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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-8x3w-qj7j-gqhf: openmls has improper tag validation

High—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: openmls (crates.io) 0.7.2.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to openmls (crates.io) 0.7.2 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

Membership and confirmation tags may not be checked correctly due to a missing length check. Any tag that is shorter than the expected tag, but matches up to its length, as well as any empty tag is considered valid. ### Impact The vulnerability affects a secondary authentication guarantee that MLS provides in certain scenarios. The primary authentication guarantee for all messages comes from the signature on MLS messages. This guarantee is *not* affected by the vulnerability. The secondary authentication attests to the group membership of the message author. For MLS private messages, it is implied in the AEAD. For MLS public messages, it is expressed as the ‘membership tag’, a MAC whose key is derived from the private group state only known to group members. In addition, for public Commit messages, the ‘confirmation tag’ works in a similar manner. Its purpose is to help members who processed the Commit message to ascertain that they now have the same view on the group as the creator of the Commit message for both the private and public group state. The vulnerability lets an attacker create MLS messages with a truncated tag that are considered valid nonetheless. The vulnerability does not affect the primary authentication guarantees of MLS, but breaks post-compromise security (PCS) of the MLS authentication guarantees. As a consequence, an adversary that has compromised a member’s signature key can create valid-looking proposals even after the affected member has successfully updated its key material. However, this is only possible in applications where the following conditions are met: - The application uses public MLS messages (i.e. it has not restricted the wire format type to private MLS messages only), and - the application supports proposals by reference (aka standalone proposals). Note that, in deployments that allow external Commits, an attacker in possession of a member’s signature key can insert itself into the group without having to forge a membership tag. ### Patches There are two ways to mitigate the issue: - Upgrade to openmls v0.7.2: This minor release includes a fix for the issue and bumps the libcrux dependencies. This release does not contain any breaking changes from v0.7.1. - Upgrade to openmls v0.8.0: This release contains the fix, as well as other improvements. The list of changes is in [CHANGELOG.md](https://github.com/openmls/openmls/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md). Some of the changes are breaking API changes.

Published
Feb 4, 2026
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
crates.ioopenmls

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.ioopenmlsbefore 0.7.20.7.2

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-qr9h-x63w-vqfmOpenMLS improper persistence of the secret tree during message processing
    0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:openmls0.7.2Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • Administrator privileges are required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:H/SA:L

osv

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

References

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