GHSA-v2jf-442r-6mjh: nebula-mesh: Signed-poll nonce LRU is in-memory and bounded; replay survives restart + eviction
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (Go) 0.3.4.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (Go) 0.3.4 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
`internal/api/pop/nonce.go:25,40,86` + `internal/api/server.go:38` — the signed-poll nonce cache is an in-process LRU sized at 65,536 entries. `internal/api/updates.go:31` sets `pollClockSkew = 5 * time.Minute` as the replay window. ## Affected All released versions through v0.3.0 that have shipped the ADR 0004 signed-poll path. (If this is gated behind a feature flag, on a side branch, or not yet on a release tag, please flag — this advisory may not apply to the released artifact yet.) ## Threat model A captured signed-poll request can be replayed: 1. **After any process restart** — the in-memory LRU is wiped, so the original nonce becomes "unseen" again. Replay succeeds if the original timestamp is still within the 5-minute skew. 2. **After forced eviction** — an attacker with control of any single host can flood >65,536 nonces under their own host_id, driving the global LRU to evict the victim's recorded nonce. Replay then succeeds. Impact is bounded: a replayed poll fetches the `/api/v1/agent/updates` body. That body can include a freshly-minted enrollment token if a rekey is pending (`updates.go:249-260`) — at which point the attacker holds a single-use token they can redeem under their own keypair. ## Suggested fix Two options, either acceptable: 1. Persist nonces in SQLite keyed by `(host_id, nonce)` with `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, retained for the timestamp-skew window. Adds one transactional INSERT per poll; bounded by the skew window (~5 min worth of rows server-wide). 2. Per-host cap on the LRU instead of a global 65k cap, so one host cannot evict another's records. Combined with shorter skew (≤30s) to bound the post-restart replay window. Option 1 is more robust; option 2 is lower-implementation-effort.
- Published
- Jun 26, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 7, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-294
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/juev/nebula-mesh | pkg:golang/github.com/juev/nebula-mesh |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/juev/nebula-mesh | before 0.3.4 | 0.3.4 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-5815nebula-mesh: Signed-poll nonce LRU is in-memory and bounded; replay survives restart + eviction in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh0Monitor
- GO-2026-5399nebula-mesh's stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh0Monitor
- GO-2026-5191nebula-mesh: POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle response lacks Cache-Control: no-store in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-6vgg-xhvh-38ffJun 12, 2026 · nebula-mesh: POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle response lacks Cache-Control: no-store0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmfJun 22, 2026 · nebula-mesh's stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/juev/nebula-mesh | 0.3.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-294 · Authentication Bypass by Capture-replayCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Session SidejackingCAPEC-102likelihood: High · High
- KerberoastingCAPEC-509High
- Remote Services with Stolen CredentialsCAPEC-555Very High
- Windows Admin Shares with Stolen CredentialsCAPEC-561
- Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)CAPEC-60likelihood: High · High
- Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash)CAPEC-644likelihood: Medium · High
- Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket)CAPEC-645likelihood: Low · High
- Use of Known Kerberos CredentialsCAPEC-652likelihood: Medium · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Remote ServicesT1021
- Remote Services:SMB/Windows Admin SharesT1021.002
- Email Collection:Remote Email CollectionT1114.002
- External Remote ServicesT1133
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass The HashT1550.002
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass The TicketT1550.003
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557
- Steal or Forge Kerberos TicketsT1558
- Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets:KerberoastingT1558.003
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS2.5 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.