GHSA-r3r4-g7hq-pq4f: CometBFT allows a malicious peer to stall the network by disseminating seemingly valid block parts
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Fixed version: github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 1.0.1, 0.38.17.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 1.0.1, 0.38.17 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
Name: ASA-2025-002: Malicious peer can stall network by disseminating seemingly valid block parts Component: CometBFT Criticality: High (Catastrophic Impact; Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md)) Affected versions: <= v0.38.16, v1.0.0 Affected users: Validators, Full nodes, Users ### Description A bug was identified in the CometBFT validation of block part indices and the corresponding proof part indices that can lead to incorrect processing and dissemination of invalid parts, which in turn could lead to a network halt. Additional validation was added to prevent this condition from happening. ### Patches The new CometBFT releases [v1.0.1](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v1.0.1) and [v0.38.17](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v0.38.17) fix this issue. Unreleased code in the main branch is patched as well. ### Workarounds There are no known workarounds for this issue. If a node is producing these malicious proofs, the only mitigation is to upgrade CometBFT. After upgrading, the validators then will eventually conclude the correct value. ### Technical Deep-Dive When the next proposer creates a block, it is split into many block parts (64kB each). Each block part is then disseminated via p2p layer in a gossip fashion. The block part contains the following fields: ```go type Part struct { Index uint32 `json:"index"` Bytes cmtbytes.HexBytes `json:"bytes"` Proof merkle.Proof `json:"proof"` } ``` - `Index` - represents the index of a block part - `Bytes` - the actual content - `Proof` - Merkle proof, which allows the receiving node to quickly verify that a `Part` is indeed a piece of the proposed block. The `Proof` contains the following fields: ```go type Proof struct { Total int64 `json:"total"` // Total number of items. Index int64 `json:"index"` // Index of item to prove. LeafHash []byte `json:"leaf_hash"` // Hash of item value. Aunts [][]byte `json:"aunts,omitempty"` // Hashes from leaf's sibling to a root's child. } ``` Note that the total number of leaves in the Merkle tree equals the number of parts in the proposed block. Previously, CometBFT did not validate the `Index` field and specifically that `Part.Index` must be equal to `Part.Proof.Index`. This leads to a condition where, it is possible to use the proof from a different part and CometBFT accept it, even though the proof proves the different part is a piece of the proposed block and not the part that the peer actually sent to us. This condition is problematic because: 1. it would disseminate the invalid block part to its neighboring nodes (because it deemed it as correct) 2. it would mark the block part as received and ask the neighboring nodes not to relay it in the future, making it impossible to receive the correct block part. To address this, CometBFT was patched to verify that `Part.Index` is equal to `Part.Proof.Index`, preventing the above condition. ### Timeline * January 15, 2025, 12:12pm PST: Issue reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty program * January 15, 2025, 12:31pm PST: Issue triaged by Amulet on-call, and distributed to Core team * January 27, 2025, 11:28pm PST: Core team completes validation of issue * January 31, 2024, 2:15pm PST: Pre-notification delivered * February 3rd, 2024, 9:00am UTC+4: Patch made available This issue was reported by [unknown_feature](https://github.com/unknownfeature) to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on January 15, 2025. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos. If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io). For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the CometBFT [repository](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-r3r4-g7hq-pq4f). For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/.
- Published
- Feb 3, 2025
- Updated
- Feb 5, 2025
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-345
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | pkg:golang/github.com/cometbft/cometbft |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | from 1.0.0-alpha.1 · before 1.0.1 | 1.0.1 |
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | before 0.38.17 | 0.38.17 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-4361Inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- GHSA-c32p-wcqj-j677CometBFT has inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived0Monitor
- GO-2025-4025CometBFT's invalid BitArray handling can lead to network halt in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGHSA-p7mv-53f2-4cwjNov 6, 2024 · CometBFT Vote Extensions: Panic when receiving a Pre-commit with an invalid data0Monitor
- ← EarlierGO-2024-3259Nov 20, 2024 · CometBFT Vote Extensions: Panic when receiving a Pre-commit with an invalid data in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- Later →GO-2025-3443Feb 4, 2025 · CometBFT allows a malicious peer to stall network by disseminating valid-looking block parts in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft | 0.38.17 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft | 1.0.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
No CVSS vector for this record, so attack conditions can't be derived.
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-345 · Insufficient Verification of Data AuthenticityAttack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)CAPEC-111likelihood: High · High
- Cache PoisoningCAPEC-141likelihood: High · High
- DNS Cache PoisoningCAPEC-142likelihood: High · High
- Content SpoofingCAPEC-148likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML MessagesCAPEC-218Medium
- Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-MiddleCAPEC-384Low
- Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API ManipulationCAPEC-385Medium
- Application API Navigation RemappingCAPEC-386Medium
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.