GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp: OpenClaw's dashboard leaked gateway auth material via browser URL/query and localStorage
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 28/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: openclaw (npm) 2026.3.7.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to openclaw (npm) 2026.3.7 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
OpenClaw's macOS Dashboard flow exposed Gateway authentication material to browser-controlled surfaces. Before the fix, the macOS app appended the shared Gateway `token` and `password` to the Dashboard URL query string when opening the Control UI in the browser. The Control UI then imported the token and persisted it into browser `localStorage` under `openclaw.control.settings.v1`. This expanded exposure of reusable Gateway admin credentials into browser address-bar/query surfaces and persistent script-readable storage. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version verified vulnerable: `2026.3.2` - Affected range: `<= 2026.3.2` - Patched version: `>= 2026.3.7` ## Impact An attacker with access to browser-controlled surfaces or persistent browser storage could recover a valid Gateway admin token and reuse it against the OpenClaw management interface. The exposure chain was: 1. macOS `Open Dashboard` constructed a URL with auth material. 2. The browser received that credential-bearing URL. 3. The Control UI imported the token from the URL. 4. The Control UI persisted the token in `localStorage`. ## Fix The fix aligns the macOS Dashboard flow with the safer existing CLI/bootstrap pattern and removes persistent browser token storage: - macOS Dashboard now passes the Gateway token via URL fragment instead of query parameters. - macOS Dashboard no longer propagates the shared Gateway password into browser URLs. - Control UI keeps Gateway tokens in memory only for the current tab. - Control UI scrubs legacy persisted tokens from `openclaw.control.settings.v1` on load. - Regression tests cover fragment transport, password omission, and token-scrubbing behavior. ## Fix Commit(s) - `10d0e3f3ca92326df0ca071fabffe463742f263c` (March 7, 2026) ## Release Process Note npm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package. Thanks @whiter6666 for reporting.
- Published
- Mar 9, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 9, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-200
Report tools
Action score
28
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 28 / 40 · 7.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | pkg:npm/openclaw |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | openclaw | before 2026.3.7 | 2026.3.7 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvhOpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval35Monitor
- GHSA-474h-prjg-mmw3OpenClaw: Sandboxed sessions_spawn(runtime="acp") bypassed sandbox inheritance and allowed host ACP initialization32Monitor
- GHSA-56f2-hvwg-5743OpenClaw affected by SSRF in Image Tool Remote Fetch30Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-3jx4-q2m7-r496Mar 4, 2026 · OpenClaw: Hardlink alias checks could bypass workspace-only file boundaries in specific configurations0Monitor
- ← EarlierGHSA-jjgj-cpp9-cvpvMar 4, 2026 · OpenClaw Vulnerable to Local File Exfiltration via MCP Tool Result MEDIA: Directive Injection0Monitor
- Later →GHSA-6rmx-gvvg-vh6jMar 9, 2026 · OpenClaw's hooks count non-POST requests toward auth lockout21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:openclaw | 2026.3.7 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- GHSA-jjgj-cpp9-cvpv5 days apartOpenClaw Vulnerable to Local File Exfiltration via MCP Tool Result MEDIA: Directive Injection0Monitor
- GHSA-9f72-qcpw-2hxc6 days apartOpenClaw: Native prompt image auto-load did not honor tools.fs.workspaceOnly in sandboxed runs0Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-200 · Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized ActorCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv
Root cause
The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-200 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
{
"permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],
"background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }
}Fixed
{
"permissions": ["activeTab"],
"host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- ExcavationCAPEC-116likelihood: High · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
- FootprintingCAPEC-169likelihood: High · Very Low
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- FingerprintingCAPEC-224likelihood: High · Very Low
- ICMP Echo Request PingCAPEC-285likelihood: Medium · Low
- TCP SYN ScanCAPEC-287Low
- Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) RecordsCAPEC-290Low
ATT&CK techniques
- System Service DiscoveryT1007
- System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1016
- Remote System DiscoveryT1018
- System Owner/User DiscoveryT1033
- Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.005
- Network Service ScanningT1046
- System Network Connections DiscoveryT1049
- Process DiscoveryT1057
- Permission Groups DiscoveryT1069
- System Information DiscoveryT1082
- File and Directory DiscoveryT1083
- Account DiscoveryT1087
- Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionT1111
- Peripheral Device DiscoveryT1120
- System Time DiscoveryT1124
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.