered start tag. ## Impact Any code that parses untrusted XML and iterates a start tag's attributes with the default duplicate check enabled can be made to spend CPU time quadratic in the number of attributes on a single tag. Because the check is pure computation with no `.await`/I/O, an I/O-based timeout on the consumer (for example a read or request timeout) cannot interrupt it while it runs. Measured cost of a single start tag, release build: | Attributes on one tag | Time | |---|---| | 80,000 | ~6 s | | 800,000 | ~10 min | The cost grows with the square of the attribute count, so a start tag of a few tens of megabytes can stall a parsing thread for hours. No memory is exhausted and the parser does not crash; the effect is CPU exhaustion on the thread doing the parsing: a single crafted start tag can pin a CPU core for minutes to hours, denying service to that worker. A deployment that places a wall-clock bound on parsing, or confines it to a non-critical thread, may consider the availability impact lower. ## Affected code paths * `BytesStart::attributes()` / `Attributes` iterated with checks enabled (the default), and `BytesStart::try_get_attribute`. * `NsReader`, which resolves namespaces by iterating a tag's attributes and so reaches the same check internally. Consumers that iterate attributes with `.attributes().with_checks(false)` and do not use `NsReader` are not affected. This was reported as reachable by a remote, unauthenticated attacker in a real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet Labs Routinator) via a crafted RRDP `snapshot.xml`. ## Remediation Upgrade to `quick-xml >= 0.41.0`, where the duplicate check keeps the linear scan for start tags with a small number of attributes and switches to an `O(1)` hash pre-filter above a threshold, making the whole tag `O(N)`. The reported `AttrError::Duplicated` positions are unchanged. If upgrading is not possible and duplicate-name detection is not required, disable it with `.attributes().with_checks(false)` (this does not help `NsReader` consumers, which have no equivalent opt-out before 0.41.0).
- Published
- Jun 29, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 2, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- —
Report tools
Action score
30
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
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- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | quick-xml | pkg:cargo/quick-xml |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | quick-xml | from 0.0.0-0 · before 0.41.0 | 0.41.0 |
Same product
crates.io: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- RUSTSEC-2026-0195Unbounded namespace-declaration allocation in `NsReader` enables memory-exhaustion denial of service30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:quick-xml | 0.41.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
—
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.