GHSA-qxvg-h7q2-hcxh: motionEye: LFI → pass‑the‑hash admin → unsafe restore → unauth action exec (RCE)
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 39/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: motioneye (PyPI) 0.44.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to motioneye (PyPI) 0.44.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
## Summary A multi‑stage chain in motionEye leads to remote code execution. The chain combines: 1. **Arbitrary file read (LFI)** via the picture download endpoint for **local motion cameras** using absolute paths. 2. **Pass‑the‑hash admin auth** due to accepting request signatures computed with password hashes. 3. **Unsafe config restore** that extracts attacker‑controlled tarballs into `CONF_PATH`. 4. **Unauthenticated action execution** via `/action/<id>/<action>`. If the **normal user password is unset**, the chain becomes **unauthenticated RCE**. If a normal password exists, a **normal user** can still achieve **admin escalation and RCE**. --- ## Affected Code (motionEye repo) ### 1) LFI (absolute path) — `picture/<id>/download` **Files:** - `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/picture.py` → `download()` (local motion camera branch) - `motioneye/motioneye/mediafiles.py` → `get_media_content()` **Issue:** `get_media_content()` only blocks `..` and then joins `target_dir` with `path`. Absolute paths (e.g. `/etc/hosts`) bypass the join and are read directly. ### 2) Pass‑the‑hash admin auth **File:** `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/base.py` → `get_current_user()` **Issue:** The signature check allows signatures computed using the **admin password hash** (SHA1) as the key. If the hash is leaked (via LFI), admin access can be obtained without the plaintext password. ### 3) Unsafe restore (tar extraction) **File:** `motioneye/motioneye/config.py` → `restore()` **Issue:** `tar zxC CONF_PATH` is used on user‑supplied data without sanitizing entries. A crafted tar can drop executable files into `CONF_PATH`. ### 4) Unauthenticated action execution **File:** `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/action.py` → `post()` **Issue:** No authentication decorator is present. It executes `<action>_<camera_id>` found in `CONF_PATH` with `subprocess.Popen`. --- ## Exploit Chain (Detailed) 1. **Create or find a local motion camera id** (local motion cameras are required for the vulnerable LFI path). 2. **LFI via picture download**: - Request: `/picture/<id>/download/<absolute_path>` - Example: `/picture/1/download/%2Fetc%2Fhosts` - Result: Arbitrary file read. 3. **Read admin hash** from `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`: - Contains `@admin_password <SHA1_HASH>`. 4. **Pass‑the‑hash admin**: - Compute signature for `/config/restore?_username=admin` using the **hash** as key. - Admin access is accepted with hash‑based signatures. 5. **Restore malicious tar**: - Upload a tar containing `lock_<id>` (or any action) as an executable. - File is written into `CONF_PATH` by restore. 6. **Trigger unauth action**: - POST `/action/<id>/lock` - The server executes the injected file. --- ## Proof of Execution (Observed Output) In local testing, the injected action created a marker file: ``` /tmp/meye_rce_ok ``` Verification command: ``` docker exec -it motioneye ls -la /tmp | grep meye_rce_ok ``` Example output: ``` -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 ... /tmp/meye_rce_ok ``` --- ## Preconditions / Requirements - At least **one local motion camera** exists (e.g., `netcam_url`, `videodevice`). - `picture/<id>/download` is reachable: - **Unauth** if `@normal_password` is empty (default in some installs). - **Auth required** if normal password is set (attacker needs normal creds). --- ## Impact - **Unauth RCE** (normal password unset). - **Authenticated RCE** (normal user → admin → RCE). - Arbitrary file read on server filesystem. - Full compromise of motionEye process account. --- ## Suggested Fixes 1. **Block absolute paths** in `get_media_content()` and `get_media_path()`. 2. **Remove hash‑based signature acceptance**; only accept signatures computed with plaintext passwords. 3. **Harden restore**: reject absolute paths, `..`, symlinks, non‑regular files. 4. **Require authentication** on `ActionHandler` (admin‑only).
- Published
- Jun 23, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 23, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-22
Report tools
Action score
39
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI | motioneye | pkg:pypi/motioneye |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | motioneye | before 0.44.0 | 0.44.0 |
Same product
PyPI: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-phv5-334h-mxcwmotionEye Partial Authentication Bypass: Unauthenticated Admin Credential Theft via Path Traversal0Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI:motioneye | 0.44.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
osv
Root cause
A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-22 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);
res.sendFile(file);Fixed
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);
if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {
return res.sendStatus(400);
}
res.sendFile(file);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Path TraversalCAPEC-126likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.