GHSA-p7mv-53f2-4cwj: CometBFT Vote Extensions: Panic when receiving a Pre-commit with an invalid data
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 0.38.15.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/cometbft/cometbft (Go) 0.38.15 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
Name: ASA-2024-011: Vote Extensions: Panic when receiving a Pre-commit with an invalid data Component: CometBFT Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md)) Affected versions: `>= 0.38.x`, unreleased `v1.x` and `main` development branches Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators ### Impact A CometBFT node running in a network with [vote extensions][abci-spec] enabled could produce an invalid `Vote` message and send it to its peers. The invalid field of the `Vote` message is the `ValidatorIndex`, which identifies the sender in the `ValidatorSet` running that height of consensus. This field is ordinarily verified in the processing of `Vote` messages, but it turns out that in the case of a `Vote` message of type `Precommit` and for a non-`nil` `BlockID`, [a logic was introduced](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/blame/46621a87064b2ae235e122e66d9b22417b3aa35e/internal/consensus/state.go#L2357-L2364) before this ordinary verification to handle the attached vote extension. This introduced logic (not present in releases prior to `0.38.x`) does not double-check the validity of the `ValidatorIndex` field. The result is a panic in the execution of the node receiving and processing such message. #### Impact Qualification This condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node sending this `Vote` message to its peers. Namely, nodes running upstream code cannot produce invalid `Vote` messages, with non-existing `ValidatorIndex`. Moreover, networks utilizing default behavior, where vote extensions are not enabled, are not affected by this issue. ### Patches The new CometBFT release [`v0.38.15`][v0.38.15] fixes this issue. Unreleased code in the `main` and `v1.x` branches, and experimental code in the `v0.38-experimental` and `v1.x-experimental` branches are patched as well. ### Workarounds When the consensus code panics after receiving an invalid `Vote` message, the operator can identify the peer from which that message was received. This may require increasing the logging level of the `consensus` module. This peer can then be subsequently banned at the p2p layer as a temporary mitigation. ### References - [ABCI spec][abci-spec], in particular the operation of vote extensions - [Patched v0.38 release][v0.38.15] [abci-spec]: https://docs.cometbft.com/v0.38/spec/abci/abci++_basic_concepts [v0.38.15]: https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v0.38.15 ### Timeline * October 21, 2024, 3:26pm PST: Issue reported to the Cosmos Bug Bounty program * October 21, 2024, 3:41pm PST: Issue triaged by Amulet on-call, and distributed to Core team * October 29, 2024, 11:35pm PST: Core team completes validation of issue * October 30, 2024, 3:33am PST: Core team completes patch for issue * October 30, 2024, 5:09am PST: Amulet creates coordination plan; schedule for distribution * November 4, 2024, 8:00pm GMT: Pre-notification delivered * November 6, 2024, 8:00am GMT: Patch made available This issue was reported by [corverroos](https://github.com/corverroos) to the Cosmos Bug Bounty Program on HackerOne on October 21, 2024. If you believe you have found a bug in the Interchain Stack or would like to contribute to the program by reporting a bug, please see https://hackerone.com/cosmos. If you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io). For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security. A Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the CometBFT [repository](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-p7mv-53f2-4cwj). For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/.
- Published
- Nov 6, 2024
- Updated
- Sep 2, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-129
Report tools
Action score
0
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 0 / 40 · —
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | pkg:golang/github.com/cometbft/cometbft |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/cometbft/cometbft | from 0.38.0 · before 0.38.15 | 0.38.15 |
Same product
Go: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GO-2026-4361Inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- GHSA-c32p-wcqj-j677CometBFT has inconsistencies between how commit signatures are verified and how block time is derived0Monitor
- GO-2025-4025CometBFT's invalid BitArray handling can lead to network halt in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierGO-2024-2951Jul 2, 2024 · Denial of service when syncing with a malicious peer in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- ← EarlierGO-2024-3112Sep 13, 2024 · CometBFT's state syncing validator from malicious node may lead to a chain split github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
- Later →GO-2024-3259Nov 20, 2024 · CometBFT Vote Extensions: Panic when receiving a Pre-commit with an invalid data in github.com/cometbft/cometbft0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/cometbft/cometbft | 0.38.15 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-129 · Improper Validation of Array IndexCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
osv
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (2)
- Fix✗ → ✓
- CVSS8 → —
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (6 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.