GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf: nebula-mesh's stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (Go) 0.3.2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (Go) 0.3.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
`internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245` — the `enrollment_tokens.token` column holds the raw UUID token. `ConsumeToken` does `WHERE token = ?` against the raw string. Compare with `operator_api_keys.key_hash`, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in `internal/api/middleware.go:51-53`). ## Affected All released versions up to v0.3.0. ## Threat model Read access to `nebula-mgmt.db`: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens — which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host's identity — are not. An attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent's intended Nebula identity. ## Suggested fix 1. Schema migration: rename `enrollment_tokens.token` → `token_hash` (or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows). 2. Store SHA-256 of token on create: ```go sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) ``` 3. `ConsumeToken` accepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed. Side bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from `uuid.New().String()` (122 bits) to `hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes)` (256 bits), matching the project's session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in. TOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (`internal/web/totp.go:74-78`) — confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.
- Published
- Jun 22, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 25, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-312
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/juev/nebula-mesh | pkg:golang/github.com/juev/nebula-mesh |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/juev/nebula-mesh | before 0.3.2 | 0.3.2 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-5815nebula-mesh: Signed-poll nonce LRU is in-memory and bounded; replay survives restart + eviction in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh0Monitor
- GHSA-v2jf-442r-6mjhnebula-mesh: Signed-poll nonce LRU is in-memory and bounded; replay survives restart + eviction0Monitor
- GO-2026-5399nebula-mesh's stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-6vgg-xhvh-38ffJun 12, 2026 · nebula-mesh: POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle response lacks Cache-Control: no-store0Monitor
- Later →GO-2026-5191Jun 25, 2026 · nebula-mesh: POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle response lacks Cache-Control: no-store in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/juev/nebula-mesh | 0.3.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-312 · Cleartext Storage of Sensitive InformationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS5.5 → —
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.