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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-q855-8rh5-jfgq: ha-mcp: Add-on settings and policy routes are reachable without authentication at the bare root path

MediumCVSS 6.5 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • Fixed version: ha-mcp (PyPI) 7.10.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to ha-mcp (PyPI) 7.10.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary In add-on mode, the ha-mcp settings UI routes are mounted both under the MCP secret path **and** at the bare root of the published port (`:9583`), so Home Assistant ingress can serve the "Open Web UI" button. The root-mounted routes perform no authentication — no secret, no `Origin` check, no CSRF token — so any client that can reach `:9583` without the MCP secret can invoke them. ### Affected configurations Home Assistant **add-on** installations (`host_network: true` with port `9583` published), v7.6.0 and earlier. Docker and standalone installs are **not** affected — there the settings routes are mounted only under the secret path. Root-mounted routes in affected versions: tool visibility (`/api/settings/tools` GET/POST), feature flags (`/api/settings/features` GET/POST), the auto-backup suite (`/api/settings/backups…` incl. restore/delete, and `/api/settings/backup-config`), add-on restart (`/api/settings/restart`), and — when the opt-in Tool Security Policies feature is enabled — the approval-policy API (`/api/policy/config` GET/PUT, `/api/policy/approve`, `/api/policy/deny`, …). ### Impact Without authentication, a caller that reaches `:9583` — a peer on the local network, a reverse proxy/tunnel that forwards the bare root path (e.g. a whole-host Cloudflared config), or a CSRF `POST` from a page open in a LAN browser — can read or change which MCP tools are exposed, toggle feature flags, list/view/restore/delete backups, restart the add-on, and (with Tool Security Policies enabled) read and rewrite the approval policy, disabling the human-approval gate on gated tools. There is **no** access to Home Assistant data, entities, or credentials, and no code execution. All effects are confined to the add-on's own configuration and lifecycle and are recoverable. The primary (same-LAN) vector is within the add-on's documented trusted-network model; remote reachability requires the operator to have reverse-proxied the bare port. ### Proof of concept With the add-on running and reachable on `:9583`, from any host that can reach the port without the secret: ``` GET /api/settings/tools -> 200 (read tool config, no auth) POST /api/settings/tools {"states":{}} -> 200 (rewrite tool config, no auth / no CSRF token) POST /api/settings/restart -> 200 (restart the add-on) ``` The MCP endpoint itself remains correctly protected by the secret path. ### Patch Fixed in PR homeassistant-ai/ha-mcp#1508 (merged to `master`): the root-mounted add-on routes are restricted to Home Assistant ingress, which always originates from the Supervisor (`172.30.32.2`); every other caller receives `403`. Direct and remote access continue to use the settings UI under the MCP secret path (`…/<secret>/settings`), so the "Open Web UI" button, Cloudflared, and the Webhook Proxy add-on are unaffected. The fix will ship in the next stable add-on release. If you'd rather have it now, it is already on the dev channel (add-on dev build ` 7.6.0.dev393` or later) — optional; there's no need to switch channels just for this, it is a fairly low risk surface and only exposes the web UI for addon mode only. ### Severity `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` = 6.4 (Moderate). Confidentiality impact is None — tool config and backups are not secrets or credentials; integrity and availability impacts are Low — configuration changes and an add-on restart are recoverable. ### Credit Reported by @bharat.

Published
Jul 7, 2026
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
EPSS
—

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Action score

26

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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VendorProduct
PyPIha-mcp

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIha-mcpbefore 7.10.07.10.0

Same product

PyPI: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • GHSA-g39v-cvjh-8fpfHome Assistant MCP Server: YAML config backups written under www/ are served unauthenticated at /local/
    26Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:ha-mcp7.10.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
low · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
low · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
Low
Availability impact
Low

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

osv

Root cause

A function added for development or support ships to production without authentication. It often relies on the assumption that it is “only reachable from the internal network.”

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
// Added for the support teamapp.post("/maintenance/reset", resetDevice);

Fixed

ts
if (config.maintenanceEnabled) {  app.post(    "/maintenance/reset",    requireSession, requireRole("admin"), resetDevice  );}

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

All records