GHSA-xrf2-5r3p-5wgj: libcrux: Panic in Signature Hint Decoding During Verification
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: libcrux-ml-dsa (crates.io) 0.0.8.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to libcrux-ml-dsa (crates.io) 0.0.8 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
During ML-DSA verification the serialized hint values are decoded as specified in algorithm 22 `HintBitUnpack` of [FIPS 204, subsection 7.1](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.204.pdf#%5B%7B%22num%22%3A120%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22FitH%22%7D%2C657%5D). The algorithm requires that the cumulative hint counters per row of the hint vector are strictly increasing and below a maximum value which depends on the choice of ML-DSA parameter set (line 4). In libcrux-ml-dsa, hint decoding did not check the boundedness of the cumulative hint counter of the last row of the hint vector. ## Impact A manipulated invalid hint can cause an out-of-bounds memory access since the hint decoding logic may attempt to read outside the bounds of the serialized signature, causing a runtime panic. ## Mitigation Starting from version `0.0.8`, hint decoding will check the cumulative hint counter of the last row as well.
- Published
- Mar 26, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 27, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-125
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | libcrux-ml-dsa | pkg:cargo/libcrux-ml-dsa |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | libcrux-ml-dsa | from 0.0.0-0 · before 0.0.8 | 0.0.8 |
| crates.io | libcrux-ml-dsa | before 0.0.8 | 0.0.8 |
Same product
crates.io: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-fhvh-vw7h-9xf3libcrux-ml-dsa: Signature Verification on AVX2 Platforms Mishandles Edge Case0Monitor
- RUSTSEC-2026-0125Signature Verification on AVX2 Platforms Mishandles Edge Case0Monitor
- RUSTSEC-2026-0126AVX2 Implementation Did Not Fully Reduce Intermediate Values0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierRUSTSEC-2026-0076Mar 4, 2026 · Panic in Signature Hint Decoding During Verification0Monitor
- ← EarlierRUSTSEC-2026-0077Mar 4, 2026 · Incorrect Check of Signer Response Norm During Verification0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-cp57-fq8g-qh6vMar 26, 2026 · libcrux has an Incorrect Check of Signer Response Norm During Verification0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:libcrux-ml-dsa | 0.0.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-125 · Out-of-bounds ReadCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.