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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-ghmh-jhmj-wcmf: nebula-mesh's stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (Go) 0.3.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (Go) 0.3.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

`internal/store/sqlite.go:1177,1192,1221,1245` — the `enrollment_tokens.token` column holds the raw UUID token. `ConsumeToken` does `WHERE token = ?` against the raw string. Compare with `operator_api_keys.key_hash`, which is SHA-256 hex (constructed in `internal/api/middleware.go:51-53`). ## Affected All released versions up to v0.3.0. ## Threat model Read access to `nebula-mgmt.db`: backup, snapshot, file-system access, future SQL-injection sink. The principle of defense-in-depth: API keys are hashed at rest; enrollment tokens — which grant the same lifecycle authority over a host's identity — are not. An attacker who reads the DB before a legitimate agent enrolls can consume the single-use token first, mint a cert against their own keypair, and take the agent's intended Nebula identity. ## Suggested fix 1. Schema migration: rename `enrollment_tokens.token` → `token_hash` (or add the new column and drop the old after backfill of pending rows). 2. Store SHA-256 of token on create: ```go sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) row.TokenHash = hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]) ``` 3. `ConsumeToken` accepts the raw token, hashes once, looks up by hash, atomically marks consumed. Side bonus: take this opportunity to switch the token format from `uuid.New().String()` (122 bits) to `hex.EncodeToString(crypto/rand 32 bytes)` (256 bits), matching the project's session-token and API-key conventions. UUIDs are recognisable in logs and crash dumps; opaque hex blends in. TOTP recovery codes appear to already be SHA-256 hashed at rest (`internal/web/totp.go:74-78`) — confirming that pattern is intentional elsewhere, just missed here.

Published
Jun 22, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
Gogithub.com/juev/nebula-mesh

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/juev/nebula-meshbefore 0.3.20.3.2

Same product

Go: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GO-2026-5815nebula-mesh: Signed-poll nonce LRU is in-memory and bounded; replay survives restart + eviction in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh
    0Monitor
  • GHSA-v2jf-442r-6mjhnebula-mesh: Signed-poll nonce LRU is in-memory and bounded; replay survives restart + eviction
    0Monitor
  • GO-2026-5399nebula-mesh's stores enrollment tokens unhashed in SQLite in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh
    0Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

  • ← EarlierGHSA-6vgg-xhvh-38ffJun 12, 2026 · nebula-mesh: POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle response lacks Cache-Control: no-store
    0Monitor
  • Later →GO-2026-5191Jun 25, 2026 · nebula-mesh: POST /api/v1/hosts/{id}/mobile-bundle response lacks Cache-Control: no-store in github.com/juev/nebula-mesh
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Go:github.com/juev/nebula-mesh0.3.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

Show all references (1 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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