GHSA-cp57-fq8g-qh6v: libcrux has an Incorrect Check of Signer Response Norm During Verification
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: libcrux-ml-dsa (crates.io) 0.0.8.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to libcrux-ml-dsa (crates.io) 0.0.8 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
The ML-DSA verification algorithm as specified in [FIPS 204, subsection 6.3](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.204.pdf#subsection.6.3) requires verifiers to check that the infinity norm of the deserialized signer response $z$ does not exceed $\gamma_1 - \beta$ (line 13 of Algorithm 8). The same check is required to be performed during signature generation. libcrux-ml-dsa did not perform this check correctly during signature verification, accepting signatures with signer response norm above the allowed maximum value. The check is correctly performed during signing. ## Impact Applications using libcrux-ml-dsa for signature verification would have accepted signatures that would be rejected by a conforming implementation. ## Mitigation Starting from version `0.0.8`, signature verification uses the correct value for $\gamma_1$ in the signer response norm check.
- Published
- Mar 26, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 27, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-347
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io | libcrux-ml-dsa | pkg:cargo/libcrux-ml-dsa |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | libcrux-ml-dsa | from 0.0.0-0 · before 0.0.8 | 0.0.8 |
| crates.io | libcrux-ml-dsa | before 0.0.8 | 0.0.8 |
Same product
crates.io: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-fhvh-vw7h-9xf3libcrux-ml-dsa: Signature Verification on AVX2 Platforms Mishandles Edge Case0Monitor
- RUSTSEC-2026-0125Signature Verification on AVX2 Platforms Mishandles Edge Case0Monitor
- RUSTSEC-2026-0126AVX2 Implementation Did Not Fully Reduce Intermediate Values0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierRUSTSEC-2026-0076Mar 4, 2026 · Panic in Signature Hint Decoding During Verification0Monitor
- ← EarlierRUSTSEC-2026-0077Mar 4, 2026 · Incorrect Check of Signer Response Norm During Verification0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-xrf2-5r3p-5wgjMar 26, 2026 · libcrux: Panic in Signature Hint Decoding During Verification0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:libcrux-ml-dsa | 0.0.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-fhvh-vw7h-9xf354 days apartlibcrux-ml-dsa: Signature Verification on AVX2 Platforms Mishandles Edge Case0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ["RS256"],
issuer: "https://id.example.com",
audience: "portal",
});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.