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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-qr9h-x63w-vqfm: OpenMLS improper persistence of the secret tree during message processing

Medium—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: openmls (crates.io) 0.7.1.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to openmls (crates.io) 0.7.1 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary A bug in the OpenMLS library prevented private key material from being updated in storage during message processing. The key material in question are the keys stored in the MLS secret tree, which are used for decryption of private MLS messages. The effects of the bug are limited in scope, but can affect forward secrecy and limit how many messages can be decrypted. ### Technical details #### Scope The scope of the bug is limited to private messages (application and handshake messages) received in groups. Furthermore, the scope is limited to one epoch and the effects are reset with each epoch transition, or through consecutive group operations without reloading group state in between. #### Functional impact Within each epoch of a group, there is a maximum number of private messages per sender that can be skipped before an error is thrown. The number of messages is set through maximum_forward_distance in the SenderRatchetConfiguration and the default value is 1000. The bug causes the library to think that private messages have been processed, even when that's not the case. This can cause an error to be returned during message processing. #### Security impact This bug can be exploited only if an adversary gains access to the client’s state. The risk for exploitation is thus relatively low in typical use cases. The bug can be exploited to decrypt more messages than intended by the client. The number of additional messages that can be decrypted is limited to the number of messages that can be skipped, which is maximum_forward_distance. This means that if an adversary gains access to a client’s state, they can decrypt up to maximum_forward_distance additional messages per sender in the current epoch. This affects forward secrecy, as messages that were previously considered secure can be decrypted. OpenMLS otherwise deletes message encryption keys as soon as an epoch ends if not otherwise configured via the `max_past_epochs` setting. This is still the case even in vulnerable versions. ### Affected versions Vulnerable: all versions up to and including version 0.7.0 Not vulnerable: all versions greater than and including version 0.7.1 (see below for security after upgrading from a vulnerable version to a secure one) ### Mitigation Message encryption secrets are deleted when a commit is merged, i.e. when the group transitions to the next epoch. If the client is not configured to retain message secrets for past epochs, messages decrypted in past epochs are thus secure. If past message secrets are retained, messages decrypted in past epochs are secure as soon as the relevant epoch leaves the retention window. Increasing update/commit frequency can thus help keep the window for compromise low. Another way to mitigate the effect is to create a private message (application or handshake message) for each sender of previously received messages. It is important to do that with the same MlsGroup object, withpout reloading it from storage in between. This will ensure that the message encryption keys are updated correctly. ### Security post-patch Since the bug affects persisted state, patching by itself strictly speaking doesn’t solve the issue. State written prior to patching is still vulnerable. An affected client is fully healed from the effects of this bug as soon as it either enters the next epoch (by merging a commit), or, if message encryption key retention is configured, by advancing sufficiently many epochs for pre-patch epoch state to drop out of the retention window. Additionally, the client is healed even before the next epoch, if it processes enough messages s.t. any messages decrypted pre-patch fall out of the window for out-of-order tolerance. This is 5 by default, but can be configured to an arbitrary number using the `sender_ratchet_configuration` setting during group creation. ### Acknowledgements We would like to thank [Ege Erdogan](https://github.com/erdoganege) and [Fatih Ergin](https://github.com/fatihergin) for reporting this issue.

Published
Sep 26, 2025
Updated
Sep 26, 2025
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
crates.ioopenmls

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.ioopenmlsbefore 0.7.10.7.1

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:openmls0.7.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
  • Administrator privileges are required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
High
User interaction
P

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Root cause

The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

json
{  "permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],  "background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }}

Fixed

json
{  "permissions": ["activeTab"],  "host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]}

References

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Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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